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Abstract 
This research examines corruption offences in public investment in Vietnam. An 
important part of the research is to examine and evaluate effectiveness and 
accountabilities of anti-corruption in public investment in Vietnam, including the 
Government Inspectorate of Vietnam, the People’s Procuracy of Vietnam and the 
People’s Public Security Forces of Vietnam based on their functions, powers and 
responsibilities. 
The aim of this research was to examine corruption and criminal behaviour in 
public investment in Vietnam, to identify practical policies, models and strategies for the 
purpose of improving the capacities and effectiveness of anti-corruption in public 
investment in Vietnam. 
The overall objective of this research was to research the corruption offences in 
public investment in Vietnam; to evaluate the effectiveness and accountabilities of anti-
corruption in public investment in Vietnam, including the Government Inspectorate of 
Vietnam, the People’s Procuracy of Vietnam and the People’s Public Security Forces of 
Vietnam based on their functions, powers and responsibilities; and to analyse corruption 
offences in public investment in terms of organisational structures and criminal behaviour 
to identify practical recommendations to enhance the success in combating corruption in 
public investment in Vietnam. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was 
employed in this study. The research has implications for anti-corruption commission 
policy makers and researchers in Vietnam. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 discusses the background of Vietnam from a multitude of perspectives, 
including history, culture, economy, and more specifically, public investment, corruption 
in public investment, anti-corruption agencies and the history and limitations of anti-
corruption law in Vietnam. This chapter then states the research problem, the aim of the 
research, research objectives and research questions. The chapter then introduces the 
research design and outlines the remainder of the thesis. 
1.1 Background of Vietnam 
This thesis offers a study of corruption cases and law enforcement in the context 
of public investment in Vietnam. Plenty of authors have provided definitions of 
corruption (Bardhan, 2018; McMann, Pemstein, Seim, Teorell & Lindberg 2016). 
Karklins (2016) defined that corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for private 
benefits. The misuse of the entrusted power has a negative impact on the economic 
development. My thesis is mainly based on the definition of Karklins. It is widely known 
that corruption is a not a new phenomenon as it happens all over the world. Therefore, 
there should be solutions which help battle corruption especially in the area of public 
investment. Though corruption is harmful to the economic development in Vietnam, there 
is the dearth of research about this topic. This study investigates corruption activities 
which are taking place in Vietnam in the context of public investment as well as suggests 
solutions to remediate this issue. 
Vietnam is a country with many differences in politics, economy, society and 
history as compared with other countries (Kervliet, 2018). Because of the differences in 
the nature of Vietnamese society, given the aim of studying corruption cases and law 
enforcement in public investment, this study starts by discussing the historical, cultural 
and economic situation of Vietnam, then moves to a discussion of public investment in 
Vietnam’s economy and corruption in public investment. An understanding of anti-
corruption agencies in Vietnam, the history of anti-corruption in Vietnam and the 
statement of the problem will assist in anti-corruption in public investment in Vietnam. 
Vietnam is situated in the centre of Southeast Asia, on the eastern margin of the 
Indochinese peninsula. It borders the People’s Republic of China to the north, Lao PDR 
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and the Kingdom of Cambodia to the west, the East Sea and the Pacific Ocean to the 
southeast. Vietnam has a long coastline of 3,260 km and a land border with a total length 
of 4,510 km. On the mainland, Vietnam’s territory stretches over 1,650 km from north to 
south (as the crow flies). The widest lengths from the easternmost point to the 
westernmost point in the northern and southern parts of the country are approximately 
600 km and 400 km, respectively. The narrowest part of the country is around 50 km in 
width (Quang Binh) (Lap, 1999). With a population of over 92.7 million, Vietnam is one 
of Southeast Asia’s most densely populated countries  (Vu, Oh, Bui & Le, 2016). 
 
Figure 1: Map of Vietnam  
Source: Atlat (2019) 
1.1.1 Historical Background 
Vietnam’s history commenced with a thousand years of northern domination, 
from 111 BC to 938 AD. In 938, Ngo Quyen defeated the invading forces of the southern 
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Han state of China on Bach Dang River and brought independence and freedom to the 
nation. Following that, Vietnam’s feudal system developed rapidly, along with a massive 
expansion of the territory to the south. In the mid-19th century, the country came under 
French colonial rule and became part of the French Indochinese Federation, together with 
Lao PDR and the Kingdom of Cambodia (Truong, Phan & Nguyen, 1997). 
After the Democratic Republic of Vietnam expelled French colonialists in 1954, 
Vietnam was divided into two halves: the North (or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) 
followed communism, while the South (or the Republic of Vietnam) was established with 
financial aid from the US. War continued until April 1975, the time of national 
reunification (Truong, Phan & Nguyen, 1997). 
1.1.2 Cultural Background 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2012), 
Vietnam has a vibrant and diversified culture. The Kinh community and 53 other ethnic 
communities have strong, age-old customs, with many meaningful festivals, strong 
religious beliefs, tolerance of different religious doctrines, and thoroughness and 
metaphor in language, literature and arts (both traditional and modern). 
Vietnamese culture has been heavily influenced by Chinese, Indian and Western 
civilisations, and this is shown through its language, Sino-Nom script (ancient script of 
the country), political system, religions and arts. 
Vietnam experienced a long history of war with plenty of invaders. These invaders 
brought in their own culture and different ways of life, which explains why prolonged 
wars throughout the country’s history formed a vibrant culture for the whole country 
(Truong, Phan & Nguyen, 1997). Life and culture are imbued with Confucianism, which 
has had impacts on the lifestyle and socio-economic development in Vietnam (Truong, 
Phan & Nguyen, 1997). 
1.1.3 Economic Background 
In 1986, Vietnam started renovation towards a free-market economy, not 
dissimilar to those officially introduced in the People’s Republic of China under Deng 
Xiaoping in the late 1970s (Gainsborough, 2004). The renovations were called ‘Doi Moi’, 
which translates as Vietnam opening its doors to the world. The communist party in 
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Vietnam introduced Doi Moi at the Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986. 
The leaders of the Communist Party of Vietnam considered it a novel policy, necessary 
both for the economic development of the country and for innovation in politics and 
society, to meet the future developmental needs of the nation (London, 2014). The change 
of leadership carried out at the Congress commenced the termination of the era of the 
revolutionaries who had emphasised stability in society (Ishikawa, 2003). 
After many years of war, following the Doi Moi (reform) period in 1986, the 
Vietnamese economy has experienced much change (Nguyen, 2016; Pringle, 2016). ‘Doi 
Moi’ was a comprehensive reform program that covered economics and many other 
aspects of social life (Clarke, Akbari, & Far, 2017).  
Nguyen (2017) argued that economic reform needs to go hand in hand with reform 
in other areas, such as administration, politics, culture and education. However, politics 
in Vietnam have failed to change in the dramatic and rapid manner shown by the 
economy. Reform in Vietnam took place along two dimensions: ‘bottom up’ (from the 
grassroots level) and ‘top down’ (from the party and the state). Because of this, the Doi 
Moi period in Vietnam did not experience conflicts between the grassroots level and the 
upper level, or huge shocks due to the adoption of rigid and voluntarist macroeconomic 
policies and measures by the central government (Nguyen, 2017). 
During Doi Moi, free-market reforms were implemented, resulting in a transition 
from a centrally planned to a socialist-oriented market economy (Nguyen, 2016; Pringle, 
2016). The reform focused on moving to independence of state-owned enterprises in the 
economy and in finance; price liberalisation (moving from centrally determined to 
market-determined prices); ownership diversification (encouraging the private sector); 
encouragement of foreign investment; strengthening both agricultural incentives and 
institutional support for agriculture; and fundamental reform of the financial system 
(Gainsborough, 2004). 
Doi Moi significantly changed Vietnam’s economy, resulting in rapid 
improvements in agriculture, construction and accommodation, industrial production, 
exports and investment in Vietnam from other countries (Ni, 2016; Pham, 2018). Vietnam 
officially became a member of the WTO in 2007, which has provided a legal framework 
to increase trade between Vietnam and other countries (Nguyen et al., 2017; Ni, 2016). 
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Vietnam is a development success story in terms of economic transformation. 
Political and economic reforms have transformed the country from one of the poorest 
countries in the world to having lower middle-income status within 20 years (World 
Bank, 2019). Per capita income increased from USD 231 in 1985 to 2,564 in 2018 
(Macrotrends, 2019). The average growth rate of the GDP had reached 6.4% by the 2000s, 
but has since slowed because of the global financial and economic crisis. However, 
despite a high rate of inflation, the economy regained its position, to stabilise at 6.8% 
growth per year by 2010 (General Statistics Office cited in Nguyen & Kazantseva, 2015). 
Though GDP growth declined in some periods after 2010, it increased again during the 
first half of 2015. Vietnam has successfully improved its macroeconomic stability 
(Macrotrends, 2019). 
However, Vietnam’s economic development has not encompassed other social 
issues, resulting in a number of challenges in a variety of areas; in particular, these include 
corruption, especially in public investment (World Bank, 2019). 
1.1.4 Public Investment in Vietnam’s Economy 
Public investment is one of the most important socio-economic development 
policies of any state, but especially for countries in transition to and development of a 
market economy, such as Vietnam (Anwar & Nguyen, 2010). 
Public investment is investment of the state sector and consists of not only 
government investment but investment by local authorities, investment in government 
bonds, investment credit granted by development banks and investment by state-owned 
enterprises (Do, 2011). The Public Investment Law adopted by the National Assembly in 
2014 defines public investment as state investment in socio-economic infrastructure 
projects as well as programs and projects for socio-economic development. Public 
investment funds come from the state budget, national government bonds, municipal 
bonds, official development assistance and preferential loans from foreign donors, 
development investment credit of the state, investment capital from revenues retained for 
investment but not yet included in the state budget balance and local authorities’ loans 
for investment (Anwar & Nguyen, 2010). 
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According to Tang, Tan & Ozturk (2016), the business community is centred on 
mobilising capital from the state budget, socialised capital and other sources of capital to 
develop technical infrastructure systems. Accordingly, important traffic works, irrigation 
works, new rural areas, electricity infrastructure, information and communication 
infrastructure, renovation and construction of urban infrastructure, industrial parks, 
hospitals, schools, cultural and sport facilities and national target programs have made 
significant contributions to creating positive changes in technical facilities, boosting 
economic restructuring and production capacity, and improving urban life as well as 
Vietnam’s socio-economic development. 
Despite the positive contributions of public investment to infrastructure and 
economic development in Vietnam, according to Anwar & Nguyen (2010), management, 
allocation and use of the state budget funds are among the areas most vulnerable to 
corruption because of the large number of projects and huge amount of state investment 
capital. This has resulted in general distrust of the political system and erosion of the 
country’s credibility in the eyes of international donors. Thus, corruption in public 
investment is currently one of the key hindrances to sustainable development in Vietnam. 
1.1.5 Anti-corruption in Asia and Vietnam 
According to Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), many countries in Asia are heavily affected by corruption (see Table 1). Only nine 
nations have CPI scores over 50, with New Zealand regarded as least corrupt. 
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Table 1: Countries in Asia Pacific by CPI Score, 2018 
CPI Score* Countries 
80–100 New Zealand (87), Singapore (85) 
70–79 
Australia (77), Hong Kong SAR (76), Japan 
(73) 
60–69 
Bhutan (68), Taiwan (63), Brunei Darussalam 
(63) 
50–59 South Korea (57) 
0–49 
Malaysia (47), Vanuatu (46), Solomon Islands 
(44), India (41), China (39), Indonesia (38), 
Sri Lanka (38), Mongolia (37), the Philippines 
(36), Thailand (36), Timor-Leste (35), 
Pakistan (33), Vietnam (33), Maldives (31), 
Nepal (31), Laos (29), Myanmar (29), Papua 
New Guinea (28), Bangladesh (26), Cambodia 
(20), Afghanistan (16) and North Korea (14) 
Transparency (2018). 
Note: * The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score varies from 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (clean). To be 
able to be encompassed in the CPI, a nation has to conduct three questionnaires on the perception of the 
public sectors related to corruption. 
There is no doubt that Vietnam is seriously affected by corruption. Why are 
Singapore and Hong Kong more successful in fighting corruption than other nations in 
Asia? The following section explores responses to this question. 
1.1.5.1 Patterns of Corruption Control in Asian Countries 
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Table 2: Patterns of Corruption Control in 27 Asian Countries 
Pattern Features Countries 
1 Implementing anti-corruption Japan, Papua New Guinea (2) 
 laws without an ACA  
2 Reliance on multiple ACAs to Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan, 
 implement anti-corruption laws Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam (7) 
3 
Reliance on a single ACA to 
implement anti-corruption laws Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, 
  Brunei Darussalam, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
  
Maldives, Thailand, Macau SAR, 
South 
  
Korea, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Bangladesh, 
  Bhutan, Mongolia, Timor-Leste, 
  Cambodia, Myanmar (18) 
Source: Combating Corruption in Asian Countries 101: Advice for Policy Makers (Quah, 2017a). 
Nations in Asia use three mechanisms of corruption control based on the quantity 
of anti-corruption sectors employed to publicise anti-corruption policies (see Table 2). 
The first mechanism for carrying out anti-corruption policies, with no reliance on an anti-
corruption sector, is implemented in Japan and Papua New Guinea. According to the UN 
(2004), Japan has not signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption, since it 
is unwilling to set up an anti-corruption sector (as stipulated in Articles 6 and 36) in 
substitution for special investigation departments, which tend to be ineffective (Quah, 
2017a). The Japanese government seems to lack the will to tackle corruption, perhaps 
because it underestimates the structural corruption in the existing system (Quah, 2017a). 
The second mechanism, which is relevant to Vietnam, involves a dependence on 
a multitude of anti-corruption sectors to place corruption under severe control. The last 
and best-known mechanism, which depends on a single anti-corruption body, was started 
by Singapore with the establishment of a bureau in charge of investigating corruption in 
1952, and reproduced in 1974 with the establishment of the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption in Hong Kong. Singapore’s success in the establishment of the above 
bureau has helped minimise corruption and contributed to the growth of nearly 150 
sectors against corruption around the world (UNDP, 2012). 
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1.1.5.2 Factors Behind Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s Success 
Table 3: Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s Performance on Corruption Indicators 
Indicator Singapore Hong Kong SAR 
Control of Corruption 2015 2.1 (97.1) 1.7 (92.3) 
PERC Survey of Corruption 2016 1st/16 (1.67/10) 4th/16 (3.40/10) 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 7th/176 (84/100) 15th/176 (77/100) 
Diversion of Public Funds 2016 3rd/138 (6.2/7) 12th/138 (5.9/7) 
Irregular Payments & Bribes 2016 3rd/138 (6.7/7) 12th/138 (6.3/7) 
Organised Crime 2016 7th/138 (6.4/7) 18th/138 (6.0/7) 
Ethical Behaviour of Firms 2016 3rd/138 (6.2/7) 17th/138 (5.5/7) 
Public Trust in Politicians 2016 1st/138 (6.4/7) 21st/138 (4.6/7) 
Source: Quah (2017b)and  Transparency International (2017) 
Table 3 shows Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s performance in the eight indicators 
stipulated for corruption by Quah (2017b). History shows that corruption was present in 
these two countries after World War II, but is no longer a concern. There are many factors 
behind Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s success in fighting corruption. 
The success of the two nations in fighting corruption comes from the vigorous 
will of their political leadership. It is clear that Singapore faced serious corruption 
problems, as the government at that time had a shortage of ‘political will’, which caused 
them to make two tremendous mistakes in terms of policy when formulating anti-
corruption strategies. The first mistake was establishing the department in charge of 
controlling corruption under the supervision of police, while police corruption was 
rampant. On perceiving this mistake, the British colonial government established a 
separate bureau in charge of investigating deeds related to corruption in October 1952 
(Quah, 2017b). 
The second mistake made by the British colonial government was that they failed 
to infuse sufficient power, funding and human resources into the bureau in charge of 
investigating deeds related to corruption. The bureau started with only one director and 
12 officers, and was hence ineffective in fighting police corruption (Quah, 2017b). 
Realising these mistakes, the People’s Action Party government retained the bureau in 
charge of investigating deeds related to corruption as an independent body, but 
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strengthened its power and enhanced funding and human resources (Quah, 2017b). Table 
4 shows the increases in funding and human resources. 
Table 4: CPIB Budget and Personnel, 2008–2015 
CPIB 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 
Budget (in millions) US$11.2 US$14.7 US$20.3 US$29.3 US$26.8 
Personnel 86 90 138 205 232 
Per capita expenditure US$2.32 US$2.90 US$3.82 US$5.36 US$4.87 
Staff–population ratio 1:56,163 1:56,408 1:38,496 1:26,682 1:23,858 
Source: Quah (2017b; p. 10) 
Another crucial reason that explains why Hong Kong and Singapore succeeded in 
combating corruption was that the bureau in charge of investigating corruption worked in 
close collaboration with the Independent Commission Against Corruption, to severely 
punish anyone found guilty of corruption no matter his or her current position, status or 
political affiliation. It is this policy that has helped to investigate five leaders from the 
People’s Action Party and eight civil servants in Singapore. 
Singapore and Hong Kong have been successful in lessening corruption because 
of their methods of handling complaints relevant to corruption. The bureau in charge of 
investigating deeds relevant to corruption has used the so-called ‘total method’ to handle 
cases (grand and petty) related to the corruption in public and private sectors and other 
crimes (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). Bertrand de Speville, the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption Commissioner from 1992–1997, indicated that the 
commission was successful in obtaining public confidence by ensuring that all reports 
relating to corruption, minor or major, had to be under investigation and kept confidential 
(Quah, 2017b). At the same time, according to Doig (2013), Hong Kong succeeded in 
combating corruption because it improved significantly in four areas: will to fight 
corruption, strong human resources fighting corruption, a diverse society with 
independent media agencies and NGOs, and the establishment of an Independent 
Commission in charge of combating corruption initiating a sound programme against 
corruption. 
Painter (2014) presented a different story. According to Painter (2014), “In the 
case of borrowing and transplantation of anti-corruption success stories, several of the 
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most commonly recommended templates originate from some of Vietnam’s neighbours, 
in particular Hong Kong and Singapore”, p. 275. Hong Kong and Singapore as specified 
by Painter (2014) are the two developing countries in Asia which seriously fights 
corruption. Political will is the factor which determines the success stories of these two 
countries.  
1.1.5.3 Anti-Corruption in Vietnam 
Since the 1986 Doi Moi, the Vietnamese government has been in agreement that 
corruption has a serious influence on many parts of the economy, including decreasing 
GDP, causing labour income instability and contributing to impoverishing the country 
(Do, 2011).  Duong (2015) noted that nationwide corruption has led to integrity loss in 
the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP).  
The VCP has recently made major efforts to fight corruption. In 2011, the VCP 
Central Committee organised a Fourth Meeting to formulate a programme of assessment 
and self-assessment of all members of the Party to help prevent any deeds related to 
corruption (East Asia Forum, 2012). In 2012, the Fifth Meeting continued the launching 
of that programme, with many changes (East Asia Forum, 2012). The meeting asked for 
improvement in the legal framework against corruption, and the renewed law against 
corruption has stricter regulations (East Asia Forum, 2012); for instance, the law regulates 
clear conduct disclosure of personal assets, transparency in doing business, responsibility 
of the government, protection plans for unlawful deeds, and freedom of access to 
information (East Asia Forum, 2012). 
According to East Asia Forum (2012), the Vietnamese government has been 
determined in the launching of a new anti-corruption programme every year. Deputy 
Prime Minister and deputy director of the Central Steering Committee on Anti-
Corruption, Truong Vinh Trong, has indicated that corruption is a serious and complex 
issue affecting investment in construction and management of land, assets and property 
(Hong-Nguyen, 2017). The VCP regards corruption as a serious issue that could 
influenced the continued survival of the party. It particularly emanates from government 
corporations and economic groups who are sponsored by the government (Lê, 2013), as 
these target groups are dominant in areas such as improvement of banking and property. 
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Novel solutions to deal with this challenging task are required, with the involvement of 
many levels; of course, it cannot be dealt with in the short term (Hong-Nguyen, 2017). 
The VCP will combat corruption via the use of all strategic methods and policies; 
however, its validity and effectiveness are still in doubt (Vietnam Law & Legal Forum, 
2012). The VCP’s efforts will depend on the effectiveness of the law enforcement system, 
specifically sectors against corruption. The dominance of media and civil society deter 
them from demonstrating corruption (Tromme, 2016). It is not easy to secure sufficient 
proof and authority to dismiss corrupt officials, especially when they have high positions 
in the party (Vietnam Law & Legal Forum, 2012). 
The shortage of components in the law has failed to protect citizens who witness 
and report corrupt deeds (Johnston, 2011). The government is passive in investigating the 
reasons why corruption is still increasing, even though they are committed to reducing it 
(East Asia Forum, 2012). In addition, there are unrealistic efforts to instigate mechanisms 
to combat corruption from Vietnamese and foreign donors (Sandgren, 2005). 
Responsibility and transparency are required for the efficient functioning of 
efforts to minimise corruption, but they will only function if government representatives 
know they will be dismissed if people’s requirements fail to be met. However, there are 
no free and fair elections in Vietnam, so competitiveness is ignored. All decisions come 
from higher authorities. For example, competition in education in Vietnam is unfair, with 
many scandals related to examinations and the buying of grades plus fake certificates and 
degrees. 
As a consequence, the lack of effort to combat corruption is a threat to the survival 
of the VCP. The need for continued measures to combat corruption can adversely affect 
the government (Ha & Hanh, 2012). With the political situation in Vietnam, corruption 
will remain regardless of efforts made in terms of deterrence of crime (Nguyen, Doan, 
Nguyen & Tran-Nam, 2016). Higher pay would help to partly eliminate corruption in 
government sectors; however, the facts show that higher pay causes a rise in corruption. 
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1.1.6 Corruption in Vietnam’s Public Investment 
Corruption has led to serious problems in construction works. Because of 
widespread corruption, several construction works, such as bridges, streets and buildings, 
have been below standards and the Vietnamese people have suffered (World Bank, 2013). 
For Vo (2015), corruption is the prime factor working against improvement of the 
economy of Vietnam. In public investment, corruption has led to heavy damage to and 
erosion of public assets (World Bank, 2013). Despite the fact that economies have been 
growing and cost of living has been improving, corruption remains and is a matter of 
concern in many nations (Olken & Pande, 2012). In the field of public investment, 
corruption has been a major factor diminishing the quality of investment projects (World 
Bank, 2012). 
1.1.6.1 Construction Projects 
Construction projects funded by the state budget have one characteristic in 
common: when projects are finalised, the value of final settlement is often based on 
estimates; that is, changes in value are not considered. Taking advantage of this 
characteristic, investors often query design agencies to overestimate some materials used 
for items hidden deep underground, in rivers and lakes, in projects involving levelling, 
dredging and embankment, with volumes of tens of thousands of cubic metres. Such 
corruption leads to losses and erosion worth billions of dong (Trinh, 2009). 
According to Trinh (2009), design consulting agencies can help investors corrupt 
billions of dong easily, while at the same time, ensuring the safety coefficients of works. 
For example, design consultants may bring investors billions of dong in corruption in a 
levelling project covering 5 ha (50,000 m2) by raising the filling and levelling volume and 
changing construction method. Apart from these tricks, design consulting agencies have 
other means to corrupt state money, such as applying the wrong unit prices for materials, 
giving unclear specifications on the quality and standards of the materials to be used but 
then applying the highest possible unit prices for the materials in the estimation. 
1.1.6.2 Bidding and Investment 
According to sociological survey results (Congly, 2017), interviewed public 
employees said that when their units are engaged in bidding and investment activities, 
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many bids win as a result of collusion between their employer and their ‘favourite’ 
contractor – the contractor selected from among those participating in the tender 
(Thanhtra, 2018). Many contractors have shared that the bidding process was not 
transparent, as corruption was in place from the beginning of the project, with the 
contractor and the employer having a secret agreement to share the commission between 
parties. The approval and announcement of the project’s bidding plan are only a formality 
(Government Inspectorate Report, 2016). 
Survey results from the Vietnam report (2014), show that although petty 
corruption has decreased, corruption in bidding and investment has increased over the 
years. Up to 42% of enterprises paid commissions to relevant officials to secure contracts 
with state agencies, a sharp increase over 2013. 
According to the current regulations of the Vietnam report (2014), construction 
and installation packages valued at over VND 1 billion (USD44,632,86) are required to 
be open to public bidding. This is to ensure that the selection of contractors is transparent 
and to minimise corruption in state-funded construction projects through the selection of 
contractors (Government Inspectorate Report, 2016). However, in reality, investors and 
consulting agencies accountable for selecting contractors operate fraudulently and take 
advantage of legal loopholes to ensure their backyard enterprises win the bidding 
(Government Inspectorate Report, 2016). 
The Government Inspectorate Report (2016) stated that corruption in the 
investment sector poses a serious problem. 
1.1.6.3 Construction Practice 
Construction is based on what contractors have to perform under contracts with 
investors to make products (items and works) according to designs that can be used 
efficiently. Dr. Le Thanh Van, Member of the Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly’s Committee for Finance and Budget, Member of the National Assembly, 
Session XIII (Le, 2013), said that corruption in the construction process is becoming ever 
more complicated and involving better workmanship. For the loose parts, the size and 
geometric features of the works are basically the same as their technical designs; however, 
the majority of the items and practices that are hidden or difficult to inspect have materials 
reduced in volume or quality by contractors. 
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Corruption in public investment is having a negative impact on Vietnam’s growth. 
To evaluate the main underlying reasons for corruption, this study next provides an 
overview of anti-corruption in Vietnam (anti-corruption agencies and law in Vietnam). 
1.1.7 Anti-corruption Agencies in Vietnam 
According to the 2012 anti-corruption law, Vietnam has the following anti-
corruption agencies: the Anti-Corruption Bureau under the Government Inspectorate, the 
Department for Investigation of Corruption Crime under the Ministry of Public Security, 
and the Department for Prosecution Practice and Investigation of Corruption Cases under 
the Supreme People’s Procuracy. 
1.1.7.1 The Anti-Corruption Bureau Under the Government Inspectorate 
The Anti-Corruption Bureau (under the Government Inspectorate of Vietnam) 
was established under Decision No.1424 / QD-TTG dated 31 October 2006 of the Prime 
Minister of Vietnam with the mission of assisting the Government Inspectorate of 
Vietnam in performing state management of corruption prevention and combating; 
performing the tasks and with powers of inspection against corruption according to the 
Government Inspectorate headquartered in Hanoi. 
1.1.7.2 The Department for Investigation of Corruption Crimes Under the Ministry of 
Public Security 
The Department for Investigation of Corruption Crimes under the Ministry of 
Public Security is responsible for assisting the Director General, heads of agencies and 
investigating police under the Ministry of Public Security in directing and guiding the 
police involved in the investigation of economic crimes and corruption throughout the 
country to take measures to prevent, detect, investigate and handle economic crimes and 
corruption, and for direct involvement in the investigation of economic crimes and 
corruption cases in accordance with the law and the order of National Assembly of 
Vietnam (2018). 
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1.1.7.3 The Department for Prosecution Practice and Investigation of Corruption Cases 
Under the Supreme People’s Procuracy 
The Department for Prosecution Practice and Investigation of Corruption Cases 
has the responsibility for prosecuting corruption offences and supervising the 
investigation and proceedings of corruption cases (Vov, 2018). 
1.1.8 History of Anti-corruption Law in Vietnam 
The Anti-Corruption Ordinance was promulgated by the Standing Committee of 
the National Assembly in 1998, amending and supplementing some articles in 2000. It is 
the essential legal basis for the fight against corruption (Vov, 2018). The ordinance 
focuses mainly on ‘anti-corruption’ based on the regulations on applying penalties for 
corruption crimes and dealing with corrupted assets. With the enforcement of the Anti-
Corruption Ordinance in 1998 and other legal documents such as the Criminal Code 
(2009), the Ordinance on Thrift Practice and Wastefulness Combat and the Ordinance on 
Cadres and Civil Servants, the fight against corruption was initially successful. However, 
the implementation of the provisions of the Anti-Corruption Ordinance in this period 
revealed many shortcomings and did not meet the requirements of the process of 
integration and development (Vov, 2018). 
Addressing the limitations of the 1998 Anti-Corruption Ordinance, the anti-
corruption law approved by the 11th National Assembly at its 8th Session on 29 
November 2005 and put into force on 1 June 2006 is considered a new tool for the fight 
against corruption. The 2005 Anti-Corruption Law (revised and supplemented in 2007 
and 2012) upholds the idea of corruption prevention, with 48 out of 92 articles stipulating 
this (Thanhtra, 2016). 
In addition, the Government and Prime Minister have promulgated many decrees, 
decisions and directives to concretise the Resolution of the Party Central Committee’s 
3rd plenum (the 10th plenary session), the anti-corruption law, the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy to 2020 and the plan of implementing the UN Convention against 
Corruption (Decision No. 445 / QD-TTG, 2010). 
Law and ordinance development programs of the National Assembly and the 
National Strategy for Preventing and Fighting against Corruption are in place until 2020. 
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The plan for implementing the convention consists of basic content such as population 
and dissemination of the convention’s material and legislation on the regulations to meet 
the requirements of the convention (Thuvienphapluat, 2009). The roadmap for the 
implementation of the convention is categorised into three phases with specific objectives 
and activities as follows (Thuvienphapluat, 2009). 
Phase I, 2010–2011: The aim is to organise, implement and assign relevant 
agencies to ensure comprehensive implementation of the convention on a large scale and 
supplement details and guide the appropriate agencies to perfect anti-corruption 
provisions in line with the convention and with the plan for the anti-corruption strategy 
implementation. The specific activities are as follows: studying and reviewing the legal 
provisions on anti-corruption to provide detailed guidance and suitable amendments and 
supplements to the convention as well as practical requirements on anti-corruption. Other 
initiatives include assigning organisations and agencies to monitor and implement anti-
corruption policies, enforcing the promulgated solutions and stipulations on corruption 
prevention and fighting, inspecting and making preliminary evaluations of the 
implementation, and expanding cooperation and collaboration with other convention 
member countries, to exchange information and experience on organisation and adoption 
of effective anti-corruption measures, means and tools. 
Phase II, 2011–2016: This phase involves a preliminary assessment of each of the 
convention implementation measures and necessary supplementation to perfect anti-
corruption laws. Specific activities to be implemented include evaluating the performance 
of the first phase of plan implementation in association with reviewing 10 years of 
enforcement of the anti-corruption law to complete the law and supplement new 
measures, adjusting the organisation and operation of anti-corruption specialised agencies 
to meet development requirements, studying the anti-corruption experience of other 
countries in a selective manner and gradually applying these to suit the conditions of 
Vietnam. 
Phase III, 2016–2020: This phase includes a comprehensive review of the 
implementation of the convention, supplementing mechanisms, improving organisations, 
and improving the quality and effectiveness of anti-corruption work. Specific activities 
will be based on the review of 10 years of implementation of the anti-corruption law and 
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the experiences of other countries with significant anti-corruption achievements, to 
recommend novel measures that suit the developmental situation of Vietnam. 
1.1.9 The Limitations of Anti-corruption Law in Vietnam 
According to Government Report No. 429 (Thanhtra, 2016), after 10 years of 
implementation of the anti-corruption law, there has been many positive and important 
accomplishments, making a contribution to the improvement of the effectiveness of state 
management, improving the business environment and realising socio-economic 
development goals. However, the corruption situation remains complex (Bai, 
Jayachandran, Malesky, & Olken, 2017; Lobez, Statnik & Vu, 2018), few corruption 
cases have been brought to light and dealt with, many cases have been prolonged, final 
judgements are yet to be serious enough and the recovery of corrupted assets remains low, 
which together arouses social anxiety and suspicion of the state’s commitment to anti-
corruption (Thanhtra, 2016). 
The eight limitations outlined in the 10-year Anti-corruption Report from 2005 to 
2015 (2016) are as follows: 
First, regulations on publicity and transparency are yet to be sufficiently 
comprehensive, and there is a shortage of measures to ensure the implementation of the 
regulations. 
Second, the regulations on accountability are not suitable and remain narrow (only 
applicable to decisions and acts that directly affect the legitimate rights and interests of 
individuals and organisations), making enforcement difficult in reality. 
Third, there is yet to be comprehensive regulations on measures for controlling 
conflicts of interest among officials, public servants and civil servants, which may lower 
the effectiveness of corruption prevention and detection. 
Fourth, regulations on handling leaders of the agencies, organisations or units 
where corruption takes place are not specific or encouraging enough for leaders to be 
more proactive in preventing and detecting acts of corruption. 
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Fifth, regulations on asset and income transparency have not been useful in 
controlling changes in assets and income. The handling of dishonest declarants or of the 
unreasonable declaration of changes in assets and income has not proven efficient yet. 
Sixth, regulations on corruption detection mechanisms through state inspection, 
auditing and supervision are neither suitable nor helpful in promoting the roles and 
functions of each agency. 
Seventh, provisions on and settlement of denunciations are still incomplete but 
must encourage the participation of people in reporting corruption. 
Eighth, the position, role and relationship between the anti-corruption law and 
other legal documents have not been clearly defined, which leads to different ways of 
interpreting and enforcing the law and lack of measures to penalise organisations and 
individuals violating the provisions of the anti-corruption law. 
Earlier studies have noted the impacts of corruption in public investment on the 
economy, but are yet to provide a clear view on the anti-corruption legal system, which 
has caused difficulties for corruption detection in Vietnam’s public investment. 
With the aim of providing a more transparent and in-depth view of the impact of 
public investment on Vietnam’s development, this study provides arguments as well as a 
theoretical framework that demonstrate inefficiencies in the fight against corruption in 
public investment, and points out the rooted causes for this situation: the institutions, 
culture and anti-corruption legislation in Vietnam. The last part of the study offers a 
conclusion and policy recommendations. 
1.1.10 Statement of the Problem 
Many studies on the impacts of corruption on public investment have been 
conducted, to explore the relationships between corruption in public investment and the 
growth of a nation. TanZi and Davoodi (1998) focus on the analysis of the relationships 
between corruption, public investment and economic growth. Through quantitative 
measurement and analysis of data collected from many countries, these two authors drew 
the conclusion that corruption increases lead to a bigger scale and smaller efficiency of 
public investment, and this is proven through indicators of public infrastructure quality 
reduction. Baliamoune-Lutz, Ndikumana and Uneca (2008) conducted a study assessing 
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the impact of corruption on economic growth through its effects on public and private 
investment. According to Cooray, Dzhumashev and Schneider (2017), corruption is the 
cause of increased public debt. Vietnam has borrowed heavily to cover construction of 
public works (public investment), so corruption in this area will have a significant impact 
on Vietnam’s public debt (Tapchitaichinh, 2018). Regarding the economic impacts of 
corruption, an important study by Tran Huu Dung (Ueb, 2014) dealt with the effects of 
corruption on public investment and economic development. The policy discussion 
entitled ‘Institutional reform, mechanisms and solutions to improve and restructure the 
public investment’ by Nguyen Duc Thanh and Dinh Tuan Minh (Ueb, 2014) also 
demonstrated that the public investment structure remains inappropriate and supervision 
and transparency are not high. These are the main factors causing ineffective public 
investment. 
1.2 Aim of Research, Research Objectives and Research Questions 
The aim of this research is to examine Vietnam anti-corruption laws, with a 
particular focus on public investment. It investigates barriers and makes 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption in Vietnam. 
To achieve the research aims, two research objectives have been formulated: 
Research objective 1: Evaluation of the effectiveness and accountability of anti-
corruption in public investment in Vietnam, including the Government Inspectorate of 
Vietnam of Vietnam, the People’s Procuracy of Vietnam and People’s Public Security 
Forces based on their functions, powers, and responsibilities. 
Research objective 2: Analysis of corruption offences in public investment 
regarding organisational structures of public officers in government to identify practical 
recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of combating corruption in public 
investment in Vietnam. 
To achieve these two objectives, the research explores the following research 
questions: 
Research Question 1: What are the causes of corruption in public investment in 
Vietnam? 
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Research Question 2: What are the challenges, difficulties and barriers to 
policies tackling corruption in public investment in Vietnam? 
Research Question 3: What are the solutions required to improve anti-corruption 
effectiveness in public investment in Vietnam? 
The paper focuses on anti-corruption policy and law in Vietnam, and identifying 
the reasons why the process of corruption detection and investigation is ineffective. 
1.3 Research Design 
As noted above, previous studies have identified some causes and effects of 
corruption in public investment in Vietnam, including the influence of corruption on 
investment growth and the quality of public investment. These factors were also discussed 
in this study, to determine their impact on public investment in Vietnam. However, this 
study differs from previous studies by applying an approach based on the effectiveness 
of anti-corruption policy and law in the fight against corruption. 
Central to this study is the influence of culture and institutions on the effectiveness 
of anti-corruption law. Interviews were conducted with staff working for the police force 
and procuracy agencies in areas relating to investigating and prosecuting crimes 
associated with corruption in the field of public investment. These survey results from 
staff working in the Government Inspectorate, police and procuracy agencies were 
analysed to supplement the understanding of the factors affecting the effectiveness of the 
law in the fight against corruption in Vietnam. The results of this study are then used to 
make appropriate recommendations to improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption in 
public investment in Vietnam. 
This thesis employed different research methods, including document analysis, 
interviewing investigators and prosecutors dealing with corruption cases in public 
investment (a qualitative method) and surveys (a quantitative method), to explore the 
efficiency of enforcing anti-corruption law in public investment in Vietnam. 
1.4 Outline of Chapters 
The study consists of nine chapters: 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of Vietnam (geography, economics and 
culture) and provides an overall look at Vietnam’s economy and the situation of public 
investment in Vietnam. In particular, this chapter analyses the impacts of corruption on 
public investment in Vietnam, discusses the reasons for choosing this topic, the objectives 
of the thesis, research objectives and research questions. Finally, the chapter describes 
the theoretical framework and research methods selected. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the literature on corruption issues in the public investment 
sector. The first section lists types of corruption. The second section reviews existing 
research on corruption, including institutional theories of corruption. Then, it clarifies the 
economic impact of corruption. The next section explains the culture of corruption and 
the consequence of political corruption; how trust relates to corruption in post-communist 
Vietnam. The following section provides literature on corruption in Vietnam generally 
and in public investment. Finally, this chapter provides an understanding of Vietnam’s 
anti-corruption forces. 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
This chapter aims to present the proposed research direction for the study, 
including research philosophy, research strategy and the methodology for approaching 
and detailing an implementation plan. This study is divided into two phases: the first 
comprises desk research, conducted to collect reputable information related to corruption 
and the anti-corruption legal system in Vietnam, while the second outlines the research 
design and various approaches adopted in this research to address the research questions. 
There are three phases of this research. Phase 1 concerns the document content analysis 
(covered in Chapters 4 and 5). Phase 2 concerns interview design and survey techniques 
(covered in Chapters 5 and 6). Phase 3 offers a synthesis (covered in Chapter 7). 
Chapter 4 Corruption in Public Investment in Vietnam 
This chapter discusses the corruption situation in the region and in Vietnam, and 
describes the past history of corruption in public investment in Vietnam. 
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Chapter 5 Anti-corruption Law Analysis in Vietnam 
Desk research (document content analysis) is the research methodology used in 
this chapter to review Vietnam’s legal regulations on anti-corruption. Limitations of 
Vietnamese law in fighting corruption are also revealed. 
Chapter 6 Interview Design, Analysis and Outcome 
This chapter presents the interview design and explains the cause of the weakness 
in the enforcement process of anti-corruption agencies and bodies. First, the chapter 
emphasises the qualitative research interview methodology. Following that, it describes 
the preparation before the interview, and techniques and observations during and after the 
interview. 
The second part of the chapter discusses the research findings and addresses the 
research questions based on collected responses of the interviews conducted with seven 
participants with more than ten years working for the government in charge of crime and 
corruption investigation and prosecution. The three major corruption case studies raised 
in the interviews are Duong Chi Dung in 2013, Bui Tien Dung in 2007 and Huynh Ngoc 
Sy in 2010. First, we provide a short background on these three corruption cases, then 
introduce the interviewees, including their positions and years of experiences. The final 
section provides data analysis discussing the three main themes emerging from the 
collected data. 
Chapter 7 Survey Design, Analysis and Outcome 
This chapter explores the survey technique for the evaluation of the enforcement 
of anti-corruption policies and law in public investment in Vietnam. This chapter provides 
an overview of the three anti-corruption commissions, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of anti-corruption laws. Chapter 7 focuses on demonstrating the research 
findings after the data collection process, and gives a brief introduction to the three anti-
corruption commissions and their functions. 
Chapter 8 Synthesis 
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This chapter summarises results and data obtained from the document analysis 
(Chapter 5), interviews (Chapter 6) and survey (Chapter 7) and addresses the research 
questions. 
Chapter 9 Conclusion 
This chapter summarises the whole process of conducting this research and the 
results obtained. Based on the results, the author outlines the contributions of the thesis 
regarding theory and practice and points out limitations. Finally, recommendations for 
future research are made. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on corruption, particularly in the public 
investment sector. This chapter comprises three parts. The first part describes corruption 
types, the second discusses the purpose of corruption and the last provides detailed 
information about corruption in Vietnam. 
This chapter provides corruption types such as grand corruption, petty corruption 
and political corruption. The next section reviews the purpose of corruption, based on 
institutional theories of corruption. It clarifies the economic impact of corruption, and 
further, explains the relationship between a culture of trust and corruption, the culture of 
corruption and institutional theory and the consequences of political corruption, and how 
trust is related to corruption in post-communist Vietnam. Finally, the chapter provides an 
understanding of corruption in Vietnam. 
2.2 Corruption Types 
To better comprehend the concept of corruption, many authors have provided 
descriptions of corruption (Bardhan, 2018; McMann, Pemstein, Seim, Teorell & Lindberg 
2016). Karklins (2016) stated that corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for private 
benefits. Jetter, Agudelo and Hassan (2015) analysed corruption in several democracies, 
but not a republic. Although anti-corruption has been discussed in academia for years 
(Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi, & Henrich, 2018), the literature suggests different 
definitions and causes of corruption. Liu (2016) states that currently, academic 
researchers have not formed a unified definition of ‘corruption’; instead, corruption is 
usually perceived as the corruption of public officials in state organisations who utilise 
their power for the practice of bribery, corruption, extortion, fraud and other acts. 
Nevertheless, this term consists of several perspectives in regard to morality, law, politics, 
culture and economy, Transparency International (2010) has provided the clearest 
description of corruption, categorising it in terms of grand, petty, political, bribes, the 
amount of property or assets lost and the sector where it occurs. 
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2.2.1 Grand Corruption 
Primarily, grand corruption includes acts or deeds committed at a high level of 
government, which malforms policies and laws (MacWilliam & Rafferty, 2017) so the 
leadership gains benefits from the assets of the public or the government (Martini, 2013). 
Transparency International (2016) indicated that grand corruption is improper use of 
high-ranking power for benefits; activities cause serious harm and damage to not only 
individuals but society. 
Domestic authorities do not always have sufficient power or authority to bring 
those involved in grand corruption to justice. If grand corruption occurs, the international 
community is responsible for acting, collectively and via actions taken by the 
collaboration of individual states (Transparency International, 2016). Grand corruption is 
a crime that breaches human rights and needs to be punished severely. Acts range from 
taking funding from public budgets meant to construct hospitals and schools, to building 
hazardous facilities as a result of underfunding caused by corrupt actors (Transparency 
International, 2016). 
Grand corruption is a serious crime because it (Transparency International, 2016): 
1. prevents the accomplishment of sustainable development 
2. damages sound financial practice and clean business sectors, not only within 
but outside countries 
3. is the prime cause of poverty and inequality in society 
4. violates human rights. 
2.2.2 Petty Corruption 
Petty corruption occurs in everyday activities, with low- and mid-level public 
officials who use their power to benefit from public services such as hospitals, schools, 
police departments and other agencies (Chene, 2008). 
The term ‘petty corruption’ is utilised for corruption deeds performed by officials 
at low levels or deeds carried out on a small scale. The range of this corruption is small 
as compared with entire business transactions. 
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Petty corruption influences poor people the most; it has some impact on 
companies but not at a large scale (Chene, 2008). Several companies have made money 
via petty corruption. Petty corruption differs from grand corruption, in which companies 
suffer tremendously and potentially have to close operations (Birdsall, Kenny & Diofasi, 
2018).  
According to Elliot (1997), petty corruption ‘occurs when private actors interact 
with nonelected government officials, particularly lower-level, administrative 
bureaucrats. These transactions involve taxes, regulations, licensing requirements, and 
the discretionary allocation of government benefits such as subsidising housing, 
scholarships and jobs. It is at the highest levels of government, where political leaders, 
the bureaucracy, and the private sector all interact, that grand corruption may occur’ (p. 
178). 
2.2.3 Political Corruption 
Political corruption refers to the exercise of policies, institutions and rules for 
distributing resources and funding in which the politicians in charge of making decisions 
manipulate their high rank to maintain their authority, status and wealth (Martini, 2013). 
Corruption is frequently defined as wrongful manipulation of public authority by the 
people in charge of making political decisions (Amundsen, 1999). 
Political corruption causes unfair distribution of resources and affects decisions 
that might be made (Amundsen, 1999). Political corruption is more than digression from 
professional codes of ethics and court rulings (Johnston, 1996). Political corruption 
occurs when rulers exercise their power to benefit from the assets of the people and the 
government; their deeds cause serious damage to not only the government but to citizens 
(Johnston, 1996). Johnston (1996)’s definition of political corruption is aligned with Scott 
(1972). 
Based on the above definition of corruption, this chapter next discusses the 
general theoretical framework of corruption, to give readers a better understanding of the 
theories that this research chose to study and to identify gaps to address in this study of 
corruption in public investment, especially in Vietnam. 
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2.2.4 Summary of Corruption 
As it is seen, there are many kinds of corruption (grand, petty and political corruption). 
The corruption though petty impacts on the loss of assets and properties of the owners. In 
public investment, corruption negatively influences the quality of investment which 
makes authorities, government and public suffer. It might cause the whole country’s 
economy to decline. Political corruption as mentioned above, it causes unfair allocation 
of resources and influences decisions that might be made. From this, it can make the 
whole entity possess suspicious attitudes. Overall, corruption must be minimised by the 
use of anti-corruption laws if the country would like to develop.  
Corruption indexes only reflect general figures. They fail to give out specific figures, 
leading to the fact that it is challenging to detect what corruption indexes can and cannot 
measure. Reality shows that only when corruption is found out will the case be under 
investigation. The appropriate measure of corruption is usually via online surveys, 
interviews as well as confidential data which is revealed. In other words, there is no 
uniform guideline to measure corruption precisely. However, the majority of 
commentators reach consensus that the use of Provincial Governance and Public 
Administration Performance Index (PAPI) and PCI can give relatively accurate 
measure of corruption. In the above chapter, the researcher used PCI to discuss the 
corruption.  
According to United Nations Development Programme (2018), in a PAPI report 
implemented in 2018 with the participation of 14,300 citizens from 63 provinces 
in Vietnam interviewed, findings show that 25% of respondents replied that 
poverty was cited as one of the most things which they were concerned about. 
Besides, they also expressed their concern about corruption, economic 
development, law, order and education.  
2.3 Purpose of Corruption 
Overall, corruption in the government involves three broad layers. First is 
corruption within the broader political system. This includes the demands of electoral 
politics and the extensive use of patronage in political appointments and ‘pork barrel’ 
funds. Second is corruption within the public sector, which is usually focused on three 
major problems: spotty performance of mechanisms for identifying and sanctioning 
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employees engaged in corrupt and illicit behaviour, considerations of pay and 
employment, and government procurement. Third is corruption within specific agencies, 
which involves grand corruption (involving widespread syndicates and large sums of 
money) and petty corruption (which involves smaller amounts of money, such as grease 
money, to facilitate the delivery of goods and services) (Thomas & Meagher, 2004). 
Corruption affects public investment in a sense that if officers in charge are corrupted, 
they are likely to commit deeds which are against investors. For example, when a building 
is constructed, they might purchase low-quality materials with high price, affecting the 
quality of the building. It will make the public investors like authorities have to suffer.  
From the implications of corruption on economic, political, cultural and labour 
development, the next section develops a theoretical framework of corruption, including 
how corruption affects Vietnam. 
2.4 Theoretical Framework of Corruption 
To better understand the general theoretical framework and elements affecting 
corruption in Vietnam, this chapter describes and discusses the relationships between 
corruption and institutional change, the impact of corruption on economic development 
and the link between the legal culture, trust and corruption (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The cycle of corruption in Vietnam 
Institutional change is understood as the modifications of institutions such as norms, 
rules, laws and expectations which exercise the way humans and pathways for 
development interact with one another. Providing that norms, rules, laws and expectations 
are appropriate, they will lead to the economic development. On the contrary, if norms, 
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rules, laws and expectations are inappropriate or only appropriate to certain stakeholders, 
they will certainly cause the downturn of economic development, paving the way for the 
corruption to emerge. Vietnam is a country where many people show respect for those 
with authorities and power. Therefore, people with authorities and power make use of 
their relationship to commit corruption since rules related to corruption in Vietnam have 
certain limitations, making their corruption practice more feasible. As such, their 
violation of laws as well as corruption causes the mistrust from the public together with 
the mistrust from Vietnam’s laws against corruption. Again, the fact that corruption 
results in the mistrust from the public makes the law and policy makers have to 
promulgate them. This is a cycle driven by the interaction of humans and institutions. 
2.4.1 Institutional Theories of Corruption Definition 
Mauro (1995) affirmed that corruption causes serious damage to all sectors and 
agencies. Though corruption is widespread, limiting its impacts, via a suitable conception 
to help assess and combat institutional corruption, helps nations and people a great deal. 
Nevertheless, institutional corruption is not the same as traditional corruption; while 
traditional corruption theories have similar characteristics with institutional corruption, 
the conceptions of traditional corruption have limited use in institutional corruption 
(Philp, 2016). 
Thompson (1995) defined ‘institutional corruption’ on perceiving that many 
complex institutions have distinct notions of corruption. From the angle of traditional 
corruption, it is important to note that institutional corruption affects both government 
institutions and private agencies, that institutional corruption is not specific, that there are 
no exchanges required for institutional corruption, and that institutions take lawful 
actions. Thompson’s definition of institutional corruption is rather suitable to Vietnamese 
situations. According to Chow (2005), the significant element which will deter the 
economic growth and reform in China is ‘bureaucratic behaviour and corruption of 
government officials’ (p. 4). Corruption as discussed by Chow (2005) is a major 
deterrence. ‘In the long run changes in corruption behaviour will lead to changes in habit 
and norms of behaviour that is a part of the culture of the society’ (Chow 2005, p. 5). 
It is inevitable that Vietnam and China have similar political Party, causing the 
existence of plenty of corporations in these both countries under the management and 
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supervision of high-ranking officers or beloved ones of those officers. Therefore, the 
function of these corporations is not managed by any external organisations, leading to 
many corruption deeds found. Besides, the institutions of these two countries are also 
similar. Since these two countries are governed by only one Communist Party, there is no 
doubt that the management team are conservative.  
Lessig (2012) continued Thompson’s exploration of institutional corruption. The 
most important concern of Lessig and Thompson was that institutional corruption has no 
regard for public trust in institutions and causes harm to trust and belief in institutions. It 
is clear that harm occurs when the public views an institution as unreliable. Further, once 
public trust is eroded, it is difficult to regain and this may cause deeds relevant to 
institutional corruption (Brock, 2014). 
Svensson (2005) describes corruption as a consequence of a nation’s legal, 
economic, cultural and political institutions in response to either beneficial or harmful 
rule; for instance, corruption can occur due to bad policies or inefficient institutions. Most 
scholars believe that corruption occurs as official government acts of abuse of power. Liu 
(2016) defines corruption as the non-public use of public power (abuse and unequal 
exchange). He (2003) conceives of corruption as including the way and the consequences, 
the subject of corruption, motivation (purpose), and means. Particularly, much corruption 
remains undiscovered, and is under the control and manipulation of those who abuse 
power to violate predefined codes of ethics (He, 2003). UNDP classifies corruption into 
two types: spontaneous and institutionalised. 
Balboa and Medalla (2006) explained that while corruption is experienced in 
society with the sense of violating the code of ethical and moral standards, 
institutionalised corruption is observed and recognised as extensive and extremely 
offensive. However, they share a pattern of being practiced over and over, by people 
whose behaviours automatically respond to life events with corrupt ideas and extended 
personal goals. More specifically, spontaneous corruption is usually found in societies 
observing strong ethics and morals in the public service. Institutionalised corruption, on 
the other hand, is found in societies where corrupt behaviours are perennially extensive 
or pervasive. In these societies, corruption has become a way of life, a goal and an outlook 
on public office. 
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There are some assumptions underlying the definitions of corruption. For 
example, standard rules-based definitions presuppose a Weberian ideal bureaucracy that 
is bounded by clear rules and a functioning legal system. It assumes that institutional 
corruption is a violation of principle-agent relationships. 
Though there are a sea of different definitions of institutional corruption as 
indicated above, they all have the same message in which corruption causes serious 
damage to sectors and agencies. Although traditional corruption and institutional 
corruption share some similar characteristics, they are not identical. Each of them shows 
the extent to which corruption can impact on. The following section is going to clarify 
how corruption impacts on the economy. 
2.4.2 The Economic Impact of Corruption 
According to Svensson (2005), countries with the highest levels of corruption are 
governed or have in the past been governed by socialist governments. Using an empirical 
analysis, Svensson (2005) aimed to investigate the correlation between corruption, 
represented by the indicators with the largest country coverage (control of corruption), 
and GDP per capita (in logarithms) (see Figure 3). Some authors, including Lambsdorff 
(2007), claim that corruption is a vice causing low growth, so causality is mainly from 
corruption to GDP. Others claim that corruption is a poverty-driven disease that vanishes 
when countries develop, so that causality is mainly from level of GDP to corruption 
(Paldam, 2002). Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) found that corruption has an adverse impact 
on economic growth in countries with high-quality institutions only, and at the same time, 
that economic growth reduces corruption. On the other hand, corruption has no impact on 
growth in countries with low-quality institutions. Further, Backburn, Bose and Haque 
(2005) indicated that the relationship between corruption and economic development is 
both negative and mutual. Causation runs from economic development to lower 
corruption and from corruption to lower economic development (measured by GDP per 
capita). There is a plausible argument that lower economic growth can lead to higher 
corruption or higher corruption can lead to lower growth rate. No consensus has been 
reached about the main directions of causality between these two variables. 
 33 
 
Figure 3: Real GDP per capita and corruption, 1995 
Source: Svensson, 2005 
According to Svensson (2005), Figure 3 illustrates two facts. First, wealthy 
countries have lower corruption rates. Second, corruption fluctuates greatly across 
countries. Countries that are far away from the regression line tend to be the most and 
least corrupt given their level of income. For instance, Russia, Argentina, and Venezuela 
were scored as relatively corrupt given their level of income. Countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa are typically aligned closely with the regression line, which shows that their 
perceived corruption is close to the expected level given their per capita GDP. The strong 
nexus between income and corruption is line with theories of corruption that argue that 
institutional quality is sharpened by economic factors (Svensson, 2005). 
In the past, most theories stated that corruption causes slower economic growth. 
However, it is noteworthy that corruption practices themselves do not impose the largest 
social cost (Svensson, 2005); the primary social losses after corruption come from 
inefficient firms and the allocation of talent, technology and capital (Murphy, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1991). Svensson (2005) stated that when profits or potential profits are taken 
from firms via corruption, entrepreneurs are less likely to open and promote their business 
or expand slowly. Entrepreneurs may also choose not to optimise their need or demand 
for public services (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008). Some entrepreneurs even have 
incentives to adopt inefficient technologies of production with an inefficiently high 
degree of reversibility, which allows them to react more flexibly to future demands from 
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corrupt officials, and more credibly threaten to shut down operations if they expect to be 
forced to bargain over bribes in the future (Choi & Marcel, 1998; Misangyi et al., 2008). 
When corruption is widespread and institutionalised, it affects the allocation of 
entrepreneurial skills (Mbanefo & Eboka, 2017). It may be financially more rewarding 
for an entrepreneur to leave the private sector altogether and become a corrupt public 
official (Misangyi et al., 2008). Some firms may choose to invest their assets to retrieve 
valuable licenses and preferential market access, while others may focus on the 
improvement of quality and productivity (Murphy et al., 1991). Mauro (1995) proved 
that, to the extent to which corruption can be measured in a cross-country setting, it does 
not affect growth. Mauro (1995) was the first to attempt to study the relationship between 
corruption and growth in a large cross-section of countries. Mauro (1995) figured out that 
corruption is found to lessen investment, leading to the downturn of the economic 
development.  
However, some studies show that there is no correlation between these values. 
Meon and Sekkat (2005) incorporated measures of political freedom as a key determinant 
of the relationship between corruption and long-run economic growth. Using cross-
country data and regressions during the period 1960–2000, they found no relationships 
between corruption and growth in ‘not-free’ countries. Aidt et al. (2008) found that in 
countries with low-quality institutions, corruption has no impact on growth. Second, a 
consensus of the majority of published works is that the correlation between corruption 
and GDP is negative. The World Bank and IMF presume that corruption has significantly 
negative effects on economic growth. Corruption undermines development by distorting 
the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth 
depends; Singh (2003, p.4) states, ‘Many of the causes of corruption are economic in 
nature, and so are its consequences – poor governance clearly is detrimental to economic 
activity and welfare’. 
In summary, the literature does not state explicitly what kinds of corruption may 
increase economic efficiency. It is implied that lower economic development paves the 
way for higher corruption and vice versa.  
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2.4.3 The Relationship Between Culture, Trust and Corruption 
This section describes the interrelation between culture, trust and corruption, to 
help readers better understand why the theory of culture affects corruption (Woodside, 
Bernal & Coduras, 2016). First, it describes the theory of culture in corruption, including 
a comparison of cultures of countries as well as the relationship between culture and 
institutional theory. Last, this section discusses the relationship between trust and 
corruption in post-communist countries (such as Vietnam). 
2.4.3.1 Difference Between Culture of Countries and Asian Cultures in Corruption 
To better comprehend the culture theory in a country such as Vietnam, this section 
first describes and compares differences between Asian and other cultures in terms of 
corruption. 
The extreme difference in Eastern and Western cultures may differentiate 
corruption in many ways. Because Asian customs respect the idea of collectivism (Ma, 
Feng, Hu, Xi, Fox & Ding, 2016), the focus on keeping others, especially those in higher 
positions, happy, gift-giving from ‘small’ and over abusive behaviour and decisions from 
the ‘bigger’ have been social norms for centuries (Green, Tinson, & Peloza, 2016). More 
than half of activities in India are done with bribery, while father–son governance in 
China and Vietnam upsets the majority of the populations. In Western cultures, corruption 
is based on individualism as people ignore the factors and consequences to seek their 
goals of power or benefits (Klitgaard, 2017). 
Regarding the specific concept of corruption in China, Western experts have 
debated and agreed on how corruption is related to the defined abuse of power and 
intellectual forces in both short and long terms (Sun, 2001). In ‘The politics of 
conceptualizing corruption in reform China’, Sun (2001) defined corruption in China’s 
situation as political control that resists the idea of the ‘post-communist phenomenon’ 
with people’s scope of contesting and controlling that gradually becomes successfully 
taken via manipulation and remaining at a high political level. Chinese debates and 
arguments about the cause and definition of corruption have spread on all social, 
academic and commercial means of information transfer (Jiang & Nie, 2014). Not only 
China but the world has been overwhelmed by this phenomenon, and how the nature of 
the problem can cause people to respond in various ways, either rationalising the nature 
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of corruption or looking for a solution to it. It was soon acknowledged that the most 
important factor is whether people have an assessment of their rights and accurate 
information or whether they have been trapped by corruption with a preconceived mental 
state (Sun, 2001). This led to one definition of corruption as a slight or highly improper 
or inappropriate use of power – power abuse (Sun, 2001). The issue of corruption soon 
became the worry in stages of nation, province or capital (Luzgina, 2018). 
2.4.3.2 Culture Corruption and Institutional Theory 
Drawing on institutional theory and recent conceptions of the nature of corruption, 
Pillay and Dorasamy (2010) indicated that national culture is an important macro-variable 
that influences corruption. Their research analyses the interaction between cultural 
dimensions and the nature of corruption as understanding governance issues from a cross-
functional perspective. Institutional theory originally suggested the idea of how typical 
existence – norms, routines and schemes – becomes dominant and shapes certain social 
mores in specific context of nationality. The theory has been widely used in political 
sociology as a useful supporting tool to identify the characteristics of a specific society 
or common unit. This finding also acknowledges the recognised the power of the 
dominant sectors or groups, such that their development eventually reflects the orientation 
that the lived-in society has grown into. Further, the correlation between cultural patterns 
and corruption has been considered by experts, who have used social behaviours and 
human orientation practices to support and understand the possibility of corruption 
(Seleim & Bontis, 2009). In the same vein, corruption can be understood and explained 
effectively by prior studies. In such the orientation of study, norms and schemes of culture 
are examined with the sample of dominant characteristics; however, it must not be 
assumed that certain ‘types of culture’ have a higher chance of causing corruption. It is 
their simultaneous existence and influence one another that, unfortunately, produces 
many unwanted circumstances. 
Giving the diversity of variables involved, it is surprising that studies that examine 
corruption across nations (Treisman, 2000) have considered corruption to be a single 
construct. However, as Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden (2005) contended, corruption 
has at least two key dimensions that differentiate it across countries: pervasiveness and 
arbitrariness. This suggests a need for a more detailed analysis of the phenomenon (Pillay 
& Dorasamy, 2010). Specifically, variations in accountability and discretion can explain 
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variations in the pervasiveness, arbitrariness and ambiguity of corruption in different 
societies. 
2.4.3.2.1 Pervasiveness 
Pervasiveness refers to the degree to which corruption is prevalent in a given 
country (Collins, McMullen, & Reutzel, 2016). According to Rodriguez et al. (2005, p. 
385), pervasiveness can be defined as the ‘average firm’s likelihood of encountering 
corruption in its normal interactions with state officials’. Pervasiveness can be measured 
in terms of how frequently a firm is asked for a bribe. A public official is more inclined 
to advance their gains illegally in societies in which ‘determined social and institutional 
facilitators converge to create structural opportunities for corruption’ (Sung, 2002, p.138). 
An example would be countries where a particular ‘payment’ is expected to influence 
successful tenders and contracts. 
Paldam’s (2002) research on economic–cultural models further reinforces the 
notion that pervasiveness of corruption is closely associated with the economic status of 
a country. Paldam stated that countries with poor-quality public services and less financial 
stability have more pervasive corruption. Countries experiencing economic hardship are 
more prone to illegal activities and diminished accountability. 
2.4.3.2.2 Arbitrariness 
The second dimension is arbitrariness, defined by Rodriguez et al. (2005, p. 385) 
as ‘the inherent degree of ambiguity associated with corrupt transactions in a given nation 
or corrupt activities emerge when agents act in their interests to maximize their gain with 
disregard for the effects on others’. High levels of arbitrary corruption are characterised 
by uncertainty regarding the size, target and number of corrupt transactions required to 
obtain approval (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Pillay and Dorasamy (2010) concluded that the 
arbitrariness of corruption is enhanced in cultures characterised by high power distance. 
In turn, the pervasiveness of corruption is diminished in cultures characterised by low 
power distance. 
Another dimension, drawn by Sorge and Hofstede (1983), is uncertainty 
avoidance, defined as society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity, one of five key 
qualities or dimensions measured by the researchers who developed the Hofstede model 
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of cultural dimensions to quantify cultural differences across international lines and better 
understand why some ideas and business practices work better in some countries than in 
others. The Hofstede model is a special defined framework supporting cross-culture 
communication invented by Geert Hofstede. The cultures have been dimensionalised as 
a ‘collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or 
category of people from others’ (Hofstede, 2011, p.3). The model suggests that different 
ideas can be understood by the common possible concept of being dimensionalised by 
stages of social class, economic status, occupation or biological gender. 
According to Hofstede’s detailed work, there are five dimensions or ‘collectives’ 
influencing cultural formation: power distance, group attachment, gender association, 
uncertainty avoidance and time orientation. These represent trends and reasons for 
different spectrums of pattern pairs that have the ability to affect people’s mind and 
behaviours in making decisions in their daily life (Bakir, Blodgett, Vitell & Rose, 2015). 
Human daily behavioural patterns are core components in developing any cultural 
definitions (Bakir et al, 2015). Besides the original purpose of visualising reasons for 
culture formation based on extremes cases of internal events, conditions and human 
nature, later, the Hofstede model was widely studied and applied to many other detailed 
samples. For many decades, economic evaluation was a common application (Hofstede, 
2011). The application of such a universal argument, the Hofstede model is now being 
employed in organisations and business cultures (Hofstede, 2011). Rather than attempting 
to understand the culture, the organisational application of the Hofstede model mainly 
produces studies on how initial building of culture will affect employee performance and 
working status, to achieve the company’s specific objectives and visions. It has been 
shown there is not only a tight correlation between culture and human nature/behaviour 
but that they have a simultaneous effect on defining each other. 
2.4.3.2.3 Uncertainty avoidance in culture corruption 
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which culture induces its members 
to feel uncomfortable (or uncertain) in structured situations. According to Morden (1999), 
this dimension addresses the question of risk. Public officials in low uncertainty 
avoidance cultures are more likely to act arbitrarily than their counterparts in high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures. High uncertainty avoidance cultures are likely to favour 
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well-defined unambiguous rules and regulations, which reduce the level of arbitrariness 
in corruption. 
It can also be argued that the reduction of uncertainty in risk-avoiding cultures is 
of greater importance than legitimacy (Pillay & Dorasamy, 2010). In many cases, the 
creation of wealth, including illicit wealth creation, offers an opportunity to diminish 
uncertainty. For this reason, countries that are high in uncertainty avoidance will be more 
tolerant of corruption practices. To connect with the above dimensions, it can be said that 
the arbitrariness of corruption is enhanced in cultures characterised by low levels of 
uncertainty avoidance. Additionally, the pervasiveness of corruption is enhanced in 
cultures characterised by high levels of uncertainty avoidance (Seleim & Bontis, 2009). 
Conversely, the arbitrariness of corruption is diminished in cultures characterised by high 
levels of uncertainty avoidance. As stated by Seleim and Bontis (2009), the pervasiveness 
of corruption is diminished in cultures characterised by low levels of uncertainty 
avoidance. 
2.4.3.3 The Consequence of Political Corruption: How Trust Relates to Corruption in 
Post-communist Nations 
This section addresses the issue of the relationship between trust and corruption 
in post-communist countries. First, it is necessary to clarify corruption in political trust, 
theories of political trust, trust in post-communist societies and communism and post-
communism. 
2.4.3.3.1 Corruption in political trust 
Liu (2016) pointed out that the authenticity of national public power comes from 
the people. The government is the executor of the sovereign. Therefore, its power comes 
from the people’s trust (Erkel & Der-Meer, 2016). When the use of public power departs 
from the originally established track, and is abused, corruption emerges. 
2.4.3.3.2 Theories of political trust 
The origins of political trust can be theorised separately into two dimensions (see 
Table 5). Cultural theories differ principally from institutional theories with regard to the 
extent to which trust is conceived as exogenous or endogenous to political institutions. 
Cultural theories define trust as a basic characteristic to be learned externally, whereas 
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endogenous theories view trust as developed from internal cause, as a result of 
institutional performance. 
Table 5: Competing Theories of the Origins of Trust and their Explanatory Emphases 
 
Source: Mishler and Rose (2001) 
Macro theories of both types emphasise that trust is a collective or group property 
broadly shared by all members of society. By contrast, at the micro level, the level of trust 
differs among individuals because of differences in socialisation and social background, 
individual perceptions and their political and economic experiences. Turning to cultural 
theories, it is assumed that trust is an emergent property linked to basic forms of social 
relations (Eckstein, 1966; Eckstein, Fleron, Hoffmann, & Reisinger, 1998). This results 
in a generalised sense of trust or distrust in other people. Cultures can be differentiated 
according to their levels of trust or distrust of others. In this regard, it is sometimes argued 
by historians that the existence of untrustworthy institutions in Russia since Czarist times 
has resulted in a socialisation process in which individuals learn to distrust other people 
and institutions (Hedlund, 1999; Joyce, 1984; Pipes, 1974). 
Chang and Chu (2006) make use of newly compiled data from the East Asia 
Barometer (EAB), which conducts comparative surveys of citizens’ attitudes towards 
politics and democracy in eight East Asian political systems: China, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Utilising data from the 
EAB, they found a strong trust-eroding effect of political corruption in Asian 
democracies. There is no evidence that contextual factors lessen the corruption–trust link 
in Asia. The trust-eroding effect holds uniformly across all countries examined and 
remains robust even after taking into account the endogenous relationship between 
corruption and trust. 
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2.4.3.3.3 Trust in post-communist societies 
Generalised trust in political institutions is critical in a democracy, but not in post-
communist countries, where scepticism and distrust in institutions are pervasive (Chang 
& Chu, 2006). Interpersonal trust is only slightly higher. Post-communist societies are 
divided into two groups: one large group of individuals who fundamentally distrust both 
political institutions and their fellow citizens, or at least are deeply sceptical of them, and 
a smaller group who trust institutions and people, but only apparently (Mishler & Rose, 
2001). Across ten post-communist societies, public reactions to new social and political 
institutions range from scepticism (the midpoint on the 7-point trust scale) to outright 
distrust (see Table 6). The median citizen in post-communist societies actively distrusted 
five of the institutions and was sceptical about the remaining six. It can be seen that across 
all institutions, an average of 31% of respondents expressed positive trust, 22% were 
sceptical and 47% were distrustful. Distrust is greatest for political institutions, especially 
parliaments and parties, which were actively distrusted by 59% and 69% of citizens, 
respectively. The military, which is the least democratic institution in the state, 
experienced the highest level of popular trust (46% positive), although the median citizen 
was still sceptical and nearly a third actively distrusted the military. It has been argued 
that a ‘healthy scepticism’ facilitates democratic society more than blind trust (Mishler & 
Rose, 1997), but the overall pattern in post-communist countries is one of severe 
scepticism bordering on outright distrust of current institutions. Positive trust in any 
institution is extremely limited, and even scepticism is in short supply (Mishler & Rose, 
2001). 
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Table 6: Trust and Distrust of Institutions and People in Post-communist Countries 
 
Source: Mishler and Rose (2001) 
As indicated in Table 6, Mishler and Rose (2001) argued that bias of public 
officials in the police and court systems, the absence or presence of corruption and the 
level of arbitrariness have a greater influence on citizens than the level of trust in 
institutional effectiveness and fairness (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). 
2.4.3.3.4 Communism and post-communism 
Communism directly and indirectly (through cultural values) affects corruption 
(Rose, 2001; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2007). According to Sandholtz and Taagepera 
(2007), communist and post-communist countries tend to focus on personal and economic 
security, which weakens their secular–rational values. 
Sandholtz and Taagepera (2007) also argued that post-communist states are 
vulnerable to corrupt activities not only because of decision making relating to the 
property of economical usage under communist rule but because of the vulnerability of 
privatisation schemes to corruption. However, the process works directionally. Corrupt 
masses will generate new corrupt elites even after former communist elites are expelled 
(Rose, 2001). Rose’s (2001) studies indicated the possibility to compare the corruption 
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levels of countries affected and not affected by communism within cultural–religious 
regions. The empirical analyses of Rose (2001) and Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) have 
a common finding: higher corruption levels tend to appear in post-communist countries, 
because, under a communist government, decisions on making use of economic resources 
are based completely on administrative power, and hence, bribes, payoffs and kickbacks 
provide means of manipulating their execution. 
To assess the proposition that communism also has a direct effect on the Elite 
Integrity, Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) devised additional empirical tests, in which 
the average difference in Elite Integrity scores between non-communist and communist 
countries was calculated. Developed by the World Bank (Kaufman, 2005), Elite Integrity 
is a control corruption score developed to provide the most comprehensive and 
methodologically sound measure of law-abiding and honest elite behaviour. 
The test has shown that countries with a communist experience have lower Elite 
Integrity scores than non-communist countries, in which the weighted average was 2.31 
(see Table 7). In other words, communist countries were 2.31 more units corrupt than 
non-communist countries. 
Table 7: Elite Integrity in Countries With and Without a Communist Past, in the Same 
Cultural–Religious Area 
 
Source: Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) 
Empirical analysis has shown that pervasive corruption was practically a necessity 
under communist regimes, despite government agencies exercising some restraining 
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influence (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005). In contrast, corruption is restricted by the 
removal of regulatory forces during the transition to democratic institutions and market 
economies. Thus, the initial phases of democratic and market transitions enabled positive 
changes to recover assets taken via bribery, kickbacks, payoffs and extortion, along with 
new institutional and effective structures (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005). 
The expansion in corruption in former communist states was not just a response 
to immediate material incentives; in fact, communism led to a culture of corruption 
(Kubbe, 2014), and whole populations were socialised into norms and expectations that 
made corruption present in daily activities. Consequently, most of the post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have reported being corrupt, resulting not only 
in the hampering of economic development, but in eradicating public trust among citizens 
in democratic institutions and public administration (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005). 
Communism is often criticised for its inability to create a sustainable economic 
system where people have the incentive to perform efficiently and act ethically in their 
work, and is often cited as a major cause of laziness and corruption (Chu, Lau, Moriah, 
& Schallich, 2009). Chu et al. (2009) studied how computers have affected work 
motivation and ethics under communism, finding that communism theoretically supports 
good work ethics and motivation within the computer industry by stratifying personal, 
public and party interests. However, in practice, the computer industry in communist 
societies suffers from laziness, greed and unethical behaviour. 
It is not communism that leads to corruption, it is the lack of balance of power 
that leads to corruption (Quora, 2014). When the president of a country (or the governor 
of a region/state) controls all the power, they have an open road to corruption. 
Communism itself does not imply a powerful government; a powerful government is only 
a tool socialists use in their attempts to achieve communism. That is where corruption 
comes from. Second, rationing and control over production create an environment where 
open defiance of the law is tolerated. 
Whether communism leads to more corruption is debatable. In general, corruption 
exists wherever illegal trade is tolerated, and public officials and bureaucrats can be 
induced to overlook illegality if the right conditions exist (Quora, 2014). 
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Vietnam and China are not post-communists as their Leninist structures are still 
operational. As mentioned above, Vietnam and China have similar political Party, causing 
the existence of plenty of corporations in these both countries under the management and 
supervision of high-ranking officers or beloved ones of those officers. Therefore, the 
function of these corporations is not managed by any external organisations, leading to 
many corruption deeds found. Besides, the institutions of these two countries are also 
similar. Since these two countries are governed by only one Communist Party, there is no 
doubt that the management team are conservative. They do not have any specific 
sanctions for people who commit corruption. That is the reason why corruption is 
regularly detected in such corporations. 
2.4.3.3.5 Transformation of corruption after transition 
Beyond the period of transition, the mechanisms of corruption continue to 
transform (Nguyen, 2009). The path of this transformation varies from country to country. 
In post-communism, corruption refers to political deeds: systemic corruption 
interpreted by the needs of patronage politics (Nguyen, 2009). Politics offers an 
opportunity for wrongful management of public resources (Vo, 2015). 
With the appearance and existence of the market economy in many nations, 
corruption activities also vary (Vo, 2015). In new democracies in which markets are 
emerging, market allocation takes the place of administrative allocation: the less reliance 
on administrative allocation, the less chance that public corruption is taking place (Le, 
2016). For instance, where higher education is provided broadly via paid services, the 
capability for bribing public officials might decrease or it may become another 
transformation (Nguyen, 2007). 
2.4.3.4 Summary 
This section indicated the differences between culture, trust and corruption. It described 
the disparity between Asian and Western cultures and gave out similarities in the cultures 
of Vietnam and China. In addition, this section had the analysis of the interaction between 
cultural dimension and the nature of corruption. Furthermore, this section also explained 
variations in the pervasiveness, arbitrariness and ambiguity of corruption in different 
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societies. From findings from the literature review, the research came up with details in 
regards to the corruption in Vietnam in the following section. 
2.5 Corruption in Vietnam 
Throughout the 1990s, strong factions in the communist party defended socialism 
against the new tide of capitalism. For a while, the socialist factions still had enough 
political muscle to direct the new capitalist vehicle (Davies, 2015). During the late 1990s, 
the World Bank on three occasions offered extra loans worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars on the condition that Vietnam sold its state-owned companies and removed trade 
tariffs. Each deal was rejected. However, from 2000, the rate of change accelerated, and 
the political balance shifted. Under pressure from international donors and foreign 
investors, Vietnam approved the sale of its state-owned companies (Davies, 2015). Three 
decades after Doi Moi (1985), Vietnam is a fully integrated member of the globalised 
capitalist economy (Davies, 2015). 
2.5.1 Corruption in Public Investment 
There are doubts about the efficiency of public investment in infrastructure 
construction because of corruption. In developing countries with poor governance, 
corruption is common and much worse in projects involving the public sector (McLaren 
& Yoo, 2016). Ahsan, Blackburn and Haque (2017) argued that public sector corruption 
can usually be viewed as two elements: exaggeration in public investment project costs, 
the use of inferior materials, or both. This section discusses public investment, including 
efficiency, in Vietnam, how corruption is currently occurring in public investment, and 
typical corruption cases from the past. 
Over 2005–2008, public investment in Vietnam increasingly expanded, reaching 
40% of GDP. The government intended to spend 30% of budget expenditure on 
investment development. As reported by Hong (2016) from the Vietnam News Agency, 
Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has constantly urged all ministerial agencies and local 
authorities to speed the disbursement of public investment funds so that the country will 
not miss the target of 6.7% economic growth in 2016. Statistics released by Mai Tien 
Dung, chief of government officials, showed that national disbursement reached USD 
1.85 billion, accounting for 70% of ODA funds, in the first five months of 2016, while 
USD 22 billion remained unexploited (Hong, 2016). Unmanageable paperwork was 
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responsible for down the disbursement process in public investment funds (Ha & Hanh, 
2012). During a meeting with top officials from the Ministry of Investment and Planning, 
Vuong Dinh Hue, the Deputy Prime Minister, stated that the government would strictly 
punish and replace officials who block and interfere with disbursement. 
Against a backdrop of economic mismanagement and frequent worldwide 
political upheavals, the Vietnamese government has carried out fundamental reforms in 
its political and economic systems through its Doi Moi policy of renovation and 
restructuring. This was a process of industrial and service liberalisation with the simple 
objective of providing market mechanisms for the economic sector; however, the context 
was still controlled by VCP. Under Doi Moi, there has been a renovation in international 
relations and the internal economy, especially in the field of agriculture (Solomon, 
Solomon, Joseph, & Norton, 2000) This has resulted in a number of achievements and 
successes, and Doi Moi has been one of the most successful economic transformations 
globally; however, Vietnam has faced many challenges and risks. There are many 
weaknesses in rapid development, and corruption is one (Le, 2016). Corruption has 
negatively affected the development rate of many countries, including Vietnam, and anti-
corruption efforts have become a global trend. The section below provides some 
understanding of the economic reform policies and corruption in the period of Doi Moi. 
2.5.1.1 Economic Reform Policies During Doi Moi 
Under Doi Moi, the Vietnamese economy was converted to market-oriented 
socialism under the guidance of the state, involving a multi-ownership structured 
economy with the relaxation of economic policies and reduction of government 
intervention in the market aimed at enhancing living standards (Vidal Alejandro, 2015). 
Doi Moi provided policies for encouraging and attracting foreign investment. In the face 
of economic recession in general and agricultural decline in particular, Doi Moi focused 
on formulating new policies for the economy, especially agriculture (Krik & Tuan, 2009). 
Before Doi Moi, the management of goods was monopolised by the state and the 
government did not recognise the potential of the free market. However, by applying new 
economic policies, households became more self-sufficient and independent from 
cooperatives and taxes were reduced or abolished for farmers living in mountain regions. 
Land was distributed to each household by the cooperatives and households had the 
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responsibility for growing, applying fertiliser and harvesting crops (Vidal Alejandro, 
2015). As a result, agricultural output grew at a much higher rate; food output in 1986 
and 1987 were 18.4 million and 17.5 million tons, an increase of 800,000 tons on previous 
volumes. The Vietnamese economy was experiencing rapid growth of 7%, one of the 
fastest rates in the world (Vidal Alejandro, 2015). 
However, there were several problems with the Doi Moi economic reform 
policies, including that market-economic institutions were not appropriately established, 
large capital flows such as ODA or FDI were not used efficiently, the geographically 
uneven decrease in the national poverty rate, the gap in education levels and working 
skills created between the rich and the poor, and the higher unemployment rate and 
inequality in society (Solomon, Solomon, Joseph, & Norton, 2000). 
2.5.1.2 Corruption During Doi Moi 
During Doi Moi, the Vietnamese economy grew rapidly. This resulted in several 
significant transformations, including an increase in corruption. One of the reasons for 
this was that marketisation, internationalisation and decentralisation created opportunities 
for bribery. Civil servants and state officials took advantage of this to create 
administrative hurdles and make profits from obscure policies and laws. There were 
several scandals related to corruption, such as Project Management Unit (PMU) 18, which 
caused Japan to halt ODA funding to Vietnam, and the corruption case involving a big 
state-owned ship-building company, Vinashin (Tromme, 2016). 
Many studies show that corruption flourished during Doi Moi, and corruption 
became endemic in Vietnamese government and society. The fast growth of the economy 
accompanied by a high level of corruption in state officials led to top state officials selling 
economic interests to find profit-making opportunities. Top state officials plundered state 
assets as Doi Moi gave them privilege and authority (Gregory, 2016). 
The success of the Doi Moi program did not come easily; it involved a struggle 
between those who sought progress and those who resisted change. People must continue 
to take the initiative into their own hands instead of waiting for the government to reform 
policies (Vidal Alejandro, 2015). 
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2.5.1.3 Corruption Within Anti-corruption Forces 
For years, the police and the judiciary have emerged as the sectors most affected 
by corruption. The Chairman of Vietnam Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption, 
Nguyen Phu Trong, raised the significant issue of corruption inside anti-corruption 
agencies (Hong-Nguyen, 2017). Trinh Xuan Thanh and Vu Huy Hoang, who were 
allegedly responsible for the loss of more than USD 132 million, were expelled from the 
party and subjected to criminal charges, but clandestinely fled the country and have not 
yet been apprehended despite an international arrest warrant being issued. Despite being 
prosecuted by the government, Hoang was not expelled from the party because no 
criminal accusation has been executed. This highlights the weaknesses of the police and 
the judicial system in the Vietnamese government, the influence of manipulation in 
Vietnamese politics and the fact that the party focuses most on internal unity to maintain 
power (Hong-Nguyen, 2017). 
There have also been allegations in the past that public officials from the 
Government Inspectorate, one of the major anti-corruption institutions, have received 
bribes to prevent cases being pursued (Chene, 2008). Such occurrences are likely to 
undermine the credibility of the leadership’s commitment as well as public confidence in 
government’s efforts against corruption (Chene, 2008). Further, the Vietnamese 
government’s 2005 Report of the Survey on Corruption (Chene, 2008) revealed that 60% 
of respondents admitted to having paid a bribe for public services and that more than 30% 
of public officials said they would accept a bribe if offered. Public procurement, the 
judiciary, tax and customs, construction permits and export/import license authorities are 
frequently cited as the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter defined petty, grand and political corruption and explained how each 
impacted on the loss of assets and properties in public investment. Then, it described the 
three broad layers of corruption in the government. Following this, the theoretical 
framework of corruption was produced with the five elements which had mutual 
relationships (1. institutional change, 2. economic development, 3. corruption, 4. culture 
legal, and, 5. trust). The institutional change in both ways (negative or positive) has an 
influence on the economic growth. If the institutions change in the positive way, it might 
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help the economic growth. Otherwise, it might cause the downturn of the economic 
development, paving the way for the existence of corruption. Corruption can appear in 
many kinds, depending on activities, deeds, or practice in which it takes place. The fact 
that corruption practice occurs is also influenced by the culture. Especially in Vietnam 
where citizens have the culture of respecting people with authorities, corruption and 
bribery happen on a regular basis as an obvious phenomenon when they would like to 
have those people perform certain things for them. Corruption and bribery make the 
public lose their trust. Therefore, it also exerts on the change of the institutions. This is a 
genuine cycle which is existing in Vietnam. Providing that the change of the institutions 
is performed to be based on the trust of citizens, it will obtain their support and contribute 
to the economic development.  
This Chapter also investigated existing research on the purpose of corruption. 
Importantly, institutional theories of corruption, the impact of corruption on the economy 
and the relationship between culture, trust and corruption were set out. More specifically, 
corruption in Vietnam was described in a general context and in the public investment 
sector, and an explanation of the Doi Moi economic reform policy and corruption during 
Doi Moi was offered. This Chapter came to the conclusion with a discussion of corruption 
within anti-corruption forces in Vietnam. The following chapter presents the 
methodology of the research approach and the detailed implementation plan, including 
document analysis, the qualitative methodology (semi-structured interview) and the 
quantitative methodology (the online survey). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the proposed research orientation for the study, including 
research methodology, research design, research approaches, document analysis, 
qualitative research methodology (semi-structured interview), quantitative methodology 
(the online survey) and ethical considerations. The employment of mixed methods (the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods) will help triangulate the data as well 
as ensure reliability and validity. 
This study is divided into three research strategies. The first is document analysis, 
conducted to collect reputable information related to the anti-corruption law system in 
Vietnam. The second is a qualitative methodology (semi-structured interviews). In line 
with the sensitive nature of the study, the target respondents, who work in government 
departments, were interviewed via a sample of respondents instead of mass interviews on 
the street (random sampling). The last is quantitative research (an online survey). Target 
respondents in the survey phase were chosen from a selection of officers working in three 
government agencies: the police, the procuracy and the Government Inspectorate. 
3.2 Research Methodology (Mixed Methods Research) 
According to Wheeldon and Ahlberg (2012), the mixed methods researcher uses 
a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect the data needed in 
a single study. This approach builds the strengths and lessens the limitations of both forms 
of study (Driscoll et al., 2007). Regarded as the ‘third methodological movement’ in 
social research, the mixture of quantitative and qualitative techniques offers advantages 
to the researcher (Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano & Morales 2007). 
At present, there are six types of core mixed methods with distinct characteristics, 
including the convergent parallel design, the explanatory sequential design, the 
exploratory sequential design, the embedded design, the transformative design and the 
design with a multitude of phases (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010; 
Wheeldon & Khlerg, 2012). As Creswell and Clark (2011, p. 68) indicate, it is the hope 
of ‘researchers to carefully select a design that best matches the research problem and 
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reasons for mixing in order to make the study manageable and simple to implement and 
describe’. 
This study investigates corruption and related criminal behaviours in public 
investment in Vietnam and explores practical policies, models and strategies for 
improving the capacities and effectiveness of Vietnam’s anti-corruption commissions. 
The mixed methods approach has been proven to be effective in social science research 
projects in general (Sparkes, 2015; Yin, 2009) and criminal justice/criminology in 
particular (De Lisle, 2011). 
The main research approach of this project is an inductive approach, which is 
appropriate for this study because it focuses mainly on the explorative nature of the 
project (e.g., analysing and comprehending the essence, cause and effects, and forms of 
corruption in Vietnam). The induction approach, as explained by Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill (2009), utilises a qualitative research methodology with well-known 
techniques, such as face-to-face interviews. Using qualitative research, the researcher 
addressed all key components of ‘corruption’ in public investment in Vietnam, then 
produced hypotheses. From that base, the researcher designed an appropriate 
questionnaire for the quantitative research phase. A deduction approach, with the 
assistance of quantitative data and descriptive analysis, was used to verify the hypotheses 
and visualise the study findings to facilitate the formulation of solutions for Vietnam’s 
corruption issues. 
3.3 Research Design 
This study aims to investigate the causes of corruption in public investment, and 
the obstacles that impact anti-corruption in Vietnam, and then sets out recommendations 
to improve anti-corruption. The thesis makes use of the following research methods: 
document analysis, qualitative methodology (semi-structured interviews) and 
quantitative methodology (an online survey). The study includes three chief phases. The 
first phase is the document analysis – to obtain an overview of the status quo of Vietnam’s 
corruption in public investment, together with the structure and validity of anti-corruption 
law. The second phase employed a qualitative methodology (face-to-face interviews) to 
measure ideas as well as evaluate government officials’ views of the effects of national 
laws, the economy and the government sector on the improvement of national corruption 
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and sound out feasible solutions for this phenomenon. The last phase used a quantitative 
methodology (an online survey) to obtain data about government officers’ opinions on 
Vietnam’s corruption to compare with the qualitative findings, reach a conclusion and 
recommend suitable solutions. 
Denzin (1973) defined triangulation as the combination or integration of methods 
or approaches employed in the study. Triangulation functions at the same time on data, 
methodology and theory dimension. Therefore, the employment of document analysis, 
semi-structured interviews and an online survey helps triangulate as well as validate data 
of this study, making the findings more valid and reliable. 
3.3.1 Mixed Method Exploratory Sequential Design 
The mixed methods sequential exploratory design (hereafter, the exploratory 
model) consists of a two-step approach, starting with a qualitative exploratory inquiry and 
progressing to a quantitative phase (see Figure 4). At the most fundamental level, the aim 
of this design is to use quantitative data to manipulate qualitative data (Creswell et al, 
2007; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). As noted above, the 
two-step approach is of great assistance when the researcher would like to generalise 
qualitative data (Morse, 1991) and to experiment with perspectives of a disparate theory 
or categorisation (Morgan, 1998) or investigate a characteristic/phenomenon deeply with 
a quantitative design as the basis (Creswell et al, 2007). 
This design offers many advantages. First, data collection in the qualitative phase 
can help identify the relationships and establish a conceptual framework (Wheeldon, 
2010). The conceptual framework from the qualitative findings can be used to check the 
quantitative analysis in the later phase. Second, the qualitative phase can be used to 
review and sharpen assessment tools used in the quantitative study (Trahan & Stewart, 
2013). Third, quantitative analysis assists the researcher in the decision of whether the 
data of the qualitative phase can be generalised or not (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
For these reasons, the exploratory method is used in this study to investigate corruption 
and criminal behaviour in public investment in Vietnam, to formulate policies, models 
and strategies to improve the capacities and effectiveness of anti-corruption in public 
investment in Vietnam. 
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Figure 4: The Mixed Method Exploratory Sequential Design 
Source: Adopted from Creswell and Clark (2011, p. 69) 
3.4 Research Approaches 
Since the study aims to scrutinise corruption in Vietnam, research objectives are 
more explorative than descriptive. It is necessary to employ many methods in this study 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). Document analysis was proposed to assist the researcher to gain 
a quick overview of the overall picture of Vietnam’s corruption and related law 
enforcement. This research methodology required the researcher to implement desk 
research, obtaining published and syndicated reports on corruption. Further details on 
these sources are provided in the document analysis section. 
In regard to the study’s inductive orientation, a qualitative methodology helped 
the researcher to conduct useful and intensive consultations with the respondents, and 
obtain valuable answers to the research questions. The quantitative methodology was a 
structured questionnaire with the support of grounded theory, used to verify and 
demonstrate the qualitative outcomes via a visual and logical presentation. 
3.5 Document Analysis 
The description and advantages of document analysis were confirmed by Bradley 
and Sutton (2010) in his book ‘Marketing research: Tools and techniques’, in which he 
explained document analysis as a useful way to approach a new study by reviewing, 
collecting, summarising and analysing all published data on the given research objectives. 
To avoid low-quality data, document analysis involves the designation of a proper 
filtering system to help the researcher screen and find reputable data to facilitate the later 
primary research. With sufficient high-quality data, the researcher can obtain new insights 
into and answers to the given research questions. 
Regarding the advantages of document analysis, Owen (2014) listed several pros, 
such as ease-of-application and cost-effectiveness (desk research costs nothing but time). 
 55 
Additionally, it is time-saving and provides a variety of data. While the researcher may 
find many types and forms of data, it might require time to control data quality (Kara, 
2012). This study drew on reputable sources of information, including reports of the 
People’s Procuracy of Vietnam and the People’s Public Security Forces, Vietnam’s anti-
corruption law, working paper and studies by well-known experts. 
In this phase, all provisions, policies and laws related to anti-corruption in 
Vietnam were scrutinised. It concentrated on exploring the current shortcomings of 
Vietnam’s anti-corruption legal system, concerning the national law enforcement 
capacity of anti-corruption agencies and bodies. 
Below are the documents on anti-corruption law, including the Law on Anti-
corruption 2012, Criminal Code 2009 (section: the crime of corruption), the Law on Land 
Management, Criminal Procedure Code and statistics on corruption. 
3.5.1 Source of Information 
This section sets out a full list of the information sources from which the 
researcher collected secondary data. References are arranged into categories, including 
government reports, non-government officers’ syndicated reports, working papers, 
journal articles and other sources of information. 
3.5.1.1 Government Documents 
These include reports and documents produced by Vietnamese government 
departments such as the Government Statistical Officer, Government Inspectorate of 
Vietnam, the People’s Procuracy of Vietnam and the People’s Public Security Forces. 
3.5.1.2 Other Reports 
These include reports issued by credible international organisations, such as 
Transparency International, the World Bank and universities. 
3.5.2 Pre-planned Materials 
Several materials were reviewed with the aim of facilitating the desk research, 
including of research studies and reports, such as ‘Viet Nam investment opportunities: 
2015’, ‘Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Vietnam’, ‘Viet Nam Youth 
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Integrity Survey’ and ‘What is the status of corruption and anti-corruption in Vietnam?’. 
Additionally, Vietnam’s legal documents, such as ‘Anti-corruption law in Vietnam’, 
‘Viet Nam’s penal code’ and the section titled ‘The crime of corruption’ in Criminal Code 
2009 were reviewed. It is noteworthy that other valuable sources can be found during 
desk research stage, to be listed in the reference source section. 
3.6 Qualitative Methodology (Semi-structured Interview) 
3.6.1 Methodology Overview 
The qualitative research interview seeks descriptions and meanings of the 
subject’s central themes. While a qualitative research interview covers both facts and 
meanings, it is concentrated on the challenge of understanding the meaning of 
interviewees’ responses (Kvale, 1996). Interviews are particularly productive in 
collecting the story behind a participant’s experiences and investigating respondents to 
questionnaires, to further investigate their responses (McNamara, 2017). McNamara 
(2017) also explained that interviewers could exploit further data throughout the topic. 
Aspects of qualitative research interviews described by Dapzury and Pallavi (2002) 
include: 
1. Interviews are conducted by interviewers to fully capture responses from 
interviewees (7 people voluntarily agreed to take part in the in-depth 
interviews) 
2. Time and in-depth skills are requirements of interviews. 
3. Unlike quantitative surveys, interviewers can raise further questions following 
responses. 
4. Interviews are more easily accepted by respondents, particularly regarding 
their own points of view and impressions. 
5. In face-to-face interviews, the interviewer works directly with interviewees. 
6. The interviewer is considered part of the measurement element and must be 
skilful in reacting to sudden and surprising events. 
7. The interview is a more personal form of research than questionnaires. 
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3.6.2 Qualitative Research Strategy 
To understand in-depth the extent to which corruption occurs in Vietnam, 
researchers analyse government systems qualitatively (Arthanari & Ullah, 2011). 
Qualitative research is concerned with information based on opinions and values, not on 
statistical data (Yin, 2009). Case studies are a form of practical research that attempts to 
investigate an existing phenomenon in a realistic context (Arthanari & Ullah, 2011). A 
case study approach allows capturing real-life events and broad views of a phenomenon 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
This case includes key actors such as government ministries or agencies and 
police departments (Arthanari & Ullah, 2011). A combination of semi-structured and in-
depth interviews was used to collect the data, mostly face-to-face interviews with 
qualified participants. Interviewees were well-informed individuals or experts, such as 
principal investigators, to identify relevant sources of evidence (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). 
Interviews covered a range of topics, such as personal definition of corruption, 
assessment of corruption in Vietnam, the government’s role in combating corruption in 
Vietnam, assessment of the investigator, prosecutors of corruption, the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption agencies and corruption prevention program in the dynamics of 
corruption, and the main efforts made to fight corruption. This research mainly focuses 
on individuals’ perceptions of corruption and understandings of the corruption cases. 
Interviews were carried out using the following categories: 
1. period to complete one corruption case prosecution 
2. main causes of corruption 
3. obstacles during the investigation, especially when suspects are senior 
officials 
4. corruption and trust in government and anti-corruption law and policy 
5. the role of anti-corruption law and agencies and their effectiveness 
6. measures for combating corruption such as corruption prevention programs 
and how to improve these. 
Interviewees were drawn from government ministries/departments involved in or 
in charge of three corruption cases over the past 10 years. Participants in the research 
 58 
were asked about the investigation of the three completed major corruption cases. 
Interviewees were persons who had investigated and interrogated corruption offenders in 
these three cases, including investigators and prosecutors. They were completely 
independent of the offenders in these three cases, and from the researcher. The 
interviewees were not asked about their varied opinions about corruption. The experience 
of the investigators helped the process of information gathering. 
There was minimal risk to the participants because those three cases had reached 
the end of the investigation and judgement, and the investigators and prosecutors had 
finished their tasks. Therefore, answers given in the interview related to the policies and 
laws applied to these three cases were not sensitive. The interviewees selected the 
locations at which to be interviewed; suggestions included a public library and a local 
coffee, far from their workplaces. The interviews ran over 15 February–24 March 2016. 
Names and other identifiers were removed to maintain anonymity. 
The sections below provide details of the three cases that had been investigated 
and prosecuted by the interviewees. 
3.6.2.1 Bui Tien Dung – Project Management Unit 18 (2007) 
In 2006, Bui Tien Dung, head of PMU 18 in the Transport Ministry, was accused 
of using millions of dongs of public funds, including funds from donors, to gamble on 
football matches and luxury consumption. The police found data inside the unit’s 
computers revealing that more than 200 employees at the unit had participated in the 
gambling. Mr Dung was also under investigation over the procurement of luxury vehicles 
for other government officials. The scandal affected many high-ranking officials and it 
was revealed that Bui Tien Dung attempted to bribe officials after being arrested. People 
in the Prime Minister’s office were investigated, and the General Secretary’s son-in-law 
was implicated. A Vice Chief of Police was implicated and withdrew his name from the 
list of delegates to the National Congress. The scandal once again raised serious questions 
about the effectiveness of ODA loans to Vietnam, and this resulted in the resignation of 
the Minister of Transport, who accepted responsibility for Bui Tien Dung embezzling 
millions of dollars of state money. 
Bui Tien Dung, who spent almost USD1 million on gambling activities and luxury 
items, was prosecuted for illegal gambling and bribery rather than corruption. His crime 
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was not considered corruption under criminal law and was therefore subject to a different 
punishment framework, and Dung was prosecuted under criminal and criminal procedural 
law. 
The PMU 18 scandal shed light on the qualitative nature of government issues; 
for instance, the governance structure of state-owned enterprises and the institutional 
design of PMUs, where external scrutiny and accountability are deficient. 
Former Transport Ministry official Bui Tien Dung was jailed for 13 years. 
3.6.2.2 Huynh Ngoc Sy – East West Highway Project (2010) 
According to Saigon Times (2010), the East West Highway provides an important 
axial road connecting the northeast and southwest areas of Ho Chi Minh City, to provide 
a short and efficient route from the city centre to the suburbs. OC Global conducted the 
technical design, resettlement program and construction supervision under a Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) ODA loan for the execution of the East West 
Highway Project (Saigon Times, 2010). The technical design commenced in 2001 and 
was completed in 2003, tender assistance was completed in November 2005 and 
construction commenced from February 2005. The tunnel and the entire 24 km of 
highway section were opened in November 2011 and the project was supposed to be 
completed in early 2015 (Saigon Times, 2010). Work on the East West Highway started 
in early 2005. The 22-kilometre road runs from the east of the city to the west, and goes 
through major districts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, Binh Tan and Binh Chanh (Nguyen, 2009). The 
highway was originally scheduled for completion in 2009, but the completion date was 
delayed until early 2010 due to postponement in site clearance and construction (Nguyen, 
2009). 
Huynh Ngoc Sy was the deputy director of the city’s Transport Department at that 
time and led the team in charge of the project. Huynh Ngoc Sy was accused of taking 
bribes from Pacific Consultants International (PCI), so that PCI would win bids in 2001 
and 2002 for the East West Highway project. During the district court in Tokyo in 
November 2008, prosecutors argued that the Japanese executives of PCI had given Sy a 
total of USD 2.6 million in bribes in return for consulting contracts in 2001–2003 for the 
USD 435 million highway project and the USD 184 million water environment project 
(Nguyen, 2009). Moreover, the investigation reported that while Sy was serving as the 
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head of the project management unit, he and his deputy Le Qua had abused their power 
to lease the office building of the East West Highway Management Unit in HCMC to PCI 
to establish a representative office (Nguyen, 2009). Eventually, to fine tune the 
relationship between the two countries, Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet told the 
Vietnam–Japan Special Friendly Ambassador Sugi Ryotaro in Hanoi that Vietnam was 
determined to deal with the case as per the law (Nguyen, 2009). 
The court sentenced Si to life imprisonment for taking bribes. 
3.6.2.3 Duong Chi Dung – Vinalines (2013) 
Duong Chi Dung’s corruption case at Vinalines aroused great public criticism and 
the punishment he receives will serve to measure Vietnam’s anti-corruption will. The 
investigative agency concluded that Vinalines’ former chairman, Duong Chi Dung, had 
purchased Floating Dock 83M at a much-inflated price, to misappropriate USD 1.6 
million of state funding. In fact, the entire investment was only worth USD 2.3 million; 
this move seriously harmed the state budget, because the purchased substandard dock was 
not usable at all. 
Nguyen Minh Thuyet, former Vice Chair of the National Assembly’s Committee 
for Culture, Education, Youth and Children, stated that state-owned enterprises use up to 
70% of Vietnam’s natural resources and as much as 40% of the state budget, but their 
contributions to the national economy are much lower than those of private firms. State-
owned enterprises are seen as weights pulling down national economic growth, and there 
is no convincing explanation of why the government insists on this economic model. 
Eventually, Dung was charged for the crime of embezzlement and intentional 
violation of state regulations, causing serious consequences to government economic 
management and state money. The court upheld the death sentence for Duong Chi Dung. 
Other accomplices received prison terms of 4–22 years. 
There had to be interviews about above three case studies because they were 
important cases relevant to serious corruption and bribery in Vietnam.  
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3.6.3 Interview Preparation 
3.6.3.1 Location 
The location selected for the research project is Ho Chi Minh, the centre of the 
Vietnamese administration division. There is no doubt that this choice eased the 
recruitment process. 
3.6.3.2 Interview Respondents 
Respondents were currently working in the police force and People’s Procuracy. 
Ten people (six men and four women) were invited to participate in the interview, but 
only seven accepted. Participants were directly involved in the investigation, 
interrogation and prosecution of significant corruption cases, for instances, the Duong 
Chi Dung (2013), Bui Tien Dung (2007) and Huynh Ngoc Si (2010) cases. 
3.6.3.3 Interview Technique 
The technique for obtaining primary data in the quantitative phase was a semi-
structured interview, which, according to Patton (2002), requires the researcher to have 
an informal face-to-face interview with respondents, privately, with either a structured 
discussion guide or free talk. The benefits of this methodology are providing a safe 
environment and a convenient atmosphere that might encourage the respondent to share 
frankly with the researcher. It can assist the researcher with observing the respondents’ 
behaviours and body language, since there are only two people in the room. 
As government officials, respondents would often spend their time contacting, 
investigating and addressing corruption matters. However, the key principles in 
investigation and police (e.g., confidentiality and limited public communication) could 
act as constraints in group sharing sessions; they may become sensitive to matters of 
personal privacy. In addition, the inspectors’ busy schedules caused difficulties for the 
researcher to set up a convenient time for a group session. Thus, a semi-structured 
interview was the most appropriate research methodology to interview the inspectors. 
One-on-one interviews also avoided the oft-observed conflicts in group discussions due 
to the leadership styles and restraint of the inspectors (Bradley, 2010). 
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The three selected cases were completely finalised in terms of investigation and 
trial; therefore, the interviews with the officials executing these cases did not affect the 
process of these cases. There was no possibility of appeal or petition, and it contained no 
risk. To achieve a coherent understanding of statements, actions and perceptions, it is 
important to engage in participant observation in various social situations (McNamara, 
2017); Dapzury and Pallavi (2011) suggest integrating into the system to be investigated, 
from ‘informal conversations’ to ‘structured interviews’. 
3.6.3.3.1 Interview questionnaires (Appendix 1) 
The interview questionnaire included 17 questions, to help the researcher identify 
the causes of corruption in public investment and the barriers to fighting against 
corruption in Vietnam; in detail: 
1. Questions 1–5 involved the person interviewed. 
2. Questions 6–9 concerned time spent investigating corruption cases in public 
investment and the effectiveness of combating corruption in public investment 
in Vietnam. 
3. Question 10 asked frankly about the causes of corruption in public investment 
in Vietnam. 
4. Questions 11–14 investigated the barriers in fighting against corruption in 
Vietnam. 
5. Questions 15–17 asked for suggestions for improving the effectiveness of anti-
corruption work in the field of public investment in Vietnam. 
3.6.3.3.2 Contact interviewees 
The researcher sent a letter to ask the People’s Procuracy and police force to 
identify the people who undertook the cases. The procuracy and police force sent an 
invitation letter, inviting those people to join the study. 
Attached to the interview invitation were two letters of support. First, from the Ho 
Chi Minh City Procuratorate (Appendix 2), introducing the researcher, and second, from 
RMIT, explaining the project (Appendix 3), the author and the reason for the request. If 
they agreed, employees contacted the author by email. 
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3.6.3.3.3 Arranging appointments 
As soon as invitees agreed to participate in the interviews, the author made 
appointments. The place of interviews was selected by the interviewees, to create a more 
relaxed environment for the interviewees. Interviews took place in Ho Chi Minh City and 
were conducted in Vietnamese. 
3.6.4 Data Analysis 
Interviews were recorded, and important details noted by the interviewer. After 
the interview, the researcher translated the entire contents from Vietnamese into English 
and recorded this in Microsoft Word. 
The data collected from the interviews comprised the main source for writing the 
case studies. Thematic analysis was conducted on each question, to gain a deeper 
understanding of corruption in public investment in Vietnam. 
3.7 Quantitative Methodology (Online Survey) 
Target respondents in the survey phase were chosen from a selection of officers 
working in three government agencies: the police, the procuracy and the Government 
Inspectorate. 
3.7.1 Methodology Overview 
The survey questionnaire was prepared and sent online. According to Bradley 
(2010), online surveys involve setting up an online platform with an electronic 
questionnaire and inviting all target respondents to a specific online site by email. This 
method appears to be the most cost-effective methodology since it can avoid costs of 
preparing locations and hiring interviewers; however, given the sensitive nature of the 
research (corruption), it required a specific online security system. In this study, an online 
survey with the support of Qualtrics (a well-known online research platform) was 
proposed. This phase involved a questionnaire to gauge respondents’ evaluations of the 
enforcement of Vietnam’s anti-corruption policies and laws regarding public investment. 
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3.7.2 Qualitative Research Strategy 
The survey questions were designed to investigate Vietnamese perceptions of 
corruption and the corruption phenomenon in the public sector, evaluate the efficiency of 
anti-corruption law implementation, measure the effectiveness of the current anti-
corruption ‘preventing’, ‘managing’ and ‘judging’ system in Vietnam, barriers to anti-
corruption inspection and shortcomings of the current anti-corruption system, and suggest 
practical solutions. 
3.7.3 Survey Preparation 
3.7.3.1 Survey Questionnaire 
The questions in the survey were arranged in a logical structure to assist the 
interviewer in obtaining accurate responses to serve the given research objectives. 
Specifically, the survey encompassed nine questions (Appendix 4).  
3.7.3.2 Sampling Survey Design 
According to Bradley (2010), a stratified sampling method separates the target 
population into a number of strata based on their demographic information (e.g., 
occupation, age and gender). In this study, for quantitative phase, the target respondents 
were officers from the Government Inspectorate, the police and the procuracy. 
Note: Sample Size (for quantitative phases) 
All participants in this research, who worked for the police, the inspectorate and 
the procuracy and departments, had an age range of 28–45 years. Most officers in the 
Vietnamese government, especially in the inspectorate and police department, are male. 
Thus, this study had a gender imbalance (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Participants in the Survey 
N=300 Males Females 
Total 181 119 
Police (N=110) 71 34 
Procuracy (N=100) 55 40 
Inspectorate (N=100) 55 45 
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3.7.3.3 Recruitment Process for Survey 
This is included two steps: 
Step 1: If respondents agreed, they needed to complete the questionnaire 
independently on the Qualtrics website. 
Step 2: An email introducing the researcher and research topic was sent to the 
Government Inspectorate, the police and the procuracy. The email provided a link to the 
questionnaire on Qualtrics. After receiving the email, the three agencies forwarded it to 
all of their staff. 
3.7.4 Data Analysis 
All collected data were analysed using Qualtrics. Qualtrics has a data-mining tool 
that draws intuitive, easy-to-understand graphs, from which the analyst found it 
straightforward to answer each of the research questions. 
3.8 Ethical Considerations 
The data collected in this research, related to corruption in Vietnam, was 
considered private and sensitive. It was compulsory for the researcher to control the 
confidentiality of the data. The audience of the collected data must be limited; only the 
moderator and his assistant had access to the data. There were several courses of action 
that had to be followed to guarantee the confidentiality of the research project. 
The target participants of the project were experts and office staff of the 
Vietnamese government. If the research was not conducted properly, issues might have 
occurred, such as the possibility that participants felt threatened or insulted by the 
research questions or the way the researcher approached them. There was also the 
possibility of the researcher losing the data or personal information gathered from the 
participants. There were potential legal issues regarding recording participants without 
their consent or approaching a minor without his/her guardian’s permission. Last, the 
researcher might have failed to maintain the confidentiality of the participants, such as 
personal information or confidential statements. 
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The researcher conducted interviews outside the workplace of the interviewees, 
which made them feel comfortable and free from pressure when responding to the 
researcher’s questions. All interviewees were requested to keep confidential their identity, 
and all such requests were fully fulfilled by the researcher. 
The online survey was based entirely on the willingness of the participants; thus, 
the participants did not feel any pressure to participate or respond to questions. 
The whole plan for the implementation of this study was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of RMIT University (Appendix 6). 
Note: The relationship between the author and the interviewees 
The researcher is currently a research student at RMIT University. Before 
attending a course there, the researcher was employed with the Ho Chi Minh City 
People’s Procuracy, working as a statist, analyst and evaluator of crimes in Ho Chi Minh 
City. Interviewees were office staff in the People’s Procuracy and Public Security, 
working in the same field as the author. However, they are senior officials, and thus, not 
aware of the author. The corruption cases to be reviewed in this study were investigated 
and interrogated under the authority of the Supreme People’s Procuracy and Ministry of 
Public Security. These agencies have higher authority than that where the researcher used 
to work. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the methodology for this research study. The first 
component is a document analysis covering corruption in Vietnam in the field of public 
investment, and reports on the application of corruption law in public investment in 
Vietnam. The paper also uses qualitative and quantitative research methodologies to 
ensure in-depth discussions on the causes of corruption in Vietnam and barriers to the 
investigation process and provide suggestions to improve the effectiveness of anti-
corruption work in Vietnam. The next chapter begins the process of applying the 
methodology, examining the current situation of the application of anti-corruption law in 
Vietnam. 
  
 67 
Chapter 4: Corruption in Public Investment in Vietnam 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses corruption in public investment in Vietnam, in two parts: 
the first part provides an overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Vietnam, and the 
second part discusses corruption in the public investment sector in Vietnam. 
4.2 Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Vietnam 
Corruption occurs worldwide (Glennie, 2017; Paulus & Kristoufek, 2015), 
hampering development, especially in developing countries such as Vietnam. According 
to Transparency International’s Corrupt Index, Vietnam is near the top of the list of the 
most corrupt countries in the world; more specifically, the country ranked 107 of the 175 
surveyed countries and 21 of the 35 Asian countries (Transparency International, 2017). 
Corruption is a phenomenon resulting from both managerial and societal issues, such as 
legal loopholes, shortcomings of governmental enforcement agencies, discrimination, 
and even irresponsibility of government staff (Johari & Ibrahim, 2017). In some South 
East Asian countries, including Vietnam, China, Cambodia and Laos, corruption is 
normalised as part of the national culture, and needs controlling and preventing as soon 
as possible; any further increases will affect their national economies. 
4.2.1 General Corruption 
Corruption is attributed to many factors, such as history, social traditions, culture, 
the economy, social ethical norms and a country’s legal system. Corruption appears in 
many competitive landscapes (market competition, political elections, health care 
services and public investment), and bribery is offered in many forms (e.g., money, 
materials or specific exclusive rights), with the purpose of gaining special treatment in a 
country’s current legislation system. In Vietnam, the regulatory environment, including 
the Economic Law, Investment Law, Public Procurement Act and Labour Law, has been 
developed to prevent corruption, but it still faces various pressures. 
From a legal perspective, corruption is associated with bribery and beneficial 
exchange with the purpose of gaining advantage from the country’s national system 
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(Philp, 2016). In Vietnam, most acts of corruption are considered crimes (Nguyen, Doan, 
& Tran-Nam, 2016). Traditional exchanges have evolved to a more dangerous form, with 
mutual benefit exchanges facilitated by the organisational systems of nepotism and 
clientelism. 
According to Ryder (2016), there is a strong connection between white collar 
crime and corruption cases, as most offenders are governmental staff, members of the 
justice system and highly educated people (e.g., professionals and other key opinion 
leaders). Although white collar crimes (such as the three corruption cases discussed in 
this paper) represent few of Vietnam’s criminal cases, they cause significant financial 
damage compared with other cases. 
The latency of white collar corruption is high (Goldstein, 2018). Empirical 
research shows that most cases going to court involve petty corruption, with low amounts 
of unlawful advantage (in petty corruption, mostly cash) involved. Taking into account 
the occupations of the offenders, it is evident that corruption appears in almost every 
segment of society. The conclusion that can be drawn is that acts of small-scale corruption 
are interwoven in the daily life of the population. Corruption practices are an integral part 
of everyday activities for many people. The motives of the perpetrators are mostly 
financial gain and avoiding punishment or administrative procedures. 
Since there is systematic regulation implemented to curb corruption, large-scale 
corruption is not often seen. It is complicated to officially launch an investigation into 
white collar corruption because of the complicated mutual relationships between 
government departments and the discrepancy among public/private institutions’ 
organisational functions. In other words, decision-making power in the existing 
government mechanisms is allocated ambiguously; sometimes, the executive level has 
the right to make independent decisions without reporting to their direct supervisor, which 
causes managerial loopholes that facilitate corruption. To disguise themselves, offenders 
in white collar corruption cases might take advantage of their relationship with 
government staff to bribe attorneys and strawmen; the real villain remains invisible in 
most cases (Galang, 2011). 
Petty corruption acts, which are undertaken by low-level staff (Temudo, 2015), 
can be separated with an organisational legal obligation. Many of those are only the tips 
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of the iceberg; in other words, they could be considered either an integral part or a specific 
income channel of a corruption machine. It seems that struggling with white collar 
corruption by law enforcement and the judiciary is a challenge indeed, requiring the 
involvement of civic and political will. 
4.2.2 Corruption in Vietnam 
There have been many quantitative and qualitative studies conducted with the aim 
of facilitating Vietnam’s fight against corruption and improving its anti-corruption laws. 
The World Bank (2010) evaluated Vietnam as a country having poor performance in 
terms of corruption and governance management; the Worldwide Governance indicators 
show that there was no improvement in Vietnam’s governance management in terms of 
management effectiveness, quality of regulatory, political stability and accountability in 
the period 2004–2010. Vietnam’s corruption management indicator rose from around 23 
to 33 over 2004–2010, but this is a negligible quantity. 
In their Enterprise Survey, the World Bank (2009) identified that in the business 
sector in Vietnam, over half of the surveyed companies believed that they were expected 
to bribe public officials to have their projects ‘lubricated’ (get things done well). This was 
also proved by the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness report, with 59% of surveyed 
enterprises stating that under-the-table money is common (Thi-Phung, Alcaide & 
Anderson, 2009). 
In a public investigation into Vietnamese corruption, Transparency International 
(2010) found that over 62% of those interviewed perceived corruption as a serious issue 
in the country. Although the government attempted to struggle against corruption, only 
37% of urban inhabitants believed that it ‘did something’, while 34% felt these efforts 
were ineffective. Additionally, nearly 50% of respondents voted the VCP to be the most 
powerful organisation in controlling corruption (Newsweek, 2017). 
4.2.2.1 History 
Facilitating national economic growth is a challenging task for Vietnam’s 
government. The centrally planned economy under the communist framework was 
seemingly too centralised and nourished corruption from the inside. In 2017, Vietnam 
was ranked 119 of 175 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
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Index. Because of corruption, living standards remain low. Vietnam’s economic growth 
is hampered by corruption. One of the many forms of corruption in Vietnam is unfair land 
appropriation. A report by the World Bank in 2015 stated that land administration is the 
second most corrupt sector in Vietnam. In late 2013, the Vietnam National Assembly 
passed the 2013 Land Law (No.45/2013/QH13), which enables private investors to either 
negotiate directly with local landowners or go through the National Assembly to acquire 
permission to appropriate land. This new law creates opportunities for unfair 
compensation. Private investors from other countries use bribes to exploit the poor locals 
and persuade them to sign their land and livelihood away. When the local families realise 
the compensation was not fair, they cannot buy back their land, even for a higher amount 
of money than they received from the original sale (Vo, 2015). Deceitful compensation 
and misappropriation of land from original landowners and farmers are the setting of 
corruption in many places in Vietnam. Land requisition for big construction projects is 
one of the biggest issues, and has caused many disputes in Vietnam. 
Le Hien Duc, an anti-corruption activist and winner of the Integrity Award from 
Transparency International, maintains a Facebook page to address this matter (Le, 2016). 
In her daily Facebook posts, she displays many unfair land-appropriation cases between 
Vietnamese officials and local citizens. On 8 April 2015, she posted a story about a bloody 
incident related to Ha Tinh’s land dispute. The residents of Hoa Loc had raised objections 
against the 500kW electrical outlet being wired through their neighbourhood. They 
argued that the wire poses a fatal danger to their lives as well as to their rice fields. To 
respond to residents’ concerns, the government authority sent more than 500 policemen 
and dogs to attack the protesters. At least two critically injured residents had to be 
admitted to the emergency room at the local hospital. Ms Le Hien Duc expressed her 
disappointment with Hoa Loc’s officials, whose jobs were to protect its citizens. She said 
because of possible illegal contracts and kickbacks, the authorities had turned their backs 
on the local people (Le, 2016). Le Hien Duc has uploaded many other posts supporting 
ongoing protests in Vietnam’s capital, Hanoi, since November 2014. Ignoring public 
objections, hundreds of trees, including some century-old trees, were cut to make room 
for a railroad project. Tran Trong Hieu, an official from the Hanoi Department of 
Construction, said they had been authorised by the local government to cut down the 
trees; however, the original contract, which dated back to 2008, never mentioned a tree 
removal addendum and authorisation. Cutting down trees without obtaining prior 
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approval from the community generated concerns about unethical bidding and illegal 
embezzlement for contract permits among officials (Baodauthau, 2016). Japan 
International Cooperation Agency has a mission to work with cities for urban 
development. On 4 February 2015, Japan International Cooperation Agency requested 
the Vietnamese Department of Transportation to return USD 782,640 (80 million yen) 
due to briberies and corruption related to the Hanoi’s USD 41 million. Six railroad 
officials have been temporarily imprisoned (Doan, 2015). A representative of the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency Advisory Board, Yamamoto Kenichi, stated, ‘This is 
the second time since 2008, corruption is caught within many of Japan ODA project in 
Vietnam. I hope this is the last time because if the third incident happens, the Japanese 
investors will be completely removing all supports to Vietnam’ (Cassin, 2015). 
4.2.2.2 Petty and Bureaucratic Corruption 
In recent years, to reduce bureaucratic corruption and improve the business 
environment, the Vietnamese government has implemented a series of reforms (e.g., 
Public Administration Reform [PAR]) aimed, among other things, at reducing the 
regulatory burden on companies, because it reduces the number of business licenses 
required to start a new business. These include measures such as simplifying company 
establishment procedures, reducing permit requirements and establishing ‘one-stop-
shops’. While these reforms are reflected to some extent in the country’s improved 
performance in the Global Competitiveness Report 2012, the number of procedures and 
time required to start a business, for example, remain high (World Economic Forum, 
2014). 
Citizens’ experience of corruption in accessing public services is also high in 
Vietnam. More than 40% of the 2010 Global Corruption Barometer’s respondents 
declared having paid a bribe to at least one of nine different service providers in the 12 
months preceding the survey. Since more than 7% of the respondents did not have any 
contact with any of the services providers, the experience of corruption among service 
users might be much higher (Transparency International, 2010). 
4.2.2.3 Society and Corruption 
As a developing country with low income, Vietnam has a huge gap between rural 
and urban areas and majority and minority ethnic groups. In rural areas, many people 
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have monthly income below the standardised poverty level (World Bank, 2013). These 
figures demonstrate the high discrepancy between average wealth index in the urban and 
rural landscapes; urban household monthly expenses are double those of rural households. 
In addition, family education levels are a significant contributor to poverty; 
specifically, poverty can be transmitted from generation to generation because of parental 
education. Over 60% of households in Vietnam have a parental education level of only 
primary school, which might prevent households from escaping from poverty (World 
Bank, 2013). 
It is noteworthy that although overall literacy in Vietnam is high, there is 
significant inconsistency in education quality among schools across the country. 
According to World Bank (2013), 80% of poor children aged 12 years are unable to pass 
a literacy test, while 7% are unable to write a complete sentence; these 7% are likely to 
be stuck in the poverty trap that their parents are unable to escape. To remove the 
significant gap between rural and urban children, many charity groups and funds have 
been organised, by both government and private organisations, with government charity 
groups managed by public officials. However, the cash flow of these groups is not 
recorded and audited transparently, creating room for unethical, corrupt actions. 
4.2.2.4 Public Administration 
Regarding public administration, the overlap and duplication of responsibilities 
and ambiguous allocation of leadership among government agencies as well as public 
officials results in corruption in the civil service (Bailey, 2018). Up to 88% of Vietnamese 
citizens thought that corruption was facilitated by the mechanisms of the government. 
The PAR proposed several solutions to reduce administrative cumbersomeness at a 
national scale, yet these have not worked as well as expected (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2014). 
Public procurement (e.g., buying cars, building offices and hotel expenses for 
office business trips) is considered one of the sectors most susceptible to corruption. In 
2009, the total annual amount of public procurement was approximately VND 388,985 
trillion (USD 20.47 billion), accounting for more than 22% of GDP. A study conducted 
by Vian, Brinkerhoff, Feeley, Salonmon and Vien (2012) concludes that the number of 
competitive tenders in the total value of awarded government procurement contracts 
declined significantly between 2008 and 2009. In 2008, more than 72% of contracts were 
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awarded through competitive bidding, while in 2009, only 53% of procurement contracts 
followed a competitive bidding process. 
It is worth noting that there are several challenges in regards to public 
administration, especially in the areas of tax collection and business registration. 
Transparency International (2015) indicated that the current legal loopholes in 
Vietnamese tax laws have contributed to the increase in corruption in tax administration 
and has caused difficulties for small- and medium-sized companies. Nearly 20% of 
surveyed medium-sized companies reported making informal payments (under-the-table) 
during their negotiations for a tax review with the Department of Tax at the end of the 
year for the previous three years (Malesky, 2016). 
4.2.2.5 Judiciary 
The judiciary’s power must be separated from the parties at all levels; however, 
since there is only one communist party in Vietnam, the national courts are completely 
managed and influenced by the party (Herr, 2018). This has resulted in inevitable 
intervention and enforcement in the systematic operation of the court because of the 
dependence of judgements on the VCP; the Global Integrity (2010) even revealed that 
many appointments for judge positions were heavily based on mutually beneficial 
relationships instead of legal expertise. A lack of fairness, consistency and transparency 
in legal decisions is understandable, given that the lack of judicial independence has been 
noted as one of the most challenging problems in Vietnam. 
Corruption in the judicial system is cited by 28% of domestic investors as one of 
the main factors preventing them from using courts to resolve business disputes (Malesky, 
2016). Similarly, Vietnamese citizens surveyed for the Global Corruption Barometer 
perceive the judiciary as the fourth most corrupt sector in the country. 
4.2.2.6 Education 
According to Transparency International (2015), 90% of those surveyed agreed 
that education was one of the most corrupt sectors in Vietnam, and 39% of people who 
had had contact with the sector had experienced corruption behaviour by public officials. 
There are many forms of corruption in the education sector, including corruption in the 
educational revolution at the national scale, in the construction of schools, in the purchase 
 74 
of teaching instruments and even in the provision of school books (Transparency 
International, 2017). Petty corruption includes bribing teachers in exchange for awards 
recognising learning achievement or good marks. At the undergraduate level, parents may 
bribe teachers to ensure enrolment in a specific desired university. 
4.2.2.7 Police 
Global Integrity Report (2010) identified that over 90% of Vietnamese 
respondents associate the police with corrupt behaviour, and nearly 50% had witnessed 
acts of corruption by police. Many citizens reported that they had given bribes of USD 
3–30 to traffic police. It is worth noting that young people’s experience of corruption 
seemed to be much higher than seniors; around 40% of young people interviewed 
confirmed that they had experienced corruption, while this number was only 19% for 
seniors. Nepotism and favouritism in police sectors, with personal and money-oriented 
appointments to important positions, are emerging as problematic issues in a corrupt 
recruitment system. 
4.2.2.8 Health Sector 
The Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 2013 shows that 85% of citizens 
perceive serious corruption in central health services, while 65% perceive corruption in 
local health services. The prevalence of corruption in the health sector is also confirmed 
in Transparency International (2015), where 29% of users of medical services reported 
paying bribes. 
The surveys, conducted by Transparency International and Boston University 
School of Public Health in 2012 and Towards Transparency in 2011, highlighted a 
phenomenon of ‘under-the-table money’ in the health sector in Vietnam. This 
phenomenon was suspected of being facilitated by the government, in that they adopted 
a private management mechanism that allows public hospitals to offer private services of 
higher quality to patients. This kind of ‘unintentional encouragement’ reduced the 
transparency and efficiency of public health services management, and created room for 
corruption (Transparency International, 2011). 
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4.2.2.9 Environment, Natural Resources and Extractive Industries 
Vietnam has a high demand for timber from its developing furniture 
manufacturing industry; however, legal restrictions on domestic logging have forced the 
country to import timber from neighbours such as the Kingdom of Cambodia and Lao 
PDR. Ironically, Lao also prohibited raw timber exports in 2008, implying there is an 
illicit log trade occurring between Lao PDR and Vietnam (Duong, Kadokami, Shirasaka, 
Hidaka, Kong & Nguyen, 2015). Corruption is growing in the forestry sector, with the 
opaque process for logging quota distribution treated as negotiable based on bribery and 
beneficial relationships. 
Oil, gas and extractive industries have been developing swiftly in recent years. 
Vietnam is endowed with more than 60 types of minerals, including bauxite, titanium, 
rare earth and limestone. In 2009, these sectors accounted for approximately 25% of state 
budget revenues (Ha & Duong, 2018). There is a lack of transparency and accountability 
related to information on incomes and expenditures of extractive industries, and no clarity 
in relation to commission fees and environmental protection charges in the oil and gas 
sector, which may leave room for corruption to flourish (VCCI, 2011). Both are 
considered by stakeholders as ‘secretive’ as there is little public information available 
(Ruggie, 2017). 
4.2.2.10 Land Management 
Vietnam faces challenges in the process of land acquisition and allocation. The 
complexity, systematic detects and opaqueness in the procedures for licensing under the 
Land User Certification facilitate corrupt behaviour. The World Bank (2011) reported 
many corrupt acts of land investors, who did not hesitate to bribe land officials in 
exchange for privileges in accessing, occupying and exploiting land resources. Some 25% 
of urban Vietnamese who had contact with land services in 2009 reported paying bribes 
(Transparency International, 2009). The World Bank Development Report (2010) 
showed that 20% of those surveyed who had used the service that issues Land Use Rights 
Certificates since 2006 perceived the level of corruption within such services as ‘average’, 
while 15% perceived it as ‘serious’. 
According to the World Bank (2011), a combination of policy reforms, greater 
transparency and enhanced accountability would help reduce the threat of corruption 
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related to land management. The government is working to improve the legal framework 
for land administration in the country. The Law of Land (2003) has enabled the creation 
of a more transparent environment and addressed former discrepancies in land policy and 
land administration between North and South, but stronger implementation, as well as 
transparency and accountability, are needed. 
4.3 Corruption in the Public Investment Sector in Vietnam 
4.3.1 Public Investment 
The government is making a great effort to build the national capital stock via the 
allocation of major resources to public investment (Ha & Hanh, 2012), such as innovation 
activity (basic research), basic physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, rail lines, airports 
and water distribution), education (primary and advanced, job training), and green 
investment (clean power sources and weatherisation) (Bivens, 2012). This will lead to 
higher productivity and living standards, and bring benefit not only to those undertaking 
the investment but help boost growth, promoting private investment to a wide range of 
people and businesses. In developing countries, particularly Vietnam, governments are 
advised to increase investment in infrastructure to encourage international trade and 
economic growth (Tran, 2012). 
There are doubts about the inefficiency of public investment in infrastructure 
construction due to corruption. In developing countries where there is poor governance, 
corruption is common and much worse on projects involving the public sector (McLaren 
& Yoo, 2016). Haque and Kneller (2008) reported that public sector corruption can 
usually be seen in two elements: an exaggeration in project costs and the use of inferior 
materials, or both. This section discusses public investment including its efficiency in 
Vietnam, how corruption is currently occurring in public investment and typical 
corruption cases in the past. 
From 2005 to 2008, public investment increased significantly, reaching 40% of 
GDP. The government intended to spend 30% of budget expenditures on investment 
development. As reported by Hong (2016) from the Vietnam News Agency, Prime 
Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has constantly urged all ministerial agencies and local 
authorities to speed the disbursement of public investment funds, so that Vietnam reaches 
its 2016 target of 6.7% growth. Statistics released by Mai Tien Dung, chief of the 
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government office, claimed that national disbursement had reached USD 1.85 billion, 
which accounted for 70% of ODA funds, in the first five months in 2016, while USD 22 
billion remained unexploited (Hong, 2016), with unmanageable paperwork cited as 
slowing the disbursement of public investment funds (Ha & Hanh, 2012). During a 
meeting with top officials from the Ministry of Investment and Planning, Vuong Dinh 
Hue (Deputy Prime Minister) stated that the government would strictly punish and replace 
officials who block or interfere with the disbursement. 
4.3.2 Corruption in Public Investment 
Although Doi Moi recorded a number of achievements and has been described as 
one of the most successful economic transformations globally, Vietnam encounters a sea 
of challenges and risks (Vu & Hartley, 2017). There are many pitfalls associated with 
rapid development, and corruption is one (Le, 2013). Corruption has a negative impact 
on the development rate of countries including Vietnam, and anti-corruption is a growing 
global trend. One of the challenges for Vietnam in successfully implementing anti-
corruption laws is that it is too broad to manage (OECD, 2007). Additionally, lack of 
freedom of information limits the fight against corruption, because freedom of 
information is a fundamental part of transparency, which plays a significant role in 
development (Leon, 2014). Corruption is a threat that is destroying and driving the 
renovation process of the VCP and Vietnam (Costandi, 2013). Corruption arises in 
business to gain benefit over competitors; it has become a phenomenon in Southeast Asia 
public investment, especially in infrastructure development. Public investment involves 
corruption risks that can prevent Vietnam from achieving modernisation and 
industrialisation by 2020, and is damaging people’s trust in the VCP’s reform and policy 
(East Asia Forum, 2012). 
4.4 Conclusion 
Corruption has affected the development of the economy, politics, society and 
education in Vietnam. Chapter 4 reviewed corruption generally and in public investment 
in Vietnam. 
The next chapter reviews Vietnam’s legal regulations on anti-corruption and anti-
corruption models of public investment in Vietnam. The limitations of Vietnamese law 
in fighting corruption are also discussed.  
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Anti-corruption Law in Vietnam 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses anti-corruption law in Vietnam. Before going into the 
details of Vietnam laws relating to corruption in the field of public investment, this 
chapter provides an overview of the history of the formulation of the anti-corruption law 
in Vietnam, and the status quo regarding filing lawsuits and suspects for corrupt criminals 
in Vietnam. Finally, this chapter sets out the limitations of the anti-corruption law in 
Vietnam. 
5.2 History of the Formulation of the Anti-corruption Law in Vietnam 
To provide an understanding of the anti-corruption history of the Vietnamese 
government, this section gives an overview of the entire process of promulgating laws on 
anti-corruption from feudal times to the present. This overview will help show the 
development process of the law on anti-corruption, and evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of the present law on anti-corruption in Vietnam. 
The history of Vietnam can be divided into different periods; the two main periods 
are the feudal period (the period before the end of the 19th century / beginning of the 20th 
century) and the modern period (from the beginning of the 20th century) (Vietnam 
History, 2015). This section provides an overview of the formation process of Vietnam’s 
anti-corruption law in the feudal and the modern periods. 
5.2.1 Feudal Period 
In ancient days, expressions such as ‘greedy mandarins’ described those of high 
position who abused their positions and powers and used various ways and means to cause 
difficulties for ordinary people, receive bribes, take public property and money from 
ordinary people for personal gain (Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). 
These acts affected the social order and economy of feudal society, destroyed 
disciplines and rules set by the state and caused people to suffer and resent the royal court. 
Anti-corruption, therefore, was one of the major goals of feudal dynasties, not only to 
safeguard the economic interests of the ruling class, but to build a stable, prosperous 
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society and a regime that satisfied the people (Lindsey & Dick, 2002). For any emperor 
to rule for a long time, in addition to mastering and implementing relevant theories, he 
needed loyalty and affection from mandarins as well as the respect and support of the 
people (Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). Thus, a ‘sense of justice’ was a tactic to win the 
people’s hearts and maintain stability, to build and protect the ruling powers. This 
philosophy was clearly reflected in the legal regulations of the feudal dynasties of 
Vietnam, in the imperial edicts, decrees and orders of the king and the royal court (Dai 
Viet su ky toan thu (Whitmore, 1997). Organisational institutions and administrative 
apparatus, regimes and policies of managing mandarins were developed together with the 
history of national construction and defence to meet the needs of management and 
development of the economy, culture, society, security and defence at each stage and 
historical period Lindsey & Dick, 2002). 
To prevent corruption in the administrative apparatus, feudal states took a number 
of measures, such as reforming the state apparatus, recruiting talented people to contribute 
to the country and monitoring mandarins’ acts to evaluate their ethics and working 
capacity and to deal with corruption (Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). 
Measures against corruption in the feudal period generally reflect the ideology 
and views of the dynasties: always emphasising measures for prevention of corruption 
and considering prevention as one of the most important measures in building and 
maintaining a corrupt-free feudal state apparatus that failed to give mandarins room to 
commit acts of corruption (Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). 
5.2.1.1 Feudal Laws to Prevent Corruption 
Today, prevention of corruption is seen in the radical anti-corruption measures 
adopted by countries around the world. Experience has shown that preventive measures, 
if taken effectively, prevent conditions and opportunities resulting in corruption at the 
source; in other words, they help eliminate the causes of corruption and thus achieve long-
lasting and radical effects. Effective precautions against corruption avoid social 
instability as a result of corruption, and so are a very effective and radical anti-corruption 
measure (Ta, 2015). 
Studies on laws in the feudal period indicate that although the famous laws of 
Vietnamese feudal dynasties still preserved until today are the Penal Code (a law focused 
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on sanctions; Le, Thien, Tuyen and Lam (1965), the Penal Code and decrees and orders 
of the kings expressed very clearly the spirit of prevention of corruption (Ta, 2015). 
Although each stage and period ruled by different dynasties showed this spirits through 
different means, such laws always made an important contribution to the building of a 
corruption-free, strong government apparatus and righteous mandarins. This is discussed 
further below. 
5.2.1.1.1 Paying attention to administrative reforms 
Acts in feudal periods of Vietnam promulgated many regulations to build a 
corruption-free, strong government apparatus. In the Hong Duc Code (Cong, 2013), there 
were many laws for strong reforms under the Le dynasty. Under the reign of King Le 
Thanh Tong, the strongest and most effective reform was the new regulation that 
mandarins had to supervise each other at all times. Powers and responsibilities of each 
department, area and mandarin were clearly defined, and they were required to supervise 
one other. Each department was responsible for one task, departments were supervised 
by general departments, mandarins supervised each other, and mandarins of higher rank 
supervised those of lower rank (Cong, 2013). The feudal state’s apparatus under the reign 
of King Le Thanh Tong was considered powerful and effective, demonstrating the 
dominance of the central government over local governments throughout the country and 
the supreme power of the head of the state (Ta, 2015). 
According to Ta (2015), under the Le dynasty, mandarins were selected via 
various methods, such as mandarinic examinations and nominations. The royal court also 
regularly organised periodic evaluations of work effectiveness of mandarins to evaluate 
their performance and capacity every year. The King also organised Hoanh Tu 
examinations to choose talented mandarins for office. In choosing mandarins, integrity 
and righteousness were the top criteria. In particular, under the reign of King Le Thanh 
Tong, a ‘probation’ regime for mandarins was applied for the first time. 
Under the Nguyen dynasty, although there was not a clear policy regarding the 
selection and employment of mandarins, the methods used by kings in choosing 
candidates showed that they paid attention to choosing talent from among the elites in 
society who made great contributions to the country; the kings cared about family 
background in finding and fostering talent (Cong, 2013). According to the motto of King 
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Minh Mang, talented people are ‘assets’ of the state, so the king desired talented people 
in the royal court, and also outside the court, to help the king implement ambitious plans. 
These principles were effective in selecting managers to manage and maintain the social 
order under the Nguyen dynasty (Ta, 2015). 
One of the most popular measures taken by dynasties was Hoi Ty Rule (Rule of 
Avoidance) (Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). According to this rule, the head of a district 
was not allowed to assume office in his hometown, marry a local woman, have any real 
estate in the district under his management or have a deputy who came from the same 
locality as him, and importantly, these mandarins were allowed to change districts under 
their management with a certain cycle. According to Le, Thien, Tuyen and Lam (1965), 
under the Le dynasty, this rule was applied regularly to limit and prevent the possibility 
of committing acts beyond the powers of mandarins. Under the Nguyen dynasty, the 
experience of applying the Rule of Avoidance was developed to guidelines for employing 
personnel: after a person passed the royal examinations, the court often assigned him 
many different responsibilities so that he was rotated and challenged, to gain experience 
and mature (Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). In 1831, King Minh Mang promulgated the 
Rule of Avoidance, to prohibit relationships in areas such as inspections, trials and the 
grading of examinations. During the reign of King Thieu Tri, the king added a number of 
articles to the trial law, including regulations preventing relationships between mandarins 
coming from the same hometown, creating factions, family relationships, avoiding 
practices such as cover ups and collusion to implement corruption and bribery, as well as 
preventing repression of whistleblowers or deliberately unbalancing the justice system. 
The continuous improvement of the above regulations not only aimed to ensure fairness 
in the handling of state affairs and restrict the possibility of mandarins colluding with 
their relatives but to eliminate such acts as domineering and abusing their powers to harm 
people (Ta, 2015). 
5.2.1.1.2 Establishing a fair and reasonable salary regime for mandarins 
One of the measures established and implemented by the feudal courts was to 
define the salary regime of mandarins, depending on their rank, the nature of their job and 
the capacity of each individual. Right after receiving the throne, King Le Thanh Tong 
established regulations to be officially applied to mandarins, rituals, a regime for wages 
and taxes for Quan Van (civil mandarin) and Quan Vo (military mandarins) in the court 
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(Vi, Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). Those who committed corruption were dealt with 
strictly. This regime was defined in the principle (Hanoi, 1991): paying remuneration and 
bonuses to encourage people to make contributions, depending on their responsibilities. 
Royal family members and mandarins who made great contributions to the country and 
whose ranks were not defined were remunerated, and the bonus was based on different 
levels. Therefore, for Quan Van and Quan Vo inside and outside the court, responsibilities 
were totally different, so it was necessary to clarify great responsibility versus little 
responsibility. King Le Thanh Tong also ordered that, to reprimand officials, the wage 
and bonus regime must be strictly implemented (Hanoi, 1991, p. 95):  
“The State has set a wage & bonus regime in hope that you as mandarins would not 
commit corruption and issued rules and regulations for you to follow. Now you fail to 
comply with such rules and regulations, you have taken advantage of public issues to 
implement your personal issues while on duty, when settling a lawsuit, you’ve received 
bribes and haven’t observed the rules and regulations, causing all other people to 
express their dissatisfaction and resentment. Considering bad things, you have done, it 
is not a small issue at all. Now you must cleanse your heart, keep your righteousness 
and integrity, try to do public affairs well, love the military and ordinary people and 
maintain the peace of the society, then you are also peaceful. If you are not going to 
give up these bad acts and are accused of such acts or if I investigate and detect the 
truth, you will get a punishment that is more severe than normal punishment by 2 times. 
Mandarins of higher ranks and fellow mandarins, if failing to give advice to the 
mandarin breaking the rules and regulations, when the act is detected, they will be 
punished according to the law and their bonus shall be cut off.” 
Under the Nguyen dynasty, together with the wage regime, at the end of the reign 
of King Gia Long, the king provided an additional allowance in addition to the salary to 
maintain the integrity of mandarins; this was known as the allowance to maintain integrity 
(Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). At first, this allowance was only for heads of districts, 
such as Tri Phu and Tri Huyen, because according to King Gia Long, those mandarins 
were close to people, and although the ranks were not high, they took on great 
responsibilities. Thus, besides the salary, it was necessary to provide them with the 
allowance to maintain integrity and show the state’s favour. Later, under the reign of King 
Minh Mang, the beneficiaries of this allowance were extended. In addition to Tri Phu and 
Tri Huyen, Tri Chau and other officials such as Tri Chau were granted the money because, 
according to King Minh Mang (Wook, 2004), the allowance to maintain integrity was to 
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promote officials to keep their integrity. Under the reign of King Tu Duc, this money was 
also provided to tax collectors. The ‘allowance to maintain integrity’ regime applied only 
to officials at the local level; officials serving in the central government in the citadel 
were not entitled to this regime (Wook, 2004). 
According to Le, Thien, Tuyen and Lam (1965), the actual value of the allowance 
to maintain integrity under the Nguyen dynasty was so high that it was equal to the salary 
mandarins might receive for several months. Materially, it had considerable significance 
because mandarins relied on this amount to protect their integrity. The allowance to 
maintain integrity was a relatively effective measure to prevent corruption among 
mandarins under the Nguyen dynasty. 
5.2.1.1.3 Establishing agencies in charge of supervising real powers and work efficiency 
Along with conducting reforms and strengthening the bureaucracy, feudal courts 
also had relatively strict measures and regulations to monitor behaviour of officials. From 
as early as the Tran dynasty, the court assigned Ngu su dai as a body to supervise activities 
of mandarins (Wook, 2004). 
According to Le, Thien, Tuyen and Lam (1965), under the Le dynasty, King Le 
Thanh Tong set up six departments to supervise work efficiency of officials. Ngu su dai 
played a very important role, and heads of departments under Ngu su dai were usually 
held by doctors. In addition to Ngu su dai, the court also set up six departments as the 
inspectorates in six ministries, which were responsible for reporting on wrong acts 
committed by mandarins and issues that were not performed according to the regulations 
in each ministry. In the local government, the court set up an agency in charge of 
supervising Ngu su to monitor how work was done by regional level or lower-ranked 
mandarins. Each region assigned Hien sat su ty to investigate officials to prevent them 
from causing difficulties to people and to detect and report officials’ violations and clarify 
when the people felt unsatisfied. 
In 1804, under the Nguyen dynasty, after coming to the throne, King Gia Long 
established the titles of Do ngu su and Pho do ngu su. In 1827, King Minh Mang 
established the titles of Cap su trung and Giam sat ngu su. In 1832, he formally set up Do 
sat vien with a full statute, including six departments and Giam sat ngu su of regions. Do 
sat vien comprised officials with ‘speech freedom’ who were allowed to give direct 
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comments, tell the truth and give advice on state affairs (Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). 
The function of Do sat vien was defined as follows: Regardless of royal family members, 
mandarins of high ranks or low ranks, activities of all individuals such as committing 
illegal acts, or committing corrupt acts or not, how well or bad they perform their duties 
shall be under oversight (Nguyen, 2018). The duty of Do sat vien was to monitor the 
conduct of officials in the court, including royal family members, to detect non-
transparent, unfair, deceitful, arbitrary and cover-up acts. Do sat vien also supervised 
examinations for selection of talent candidates to ensure fairness in the examinations and 
selection process. 
To carry out public affairs, Do sat vien had a team supervision system, Giam sat 
ngu su in 16 regions that were responsible for supervising officials in the local 
government to detect corrupt officials and acts that were not fair and violated the state’s 
rules. Officials in Do sat vien and team supervisors also had the right to report on each 
other’s violations (Nguyen, 2018). 
Do sat vien was an independent body in the central government directly reporting 
to the king. It was the supervision body with the highest power in the history of the 
organisation in the monarchical period in Vietnam. It could be said that Do sat vien was, 
in fact, the highest and most complete supervision body of the Nguyen dynasty. This body 
created a strict and effective system of supervision from the central government to the 
local government, which not only helped strengthen the effectiveness of the centralised 
monarchy regime but ensured transparency, contributing to maintaining a corruption-free 
ruling apparatus at that time (Nguyen, 2018). 
5.2.1.1.4 Anti-corruption is the duty of all 
The provisions of the law in the feudal period supported anti-corruption 
institutions. All dynasties formulated policies to encourage those who denounced corrupt 
acts and considered it necessary to do so to protect whistleblowers so that they were not 
repressed when denouncing corrupt acts and prevent revenge by the corrupt persons and 
their confederates (Wook, 2004). 
During the Ly dynasty, there was a regulation that described that those who 
denounced acts of taking tax from the royal court by tax collectors would be exempted 
from three years of unpaid hard work, and the whistleblowers in the citadel would be 
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rewarded. Nguyen Ngoc Huy (1989) added that the Quoc trieu Hinh luat (also called 
Hong Duc Code) under the Le dynasty also had clear regulations regarding a satisfactory 
reward policy for people who correctly denounced corrupt acts: ‘People denouncing the 
collectors of rice as a mean of paying tax who declared less amount of rice than the actual 
amount will be awarded with different rewards depending on the severity levels of 
violations’ (Art. 351 of Quoc trieu Hinh luat); people denouncing rule-breaking acts 
related to the selection of soldiers will be awarded with different rewards depending on 
the severity levels of violations (Art. 170 of Quoc trieu Hinh luat) 
The law of the Nguyen dynasty also reflected these viewpoints. King Gia Long 
regulated that if the warehouse keeper and the guard were aware of the behaviours and 
tricks of the thief and denounced such behaviours, their offence would be forgiven. If 
outsiders detected a thievery act, they would be rewarded an amount worth 10 times the 
value of the stolen object. If the warehouse owner and his subordinates detected a thievery 
act, they would be rewarded an amount worth five times the value of the stolen object 
(Le, Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). 
Different dynasties put in place measures to encourage ordinary people to 
participate in the affairs of court in general and anti-corruption activities in particular. 
King Le Thanh Tong ordered his people to place a mailbox in the courtyard so that people 
could deposit whistleblowing letters; local people were allowed to post information on a 
board that pointed out good deeds and wrongdoings of local officials (Wook, 2004). 
According to Vi, Le, Thien, Tuyen and Lam (1965), under the Nguyen dynasty, 
King Gia Dinh kept a mailbox as a public opinion poll to gain awareness of public 
opinion. The king also issued an imperial edict asking for public opinion to collect direct 
comments and opinions, gather sympathy of the people and recruit talented people. To 
prevent and combat corruption in the construction field, the king stipulated that all 
contents of the work must be transparent and facilitate supervision. The state required that 
the people, especially soldiers and workers, must always care about the properties and 
supplies of the country. On construction sites, the king’s royal decrees and ordinances 
about corruption acts, punishments and the list of offenders were made in multiple copies 
and posted in many places so that everybody would know that stealing public funds and 
embezzling supplies were wrong, and thus, people would be aware and detect the 
wrongful act. 
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It can be seen that the Vietnamese government in the past always considered anti-
corruption as the common duty of the entire people and set appropriate measures and 
incentives so that people would be willing to denounce corruption, which brought success 
in building a strong, corruption-free feudal apparatus and trust among the people (Le, 
Thien, Tuyen & Lam, 1965). 
5.2.1.2 Strict Handling of Corruption Cases 
Law in the feudal period imposed strict penalties on corrupt criminals. 
 
Figure 5: A trial in the feudal period. 
Source: Vietnam History through Pictures – Le, Thien, Tuyen and Lam (1965) 
Strict and timely handling of corrupt persons 
In the codes and in other legal documents of feudal dynasties, there were 
provisions prohibiting mandarins from committing various acts (Le, Thien, Tuyen & 
Lam, 1965), including the following: 
1. must not be greedy or sweep properties off the people 
2. must not receive bribes; if they receive bribes, they will be punished based on 
value of the bribe 
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3. tax collectors must not declare a lower tax amount than the actual amount 
4. must not take advantage of public affairs for personal gain 
5. mandarins are strictly prohibited from nominating persons who do not have 
talents and virtue because of personal emotions and receiving a bribe 
6. judges must maintain fairness, must not take bribes or make improper 
judgements and force innocent people to admit that they are guilty. 
In all cases, corrupt acts were handled severely regardless of whether the corrupt 
person was a mandarin or from a royal family. As early as the Ly dynasty, there were 
specific regulations on the handling of embezzlement of public assets. Regulations on tax 
collection stated that tax collectors, in addition to ten parts contributed to the state’s 
warehouse, were entitled to collect one more part called ‘hoanh dau’. Those who collected 
more than the actual amount were considered thieves. Kho ty who collected tax in the 
form of silk were punished with 100 wooden rods for each metre of silk they stole; if they 
stole one piece of silk to over 10 pieces of silk, punishment was defined based on the 
number of pieces they stole plus 10 years of service (Huy, 1998).According to Vietnam’s 
Old Law and Judicial History (1973), Hong Duc Code under the Le dynasty had nearly 
30 articles providing for sanctions applied to corrupt acts, including the following (Huy, 
1998):  
“Persons with good family background and eunuchs in the citadel are not allowed to 
ask for Quan Vo’s help with military-related affairs, if they do not observe this 
regulation, mandarins of highest rank or second highest rank shall be punished or 
blamed, mandarins of third or fourth highest rank shall be dismissed, mandarins of fifth 
or sixth highest rank shall be exiled, mandarins of seventh highest rank shall be exiled 
or get capital punishment. If Quan Vo accepts the request, they will be exiled, if their 
offence doesn’t damage the military, the punishment shall be reduced.” 
In the provisions of the law promulgated by King Gia Long, there were 17 volumes 
providing for punishment imposed on the crime of accepting bribes and nearly 20 articles 
detailing this issue (Huy, 1998). Article 392 of the Gia Long Code states that Those who 
commit acts of embezzlement, stealing wages and supplies in warehouses, and stealing 
materials and bringing home, if total value of stolen objects is up to 40 tales, they will be 
beheaded. The person in charge of construction should not take advantage of his powers 
and rights to borrow supplies or from wages, even a small amount; if detected, he received 
a severe punishment. Mandarins who abused their powers or forced others to lend them 
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goods, supplies or wages received a punishment based on what they borrowed. If their 
crime was not so severe, they were beaten with 100 wooden rods, exiled for 3,000 miles 
and all the things they borrowed were confiscated for each type of good they borrowed. 
If the level of violation was serious, they were subjected to the death penalty. 
From the above analyses, it can be seen that all of the Vietnamese feudal dynasties 
had a decisive attitude in preventing and dealing with corruption. The penalties for corrupt 
persons were often very strict: at the mild level, they would be dismissed or receive a 
punishment called Lưu (exiled and forced to work very hard) or Đồ (forced to perform 
very heavy tasks); the greatest punishment was being beheaded. Handling measures were 
diverse to minimise the possibility of the development of this evil. Because of these strict 
measures, many dynasties maintained their political and social stability and were able to 
manage the country through hard times arising from natural disasters and wars. 
5.2.1.2.1 Handling of corruption-related property under feudal laws 
In addition to criminal penalties, depending on the case, corrupt persons might 
also be subject to a number of additional penalties such as fines, confiscation of property 
or removal from their position. The provisions of the Hong Duc Code related to the 
handling of corruption-related property were quite clear and based on the principle that 
corrupt persons had to compensate an amount two times greater than the value of the 
corrupt property and such property would be confiscated or returned to the people. This 
was also the principle in dealing with corruption-related property defined in the Gia Long 
Code of the Nguyen Dynasty. 
The provisions of the Le dynasty were clearly stated in Quoc trieu Hinh luat 
(Nguyen, 1989), which defined how to handle corrupt assets. According to this code, 
corrupt persons had to compensate an amount two times greater than the value of the 
corrupt property and such property was confiscated (in the case of stealing public assets). 
If officials accepted bribes (Article 138): If Quan ty violated the law and accepted bribes, 
he would be fined as twice as the bribe amount and this fine would be put in the Treasury; 
if he committed the act of wasting a public asset (Article 560), he would compensate as 
twice as value of the asset not true, declaring reduced rice amount while collecting rice 
as a form of paying tax (Article 351): If a rice collector declared reduced rice amount 
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while collecting, he would have to compensate an amount of rice two times higher than 
the stolen rice and pay it to the warehouse. 
The above analyses of the handling of corruption and related property show that 
as early as the feudal period, Vietnam had a comprehensive anti-corruption viewpoint and 
principles. The penalties for corruption varied, ranging from mild to severe, and the 
method of handling not only aimed at confiscating goods obtained from corruption, but 
applied a principle of demanding twice as much compensation as was stolen. This method 
deterred mandarins from committing corrupt acts. 
To conclude, in the feudalism, there happened to have punishments for those who 
committed anti-corruption laws which were stipulated in the Hong Duc Code (Pendal 
Code) as shown above. At the present day, these punishments are stipulated in Pendal 
Code, especially they have been regulated in anti-corruption laws.  
5.2.2 Vietnam’s Anti-corruption Law in the Modern Period 
Vietnam obtained its independence on 2 September 1945 and became a unified 
country on 30 April 1975. To effectively build, develop and manage the country, the 
National Assembly of Vietnam has promulgated many policies and laws to govern the 
country. Being aware of the importance of anti-corruption in Vietnam, the National 
Assembly of Vietnam and the Vietnamese government have promulgated many legal 
documents on anti-corruption (Ministry of Justice, 2005). Vietnam also has an anti-
corruption strategy and officially participates in the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption in 2003. 
5.2.2.1 Historical Milestones in Vietnam’s Anti-Corruption Law 
Prior to the issuance of the Anti-corruption Law 2005, Vietnam had only issued 
ordinances on anti-corruption; specifically: 
Prior to the year of 1998, according to the National Assembly of Vietnam’s 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam which was issued on October 21, 1970 concerning those 
violating socialist-property laws. Crimes related to socialist property encompassed: 
causing danger, likelihood to re-commit, performed by a group of people and so forth. 
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1998: Vietnam’s National Assembly passed the Ordinance Against Corruption on 
26 February 1998. 
2000: Vietnam’s National Assembly issued Ordinance No. 22 on 28 April 2000, 
amending and supplementing a number of articles of the Ordinance Against Corruption. 
2005: The National Assembly of Vietnam officially promulgated the Anti-
corruption Law 2005 (Law No. 55/2005/QH11 dated 29 November 2005); following the 
issuance of this law, the National Assembly of Vietnam has made amendments twice, in 
2007 and 2012. In particular: 
2007: Law No. 01/2007/QH12 dated 17 August 2007, amending and 
supplementing a number of articles of the anti-corruption law. 
2012: Law No. 27/2012/QH13 dated 23 November 2012, amending and 
supplementing articles of the anti-corruption law. 
Law on anti-corruption consists of eight chapters and 92 articles: 
Chapter I. General provisions, including 10 articles (Articles 1–10) 
Chapter II. Prevention of corruption, consisting of 48 articles (Articles 11–58), 
which is divided into six sections 
Chapter III. Detecting corruption, consisting of nine articles (Articles 59–67), 
divided into three sections 
Chapter IV. The handling of corruption acts and other violations of the law, 
including four articles (Articles 68–71), divided into two sections 
Chapter V. Organisation, responsibilities and coordination activities of the state 
inspectorate, state auditing, investigating and procuracy agencies, courts and relevant 
agencies, organisations and units in anti-corruption activities, consisting of 13 articles 
(Articles 72–84) 
Chapter VI. The role and responsibility of society in anti-corruption, including 
four articles (Articles 85–88) 
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Chapter VII. International cooperation on anti-corruption, including two articles 
(Articles 89 and 90) 
Chapter VIII. Implementation clause, including two articles (Article 91 and 92). 
5.2.2.2 National Strategy on Anti-corruption 
Anti-corruption is the responsibility of the entire political system and is an 
important and long-term task throughout the process of socio-economic development and 
building of a socialist rule-of-law state (Thuvienphapluat, 2009). In line with this 
viewpoint, on 12 May 2009, the Government of Vietnam issued Resolution No. 21/NQ-
CP implementing a National Strategy Against Corruption to 2020. 
The strategy has the goal of preventing and eliminating the conditions of and 
opportunities for corruption; intensifying inspection and supervision of the exercise of 
state power and preventing the abuse of positions and powers for personal benefit. 
The strategy sets out five basic solutions: strengthening transparency in policy 
making, law making and implementation; perfecting the mechanism of inspecting, 
examining and supervising the implementation of transparency in policy making, law 
making and implementation; improving the economic management mechanism and 
building a transparent business environment; raising the efficiency and effectiveness of 
inspection, examination, supervision, audit, investigation, prosecution and trial in the 
detection and handling of corruption; and raising awareness and promoting the role of the 
whole society in anti-corruption (Thuvienphapluat, 2009). 
The National Strategy Against Corruption to 2020 is to be implemented in three 
phases. The first phase (2009–2011) is a synchronous implementation of solutions such 
as improving the capacity to detect and handle corruption, promoting the handling of 
noticeable corruption cases and reducing resentment among the public. 
The second phase (2011–2016) involves taking preventive measures such as 
control of assets and income of officials and civil servants. A review of 10 years of 
implementation of the anti-corruption law is to form the basis for amendment and 
supplementation of this law to suit the new situation. 
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The third phase (2016–2020) continues to effectively implement the solutions that 
have been proposed and implemented in the previous phases. 
In addition to the development of this anti-corruption law and anti-corruption 
strategy, the Vietnamese government also participates in the International Convention on 
Anti-Corruption (2012). 
5.2.2.3 International Convention on Anti-Corruption (2003) 
On 4 December 2000, the General Assembly of the UN issued Resolution No. 
55/61 determining the need for an effective international legal document on anti-
corruption. According to this resolution, the Committee for the Preparation of the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption was established. On 31 October 2003, the 
convention, which comprises eight chapters and 71 articles, was adopted by the UN 
commission (Transparency International, 2017). 
To integrate with the world economy, the Vietnamese government has actively 
joined international conventions, including the International Convention Against 
Corruption (2003). On 30 June 2009, the President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
signed Decision No. 950/2009/QD-CTN ratifying the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption; on 19 August 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam issued a 
Declaration on the Implementation of the Convention and sent a reservation to the UN. 
Thus, Vietnam has officially become a party to this convention and is obliged to 
implement its obligations under the terms of the convention, except for provisions 
declared as reservations. 
In the Declaration on the Implementation of the Convention sent to the UN, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam (Vietnamlawmagazine, 2016) stated that: 
“The Socialist Republic of Vietnam declares not to directly apply the provisions of the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption; the implementation of the provisions 
of the Convention shall be in accordance with the principles of the Constitution and the 
applicable laws of Vietnam on the basis of bilateral or multilateral cooperation 
agreements with other countries and the principle of reciprocity.” 
Thus, Vietnam is obliged to implement the UN Convention against Corruption 
but based on internal legislation of provisions of the convention into domestic law. 
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Compliance with and implementation of the convention in Vietnam will have to go 
through the following stages: internal legislation of provisions of the convention, 
implementing regulations that have been internally legalised, cooperating with other 
countries on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements and evaluating 
implementation of the convention. 
For effective implementation of the convention, the Prime Minister of Vietnam 
signed Decision No. 445/QD-TTg dated 7 April 2010, approving the implementation of 
the convention according to a three-stage roadmap. 
Stage 1, 2010–2011, has the objective of organising the development and 
implementation of all content of the convention on a large scale, supplementing the details 
and guiding the perfection of anti-corruption legislation in conformity with the 
convention. 
Stage 2, 2011–2016, evaluates the implementation of Stage 1 and reviews 10 years 
of implementation of the anti-corruption law to perfect and supplement new solutions, 
measures and forms of the organisation of the operation of the specialised agencies in 
charge of corruption prevention and fighting via adjustments according to the actual 
situation, studying the experience related to anti-corruption activities from other 
countries, with gradual application (through many steps) to suit the actual situation of 
Vietnam. 
Stage 3: 2006–2020, conducts a comprehensive assessment of the implementation 
of the convention, supplementing the mechanisms, perfecting the organisation and 
improving the quality and effectiveness of the anti-corruption work. 
It can be seen that throughout Vietnam’s history, the Vietnamese government has 
always considered corruption a ‘great’ barrier to the development of the country. Thus, 
the Vietnamese government has issued laws and strategies to combat corruption. 
However, corruption is still a major problem in Vietnam (McNamara, 2017). 
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5.3 Current Status of Filing of Lawsuits and Filing of Suspects Towards 
Corruption Criminals in Vietnam 
In recent years, the situation for corruption has changed drastically in almost all 
fields of social life, with serious implications for various localities, key economic sectors 
and some non-business agencies. Major fields of corruption include finance, banking, 
public property management, capital construction investment, land use management and 
social policy settlement. The scale of detected corruption cases, of concern to the general 
public, is generally tremendous, as shown in the number of related objects and the 
quantities of appropriated property and losses. In addition to causing property losses, 
corruption criminals reduce the state’s management effectiveness, negatively affect 
public opinion, erode the trust of the people in the leadership of the VCP and affect 
foreign investment and the internal security of Vietnam (Nguyen, 2017). 
The legal system, which has been finalised step by step, is the most influential 
factor on the filing of lawsuits and the filing of suspects towards corruption criminals 
(Nhandan, 2017). The Criminal Code 2015, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law on 
People’s Public Security 2014 and the Law on Organization of Criminal Investigation 
Bodies, among others, have been passed, amended and supplemented in accordance with 
the new situation. The system of regulations in the above-mentioned legal documents has 
created a firm legal basis for the filing of lawsuits and filing of suspects towards 
corruption criminals (Nhandan, 2017). 
The party, the state, the Ministry of Public Security and authorities at all levels 
have deployed many measures to strengthen and enhance leadership and instruct on the 
prevention and fight against corruption criminals. These are the important elements and 
conditions that contribute to heightening the effectiveness of filing of lawsuits and filing 
of suspects towards corruption criminals. 
5.4 Limitations of the Application of Law on Anti-corruption 
The prosecution and investigation of corruption cases have achieved much 
success, and made dynamic contributions to the prevention and fight against corruption 
by the party and the state (Nguyen, 2016). Many grand corruption cases have been 
detected, prosecuted, investigated and supported by the people, helping reduce 
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corruption. However, the prosecution and investigation of corruption criminals have not 
kept pace with the real situation (Nhandan, 2017). The number of filed corruption 
criminals is still low and the recovered corrupted assets inconsiderable. Settlement has 
encountered many obstacles and taken a lengthy period of time, causing scepticism 
among the people about law enforcement agencies. The report of the Vietnamese 
government in 2017 stated that the difficulties and obstacles in the filing of lawsuits and 
filing of suspects towards corruption criminals are shown in the following basic content: 
First, proving the grounds for prosecution 
Pursuant to Article 143, Article 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2015 and the 
Law on Corruption Prevention 2005, the competent authority that is qualified to prosecute 
shall apply measures to prove the grounds for filing of lawsuits of corruption criminals 
as ‘having signs of corruption criminals’ and the grounds for filing of suspects of 
corruption criminals as ‘a person who has committed corruption crimes’ to proceed with 
the filing of lawsuits and filing of suspects towards corruption criminals. 
The Law on Anti-corruption 2012 prescribes that ‘Corruption is the act of a person 
who has position and power and has abused such position and power for benefits’ (Clause 
2, Article 1), and that ‘benefits are material and spiritual interests that the person with 
position and power has obtained or may obtained through the corruption practice’ (Clause 
5, Article 2). In fact, while the identification of a person with material benefits is 
straightforward, it is difficult to identify spiritual benefits because they are unqualitative, 
unquantitative and unspecific. The prosecuting agencies that are competent to file 
lawsuits and file suspects towards corruption criminals encounter difficulties or may even 
be unable to prove the signs of corruption criminals in these cases; therefore, they fail to 
file lawsuits and file suspects in cases of spiritual benefits. 
The verification to determine the grounds for filing of lawsuits and filing of 
suspects towards corruption criminals contain many shortcomings. This is a difficult task, 
which is beyond the attempts and efforts of the investigation agencies and investigators; 
at the same time, it is also the main cause of the long duration of prosecution in particular 
and the process of solving corruption cases generally, because the determination of the 
level of damages to property is the first thing that must be proved in a corruption case. If 
there is failure to determine the property loss, it is deemed there is no crime. To determine 
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the damage to property, the investigation agency conducts a financial accounting 
verification, a technical verification and a work quality verification. This is an important 
source of evidence, which proves the signs of criminals and persons committing violation 
acts. However, the practice of prosecution encounters events in which verification 
agencies do not cooperate, refuse or shift responsibilities. For corruption cases in the field 
of capital construction, financial accounting verification agencies often require the 
verification of work quality before having a basis to conclude on the finance and 
accounting, including the audited works. Meanwhile, capital construction works are 
constructed over many years and cannot be determined in time for settlement. Therefore, 
the verification cannot be implemented because the procuracy and the court require the 
settlement of works for the verified results to be legal. If the works have not been settled, 
fake vouchers and disbursed and appropriated money are considered advances, and have 
not constituted corruption criminals by the procuracy and the court. For these reasons, 
very few corruption cases in the capital construction sector have been prosecuted, 
investigated and settled. 
Second, regarding the grounds for filing of lawsuits and filing of suspects towards 
corruption criminals (Nguyen, 2016) 
The filing of lawsuits and filing of suspects towards corruption criminals are based 
on the accusations of individuals, information of agencies, organisations and individuals, 
information on the mass media, proposals for prosecution of state prosecution agencies 
and competent agencies in conducting proceedings, direct detection of signs of criminals 
and confession of crimes (Nguyen, 2016). 
The filing of lawsuits and filing of suspects towards corruption criminals in the 
past have been based mainly on direct detection by public security agencies, via grasping 
the situation, verification of investigation agencies, accusation of individuals and 
proposals on corruption prosecution (Vo, 2015). The senior supervisory and management 
agencies, economic groups and state-owned companies have not detected any major 
corruption cases by themselves. This has restricted the detection, fight against and 
prevention of corruption criminals, and has not promoted collective strength in the 
detection, fight against and prevention of corruption. 
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Third, the legal system related to the filing of lawsuits and filing of suspects 
towards corruption criminals (Vo, 2015) 
The system of criminal law regulations on the settlement of corruption criminals 
is insufficient, ununiformed and inconsistent, especially regarding instructions from 
competent agencies, which lead to different interpretations and uses among agencies 
conducting the proceedings in filing of lawsuits and filing of suspects towards corruption 
criminals. 
The Criminal Code 2015, Chapter XXIII, Section 1 states that there are seven acts 
of corruption criminals, but Article 3 of the Law on Corruption Prevention 2012 
prescribes 12 acts; meanwhile, there have not been specific instructions, which results in 
inconsistent application of localities and causes difficulties for the determination of the 
object of dispute and the filing of lawsuits and filing of suspects towards corruption 
criminals of the public security force (Nguyen, 2016). 
The State Bank prescribes that only when the decision to file lawsuits and file 
suspects is released will the documents be supplied to the investigating agency. Financial 
and credit institutions, based on this regulation, do not provide information and 
documents to the investigating agency, leading to difficulties in verification and 
collection of documents on corruption from the financial and banking sector at the pre-
trial stage. 
Clause 4 of Article 38 of the Press Law 2016 stipulates that journalists and press 
agencies have the rights and obligations not to disclose the information provider’s name 
if it is harmful to such person, except where it is so requested by the Head of the People’s 
Procuracy or the Chief Judge of the provincial-level People’s Courts and equivalent or 
higher levels, which are necessary for the investigation and adjudication of very serious 
and particularly serious criminals (Nguyen, 2016). This regulation makes it difficult to 
detect corruption criminals and collect documents serving the filing of lawsuits and filing 
of suspects. 
The signing of legal assistance agreements between Vietnam and other countries 
is limited. This causes difficulties and shortcomings in prosecuting corruption cases 
involving foreign elements (Le, 2013). Prosecution and investigation are mainly based on 
reciprocal relations between judicial agencies of countries. The authorisation to 
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investigate and reception of the results of the investigation depend on foreign countries, 
so investigation and prosecution is often prolonged (Le, 2013). 
Fourth, the subject that has the authority to file lawsuits and file suspects towards 
corruption criminals 
According to the applicable law, the subject of direct prosecution and 
investigation of corruption criminals is the Investigation Police Department on 
Corruption-related Crimes and the Police Department of Criminal Investigation in 
Economic Management and Positions. However, in reality, these forces suffer 
shortcomings (Vo, 2015): 
1. The regulations on the functions, tasks and powers of the police force 
investigating corruption criminals and the police force on economic 
management and position-related criminals are overlapped in the localities, 
sectors and types of objects in the investigation. On the other hand, police 
teams investigating criminals related to corruption belong to the PC46, so the 
basic performance of the team is assigned by the PC46 department to the area 
reconnaissance teams; the police investigation team on corruption criminals 
only performs the investigation, so the source of detecting corruption in cases 
of basic professional operations is limited. 
2. The qualification and competence of investigators in the investigation of 
corruption cases are limited. This is a great challenge for corruption criminal 
investigation because corruption offenders are usually well-educated people 
who have broad knowledge, position, power and very sophisticated methods 
and acts of offence. When conducting prosecutions against party members, 
public security often encounters difficulties because it is regulated that it is 
not allowed to investigate party members secretly before prosecution; 
however, corruption offenders are those who have high positions and are party 
members. 
Fifth, regarding the coordinating relationship in the filing of lawsuits and filing 
of suspects towards corruption criminals 
The practice of filing of lawsuits and filing of suspects towards corruption 
criminals shows that the coordinating relationship between the investigation agencies and 
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the People’s Procuracies in solving corruption cases is not close, uniform and consistent. 
There have been many cases, during the investigation, when the People’s Procuracy 
requested the filing of suspects or approval of the decision to file suspects, but when the 
suspects were transferred to the People’s Procuracy, the investigation was suspended. 
There have also been cases where the investigating agencies and the People’s Procuracy 
agreed on the crimes and proceeded with the filing of lawsuits, but when a conclusion 
was offered, the People’s Procuracy requested additional investigation to change the 
prosecuted crime. Particularly, in the case of giving and taking bribes at V Joint Stock 
Company, Da Nang City (prosecuted in 2009), the People’s Procuracy returned the 
dossier requesting additional investigation to transfer charges from bribery giving and 
taking to abusing trust to appropriate properties (Vietnamlawmagazine, 2016). 
Anti-corruption laws have opened a lot of information. One of the highlights in 
anti-corruption laws issued in 2018 was to extend the laws to individuals, which helps to 
minimise corruption and bribery. Importantly, the laws also stipulate positions in the 
government who are not allowed to open their own businesses when they retire. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 5 outlined the formulation, establishment and development of anti-
corruption laws in Vietnam from feudal to present times. It generalised the current status 
of the application of the law in the prosecution of corruption criminals. Despite the long 
history on anti-corruption, Vietnamese anti-corruption laws contain many shortcomings. 
Anti-corruption laws have not been regulated sufficiently and comprehensively 
on measures to control conflicts of interest for cadres, civil servants and public employees 
in the performance of their duties and public duties, which reduces the effectiveness of 
the prevention and detection of corruption. Regulations on handling the responsibilities 
of the heads of agencies, organisations and units where corruption acts occur in these 
agencies, organisations and units are still unclear and unspecific. 
Regulations on the mechanism to detect corruption through the inspection, state 
audit, state inspection and supervision are unsuitable and have not promoted the role and 
functions of each agency. 
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Finally, the position, role and relationships between the Law on Anti-corruption 
and other legal documents have not been defined, resulting in inconsistent understanding 
and application, and a shortage of handling measures for organisations and individuals 
who violate the regulations of the Law on Anti-Corruption, or lenient punishments. 
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Chapter 6: Interview Design, Analysis and Outcome 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 encompasses three parts. First, it summarises the interviews. Second, it 
provides a detailed description of the background. Finally, it discusses interviewees’ 
opinions on the root causes of corruption and obstacles when suspects are senior officials. 
6.2 Interview Process 
In total, seven interview sessions were conducted. Interviews took place in a 
lecture room inside the RMIT Vietnam campus, and there was no interference during the 
interviews. All planned interview questions were asked one by one and answers collected. 
The first five questions were easily answered; the last 13 required interviewees to spend 
some time thinking before providing answers. After the interviews, the recordings and 
notes were collected and digitalised. 
6.3 Background 
Interviewees were those who had worked or were currently working in the police 
force and People’s Procuracy, directly in charge of the investigations and prosecutions of 
the three corruption cases introduced in Chapter 3: Duong Chi Dung 2013, Bui Tien Dung 
2007 and Huynh Ngoc Sy 2010. 
The interviewees of this study comprised seven individuals: three who were 
working as investigators at the Investigation Division of Ho Chi Minh City Public 
Security and four who were working as prosecutors in Ho Chi Minh People’s Procuracy. 
All participants had been working in their current positions for 5–20 years and within the 
organisation for 10–18 years. All interviewees had solid experience investigating crimes 
on social order (mid-investigators), in investigating and providing advice for leaders to 
ensure the effectiveness of criminal procedures and investigation (investigators), and in 
controlling and supervising the investigation process (prosecutors). 
The function of the Investigation Division of Ho Chi Minh City Public Security 
is to receive and process reports and denouncements on crimes, initiate criminal lawsuits 
and investigate crimes, and perform other judicial tasks according to the provisions of the 
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law; to sanction administrative violations and apply other administrative handling 
measures as provided for by law; to guide, inspect and examine agencies, organisations 
and citizens in performing the task of protecting national security and maintaining social 
order and safety; to conduct law propagation, dissemination and education; and to build 
the whole population towards protecting national security. 
The People’s Procuracy of Vietnam has the function of prosecuting acts of justice 
and public prosecutor exercising state. The procuratorate system is organised into the 
district level, provincial level, city level and the military procuracy (Thuvienphapluat, 
2014). The role of the public prosecutor is to check and supervise the rule of all the organs 
of the state, ministries and ministerial-level agencies, administrative agencies from 
central to local institutions and individuals, and then prosecute at court. The prosecutor is 
a judicial executor, under the Constitution of Vietnam (Thuvienphapluat, 2014). The 
People’s Procuratorate has the tasks of contributing to the protection of socialist 
legislation; protection of the socialist regime and mastery of the people; safeguarding the 
assets of the state, the collective, and protecting the life, health, property, freedom, honour 
and dignity of citizens; and guaranteeing all acts violating the interests of the state, the 
collective, and the legitimate rights and interests of the citizens will be handled according 
to strict laws (Thuvienphapluat, 2014). 
The prosecutor is Vietnam’s chief legal representative for the prosecution. The 
prosecutor serves two systems: the common law adversarial system and the civil law 
inquisitorial system (Thuvienphapluat, 2014). The prosecution is the legal party who is 
responsible for presenting the case in a criminal trial against the law breaker 
(Thuvienphapluat, 2014). 
6.4 Interviewee Opinions on the Root Causes of Corruption Cases and 
Obstacles When Suspects are Senior Officials 
6.4.1 Interviewee Profile (Interview Questions 1–4) 
Câu 1: Bạn làm việc ở đâu? 
Interview Question 1: Where do you work? 
Interview Question 1 Aim 
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The question about workplaces of interviewees 
Interview Question 1 Outcome 
Đã có bảy người chấp nhận lời mời phỏng vấn. Trong đó có 3 người làm tại cơ 
quan cảnh sát điều tra và 4 người làm tại viện kiểm sát nhân dân. 
Seven persons have accepted the interview invitation, of which three are working 
at the Police Investigation Department and four at the People’s Procuracy. 
Câu 2: Bạn đã làm việc cho tổ chức này được bao lâu? 
Interview Question 2: How long have you been working for this organisation? 
Interview Question 2 Aim 
The question about working duration of the interviewees 
Interview Question 2 Outcome 
Tất cả họ đề có kinh nghiệm lâu năm trong lĩnh vực điều tra, truy tố tội phạm tham 
nhũng trong lĩnh vực đầu tư công. Người có kinh nghiệm nhiều nhất trong lĩnh vực này 
là 18 năm, người có kinh nghiệm ít nhất là 13 năm. 
All interviewees are experienced in the investigation and criminal prosecution of 
corruption in public investment. The most experienced person has been working in this 
field for 18 years, and the least experienced for 13 years. 
Câu 3: Chức vụ hiện tại của bạn ở tổ chức này là gì? 
Interview Question 3: What is your current title in this organisation? 
Interview Question 3 Aim 
The question about the current position of the interviewees 
Interview Question 3 Outcome 
Trong đó có 3 người làm điều tra viên và 4 người làm kiểm sát viên. 
Three are investigators and four are prosecutors 
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Câu 4: Bạn đã giữ chức vụ này trong bao lâu? 
Interview Question 4: How long have you been in this position? 
Interview Question 4 Aim 
The question about duration of working as investigators and prosecutors 
Interview Question 4 Outcome 
They have been working in the position for more than eight years 
6.4.2 Careers of Interviewees (Interview Question 5) 
Câu 5: Trách nhiệm của bạn ở vị trí này là gì? 
Interview Question 5: What are your responsibilities in this position? 
Interview Question 5 Aim 
Collect interviewee information related to their responsibilities 
Interview Question 5 Outcome 
Đã có bảy người chấp nhận lời mời phỏng vấn. Trong đó có 3 người làm điều tra 
viên và 4 người làm kiểm sát viên. 
Three out of seven interviewees work in the Investigation Division of Ho Chi 
Minh City Public Security. The other four work in The Ho Chi Minh People’s Procuracy. 
6.4.2.1 People’s Procuracy of Ho Chi Minh City has the Function of Prosecution of Acts 
of Justice and Public Prosecutor Exercising State 
The procuratorate system is organised into the district level, provincial level, city 
level and the military procuracy. The role of the public prosecutor is to check and 
supervise the rule of all the organs of the state, ministries and ministerial-level agencies, 
administrative agencies from central to local institutions, individuals, and make the right 
public prosecutor at the court; the prosecutor is a judicial activity, by the Constitution of 
Vietnam. The People’s Procuratorate has the tasks of contributing to the protection of 
socialist legislation, protection of the socialist regime and mastery of the people, 
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safeguarding the assets of the state, the collective, and protecting the life, health, property, 
freedom, honour and dignity of citizens, and guaranteeing that all acts violating the 
interests of the state, the collective and the legitimate rights and interests of the citizens 
will be handled according to strict laws. 
The prosecutor is the chief legal representative of the prosecution in countries 
with either a common law adversarial system or a civil law inquisitorial system. The 
prosecution is the legal party responsible for presenting the case in a criminal trial against 
an individual accused of breaking the law. 
6.4.2.2 The Functions of the Investigation Division of Ho Chi Minh City Public Security 
These functions are to prevent, investigate and eradicate actions of enemies of the 
Vietnamese nation that can endanger national security. Functions include intelligence 
work; joining forces for internal political, economic, ideological–cultural security, 
network security and information security with other uniformed bodies as established by 
law; managing entrance and exit visas; managing all foreign persons in Vietnam and 
Vietnamese people in foreign countries; protecting government secrets; working in 
missions to protect national security at the border regions and crossings through legal 
means; helping to build personal security in every area of life and in every area of the 
country; and performing other duties, missions and responsibilities in keeping with the 
law. 
6.4.3 Corruption Investigation and Prosecution Timeline (Interview Questions 6–9) 
Câu 6: Cụ thể, trong những vụ án mà bạn đã tham gia điều tra, mất khoảng 
bao lâu thời gian tìm ra chứng cứ để truy tố? 
Interview Question 6: How long does it take from the time you receive initial 
investigation records to the end of the inquiry? 
Interview Question 6 Aim 
The question aims to learn how long it takes interviewees to find evidence to 
prosecute defendants in corruption cases at court. 
Interview Question 6 Outcome 
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IN 1: 1-2 tháng 
IN 2: Tùy thuộc vào tính chất của vụ án, theo Luật TTHS Việt Nam thì cho phép thời 
hạn điều tra tối thiểu là 02 tháng để tìm chứng cứ chứng minh tội phạm. 
IN3: 4 tháng 
IN4: 4 tháng 
IN5: 3 tháng 
IN6: 4 tháng 
IN7: 3 tháng 
 
IN1: 1–2 months 
IN2: It depends on the nature of cases; according to the Criminal Procedure Code of 
Vietnam, the minimum investigation period allowed to find evidence for the 
prosecution is two months. 
IN3: 4 months 
IN4: 4 months 
IN5: 3 months 
IN6: 4 months 
IN 7: 3 months 
 
Câu 7: Bạn mất bao nhiêu thời gian kể từ khi nhận được hồ sơ điều tra ban 
đầu cho đến khi kết thúc vụ án? 
Interview Question 7: Specifically, for the cases you have been involved in, how 
long does it take you to find evidence to prosecute? 
Interview Question 7 Aim 
This questions aims to find how long it takes the interviewee to detect traces of 
crime and until the end of the court. 
Interview Question 7 Outcome 
IN1: 12 tháng 
IN2: 8 tháng 
IN3: 14 tháng 
 107 
IN4: 12 tháng 
IN5: 12 tháng 
IN6: 8 tháng 
IN7: 12 tháng 
 
IN1: 12 months 
IN2: 8 months 
IN3: 14 months 
IN4: 12 months 
IN5: 12 months 
IN6: 8 months 
IM7: 12 months 
 
Câu 8: Bạn có hài lòng với kết quả điều tra hay không? 
Interview Question 8: Are you satisfied with the investigation results? 
Interview Question 8 Aim 
This question aims to find the satisfaction of the interviewee about the extent 
he/she feels content with the results of the investigation. 
Interview Question 8 Outcome 
IN1: Chưa hài lòng lắm 
IN2: tôi hài lòng 
IN3: có 
IN4: có 
IN5: có 
IN6: có 
IN7: có 
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IN1: Not really 
IN2: Yes  
IN3: Yes 
IN4: Yes 
IN5: Yes 
IN6: Yes 
IN7: Yes 
 
Câu 9: Công tác phòng chống tham nhũng trong lĩnh vực đầu tư công có hiệu 
quả không? 
Interview Question 9: How effective is the prevention of corruption in the public 
investment area? 
Interview Question 9 Aim 
This question aims to help the interviewees to evaluate the effectiveness in 
combating bribery in public investment in Vietnam. 
Interview Question 9 Outcome 
IN1: Còn rất nhiều hạn chế, do chính sách xin cho trong đầu tư, không có chiến lược 
cụ thể. 
IN2: Kém hiệu quả 
IN3: Không 
IN4: Không, bỏ xót nhiều tội phạm.  
IN5: Không có hiệu quả 
IN6: không hiệu quả 
IN7: kém hiệu quả 
 
IN1: So many shortcomings still exist due to the ‘ask-offer’ policy in investments and 
lack of specific strategies. 
IN2: No, it’s not very effective. 
IN3: No. 
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IN4: There are still many crimes that have not been detected.  
IN5: It is not effective. 
IN6: It is not effective. 
IN7: It is not effective. 
 
Bảy người được phỏng vấn đều trả lời rằng thời hạn điều tra từ 2 đến 5 tháng tùy 
theo mức độ nghiêm trọng của vụ việc. Điều này được quy định trong Bộ luật tố tụng 
hình sự Việt Nam. Thời gian có thể kéo dài hơn, nếu vụ án đặc biệt nghiêm trọng hoặc có 
nhiều người phạm tội trong cùng một vụ án 
Tất cả các ứng viên đều hài lòng với kết quả điều tra, nhưng tất cả họ đều khẳng 
định tuy kết quả điều tra tốt nhưng công tác phòng chống tham nhũng trong lĩnh vực đầu 
tư công chưa hiệu quả, bỏ lọt tội phạm. 
Translation 
All seven interviewees stated that the prosecution usually takes one–three months 
to collect adequate evidence. 
All seven interviewees stated that it usually takes three–five months from the time 
of receiving initial investigation records to the end of the inquiry. 
Three interviewees believed that provisions on the subjectivity of crimes obstruct 
them in the process of investigating, while others answered that this was because of the 
Law on Prevention and Combating of Corruption. 
Four out of seven interviewees believed that foreign aid leads to a counter-effect 
in national corruption levels. 
All candidates were satisfied with the results of the investigation, but all affirmed 
that although the investigation results are good, anti-corruption in the field of government 
spending is not effective and failing to detect crime. 
6.4.4 Corruption Main Causes (Interview Question 10) 
Câu 10: Theo ý kiến của bạn, nguyên nhân gây ra tình trạng tham nhũng 
trong vụ án này là gì? 
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Interview Question 10: In your opinion, what are the main causes of corruption? 
Interview Question 10 Aim 
To explore the main causes of corruption in the three cases, explained by those 
who were involved in the investigation and prosecution. 
Interview Question 10 Outcome 
IN1: Cách quản lý cán bộ còn nhiều thủ tục, trách nhiệm của người đứng đầu chưa cao, 
tính cá nhân trong xử lý tình huống, còn nể nang, không cương quyết. 
IN2: Cơ chế thông tin thiếu minh bạch và thiếu sự kiểm tra cũng như xử lý vi phạm 
ban đầu chưa nghiêm. 
IN3: Cơ chế quản lý và giám sát 
IN4: Luật PCTN quy định khái niệm “tham nhũng” chỉ giới hạn đối với hành vi của 
người có chức vụ, quyền hạn vì mục đích vụ lợi, trong khi người không có chức vụ, 
quyền hạn khi được giao nhiệm vụ cũng có thể lợi dụng nhiệm vụ được giao để vụ lợi. 
IN5: Một số cơ quan, đơn vị, người đứng đầu chưa quyết liệt trong chỉ đạo, tổ chức 
thực hiện công tác PCTN. Nguyên tắc tập trung dân chủ, tự phê bình và phê bình ở 
nhiều nơi bị buông lỏng. Tình trạng suy thoái đạo đức của một bộ phận không nhỏ cán 
bộ, công chức, viên chức, đảng viên, trong đó có cả các cán bộ, đảng viên công tác 
trong các cơ quan bảo vệ pháp luật. 
IN6: Cơ chế quản lý kém, không có sự minh bạch dẫn đến người phạm tội có điều kiện 
để trục lợi cá nhân 
IN7: Lợi ích cá nhân và tham vọng đồng tiền đã khiến cho người được giao trọng trách 
kinh tế đã tham nhũng gây hậu quả nghiêm trọng đến tiền vốn nhà nước và ảnh hưởng 
xấu đến xã hội 
 
IN1: There are still too many administrative procedures in officers’ and public 
servants’ management; leaders have a low sense of responsibility; subjectivity in case 
handling process, indecision and personal relationships are taken into account in the 
course of violation treatment. 
IN2: Lack of transparency in information mechanisms; inspection and handling of 
initial violations aren’t closely and strictly conducted.  
IN3: Management and supervision mechanism. 
IN4: Law on Prevention and Combating of Corruption defines the term ‘corruption’ as 
confined to acts of people with power and authority for personal purposes, whereas 
people without any power and authority also take advantage of assigned duties for 
personal purposes when they are assigned certain duties.  
IN5: Leaders of some agencies and units are not so drastic in directing and organising 
preventing and combating corruption activities. Principles such as democratic 
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centralism, self-criticism and criticism are loosening in many localities. There is 
increasing popularity of ethical degeneration among many officials, cadres, public 
servants and party committee members, including those serving in law enforcement 
agencies.  
IN6: Poor management mechanism and lack of transparency have created conditions 
for criminals to take actions for personal benefits. 
IN7: Personal benefits and increasing desire for money lead to corruption in many 
persons assigned economic duties, causing serious loss to state capital and negative 
impacts on society.  
 
In addition, there were comments on other causes, including high dependence on 
foreign donors, state-owned enterprise benefits and project management processes: 
Cơ chế quản lý nhân lực chưa hiệu quả 
Người phỏng vấn số 1 cho rằng nguyên nhân xảy ra tại “Cách quản lý cán bộ còn 
nhiều thủ tục, trách nhiệm của người đứng đầu chưa cao, tính cá nhân trong xử lý tình 
huống, còn nể nang, không cương quyết. Cùng quan điểm này, người phỏng vấn số 2 còn 
cho biết thêm “Cơ chế thông tin thiếu minh bạch và thiếu sự kiểm tra” trước khi để xảy 
ra vụ việc tham nhũng. 
Ý kiến của người phỏng vấn số 1 và số 2 đều cho thấy cơ chế, chính sách trong 
lĩnh vực đầu tư công của Việt Nam còn chưa rõ ràng, mọi quy định còn chung chung, 
điều này dẫn đến sự thiếu minh bạch. Nguyên nhân này gây cản trở lớn cho việc phát hiện 
hay ngăn chặn tham nhũng trong lĩnh vực này. 
Suy thoái đạo đức cá nhân 
Người phỏng vấn số 3 khẵng định rằng “Tình trạng suy thoái đạo đức của một bộ 
phận không nhỏ cán bộ, công chức, viên chức, đảng viên, trong đó có cả các cán bộ, đảng 
viên công tác trong các cơ quan bảo vệ pháp luật” 
Điều này cho thấy khởi nguồn đầu tiên của hành vi nhận hối lộ xuất phát từ lòng 
tham, bản chất tham lam của con người dẫn đến hành vi trục lợi từ các vụ việc họ được 
giao nhiệm vụ quản lý. Đồng tình với quan điểm này, người phỏng vấn số bảy cho rằng 
“Lợi ích cá nhân và tham vọng đồng tiền đã khiến cho người được giao trọng trách kinh 
tế đã tham nhũng gây hậu quả nghiêm trọng đến tiền vốn nhà nước và ảnh hưởng xấu đến 
xã hội” 
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Các ý kiến trên cho thấy quá trình đào tạo và nâng cao đạo đức nghề nghiệp của 
chính phủ chưa hiệu quả. Công tác đạo tạo chưa thật sự được quan tâm và làm tốt công 
việc của mình. 
Sự thiếu minh bạch 
Người phỏng vấn số 6 và 3 cho rằng “không có sự minh bạch trong công tác quản 
trị dẫn đến người phạm tội có điều kiện để trục lợi cá nhân” 
Sự minh bạch trong thông tin và hoạt động của bộ máy chính quyền là một trong 
những cơ chế thúc đẩy niềm tin của nhân dân vào chính quyền và cũng là một trong các 
biện pháp hạn chế tối đa tham nhũng vì khi minh bạch dân chúng được giám sát và quản 
lý theo đúng nghĩa của dân chủ. Nơi nào không có minh bạch thì nơi đó có tham nhũng. 
Cơ chế quản lý của Việt Nam torng lĩnh vực đầu tư còn thiếu minh bạch trong thông tin. 
Thông tin về các dự án đầu tư công hầu như rất ít. Việc này đẫn đến khó khăn trong công 
tác giám sát quản lý. 
Một số quy định trong các văn bản quy phạm pháp luật còn chưa đồng bộ, thiếu 
thống nhất, chồng chéo đã tạo những kẻ hở cho tham nhũng phát sinh, như các quy định 
liên quan đến quản lý tổ chức, hoạt động, kiểm soát đối với các tập đoàn kinh tế, tổng 
công ty nhà nước; quy định về công khai trong đấu thầu, mua sắm tài sản công; khai thác 
và quản lý khai thác khoáng sản, tài nguyên… 
Chế độ bảo hộ với doanh nghiệp nhà nước 
Người phỏng vấn số 4 cho rằng “các tập đoàn có 100% vốn thuộc nhà nước, luôn 
được giao các công trình đầu tư công, đây là nơi dễ phát sinh ra tội phạm tham nhũng” 
Ở Việt Nam, đối với doanh nghiệp do Nhà nước là đại diện chủ sở hữu thì cơ chế 
giám sát chưa được chặt chẽ. Chế độ kiểm toán đôi khi còn chưa được thực hiện thường 
xuyên, triệt để. Việc trốn thuế, khai khống chứng từ, lập chứng từ giả, vẫn tiếp diễn ở 
nhiều doanh nghiệp. Việc này tạo điều kiện cho tội phạm tham nhũng phát sinh trong lĩnh 
vực này. 
Translation 
Manpower management is not effective yet. 
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Respondent 1 said that the cause was that: 
“Cách quản lý cán bộ còn nhiều thủ tục, trách nhiệm của người đứng đầu chưa 
cao, tính cá nhân trong xử lý tình huống, còn nể nang, không cương quyết” 
Translation: Managing the cadres involves many procedures, the responsibility of 
the leader is not high and individuality in handling situations is still preferential and not 
resolute. 
Corruption offenders, prior to committing an offence, have a high position and 
authority and extensive communication. Therefore, when their corrupt behaviour is 
detected, investigators may be familiar with the offender. This leads to a situation of 
resentment, which causes difficulties in investigation. 
Along the same lines, Respondent 2 stated: 
“Cơ chế thông tin thiếu minh bạch và thiếu sự kiểm tra” 
Translation: The information system lacks transparency and control. 
Before the occurrence of corruption cases. 
Respondents 1 and 2 stated that the mechanisms and policies in government 
spending in Vietnam are still unclear and all regulations are general, which leads to a lack 
of transparency. This causes obstacles in detecting or preventing corruption in this field. 
Ethics 
Respondent 3 said that: 
“Tình trạng suy thoái đạo đức của một bộ phận không nhỏ cán bộ, công chức, viên 
chức, đảng viên, trong đó có cả các cán bộ, đảng viên công tác trong các cơ quan bảo vệ 
pháp luật” 
Translation: There is moral obsolescence in a large number of cadres, civil 
servants, officials and party members, including cadres and party members working in 
law enforcement agencies. 
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This suggests that the first origin of the act of bribery arises from greed, whereby 
people attempt to profit from the cases they are assigned to control. Echoing this view, 
Respondent 7 stated that: 
“Lợi ích cá nhân và tham vọng đồng tiền đã khiến cho người được gia trọng trách 
kinh tế đã tham nhũng gây hậu quả nghiêm trọng đến tiền vốn nhà nước và ảnh hưởng 
xấu đến xã hội” 
Translation: Individual interests and monetary aspirations have made many 
people assigned economic responsibility corrupt and caused serious consequences for 
state capital and a bad influence on society. 
Lack of transparency 
Respondents 6 and 3 stated that there is no transparency in management, which 
facilitates the offender taking actions for personal gain. 
Transparency in information and the operation of the apparatus of government is 
one of the mechanisms for promoting people’s confidence in government and considered 
a measure to minimise corruption because when there is transparency, people may 
supervise and manage in the sense of democracy. If there is no transparency, there will 
be corruption. Vietnam’s management mechanism for investment lacks transparency in 
information provision. Information on government projects is very limited. This causes 
difficulty for management and supervision. 
Regulations on publicity and transparency are not comprehensive and lack of 
measures to ensure implementation, especially the principle, form, content, time and 
responsibility of publicity and transparency, have not been clarified. The content of 
publicity and transparency by sector and field overlaps with regulations on publicity in 
many specialised legal documents. The regimes for information, reporting, measurement 
and assessment of corruption and anti-corruption are not specific. 
Protectorates in state-owned enterprises 
Respondent 4 stated that: 
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“các tập đoàn có 100% vốn thuộc nhà nước, luôn được giao các công trình đầu 
tư công, đây là nơi dễ phát sinh ra tội phạm tham nhũng” 
Translaton: State-owned corporations always receive public investment projects, 
which leads to an increase in corruption criminals. 
In Vietnam, the monitoring mechanisms in state-owned enterprises are not tight. 
Auditing systems are not always implemented regularly and thoroughly. Tax evasion, 
false declarations and false documentation continue in many enterprises, leading to 
increasing corruption in this field. 
6.4.5 Obstacles During Investigations Among Senior Officials (Interview Questions 
11–14) 
These four questions ask interviewees about the barriers they have encountered in 
the process of investigating corruption cases and the law provisions that are inadequate, 
causing problems during the investigation. Some criminals are officials in the service, 
and investigators and prosecutors face difficulties in investigating their corrupt behaviour. 
Câu 11: Điều khoản nào trong Đạo Luật Chống Tham nhũng khiến bạn gặp 
khó khăn trong quá trình điều tra? 
Interview Question 11: Which provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act 
obstructs you in the process of investigating? 
Interview Question 11 Aim 
The question aims to make clear clauses in the corruption prevention law that 
cause obstacles and difficulties for investigation of corruption cases in public investment. 
Interview Question 11 Outcome 
IN1: Không trả lời 
IN2: Quy định về mặt chủ quan của tội phạm. 
IN3: Quy định về mặt chủ quan của tội phạm. 
IN4: Luật PCTN cũng quy định tình tiết gây hậu quả: “nghiêm trọng, rất nghiêm trọng, 
đặc biệt nghiêm trọng”, nhưng lại chưa có văn bản hướng dẫn cụ thể thế nào là “hậu 
quả nghiêm trọng, rất nghiêm trọng và đặc biệt nghiêm trọng”, nên cán bộ thụ lý các 
vụ án gặp rất nhiều khó khăn khi áp dụng luật để xử lý đối tượng tham nhũng. 
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IN5: Thể chế, chính sách về quản lý kinh tế - xã hội trên nhiều lĩnh vực còn sơ hở; chưa 
giảm được các thủ tục không cần thiết có thể làm nảy sinh tham nhũng, tiêu cực, nhất 
là trên lĩnh vực quản lý đất đai, tài nguyên, khoáng sản, đầu tư xây dựng, tín dụng, ngân 
hàng, quản lý vốn, tài sản nhà nước tại doanh nghiệp 
IN6: Luật PCTN quy định cụ thể về các hành vi tham nhũng, nhưng khi thực hiện, cán 
bộ điều tra gặp rất nhiều khó khăn trong việc phát hiện. Do các trường hợp phạm tội là 
cán bộ cấp cao trong bộ máy nhà nước. Họ được những người cấp cao hơn ra những 
văn bản gây trở ngại quá trình điều trá chứng minh vụ án 
IN7: Luật PCTN quy định tài sản tham nhũng phải là tài sản có được từ hành vi tham 
nhũng, tài sản có nguồn gốc từ tham nhũng. Theo quy định này, để chứng minh tài sản 
của một người nào đó có được do tham nhũng thì phải chứng minh được người đó có 
hành vi tham nhũng. Chính những quy định bất cập này làm hạn chế việc xử lý thu hồi 
tài sản tham nhũng. 
 
IN1: No answer 
IN2: Provisions on subjectivity of crimes 
IN3: Provisions on subjectivity of crimes 
IN4: The Law on Prevention and Combating of Corruption also stipulates 
circumstances that cause ‘serious, very serious and especially serious’ consequences; 
however, specific guiding documents on the matter of what comprise ‘serious, very 
serious and especially serious consequences’ are not yet issued; therefore, officers 
handling the cases face many difficulties while applying the law to deal with crimes.  
IN5: There are many weakness in mechanisms and policies on socio-economic 
management in many fields; unnecessary procedures that create conditions for 
corruption and negative issues, especially in management of land, natural resources, 
minerals, construction investment, credit, banking, capital and state assets in 
enterprises, are still prevalent.  
IN6: The Law on Prevention and Combating of Corruption has specifically defined 
corruption acts; however, investigators face many difficulties in detecting crimes, 
because criminals are usually senior officials in the government apparatus who have 
high positions and frequently issue documents that prevent investigators from finding 
the real crimes. 
IN7: According to the Law on Prevention and Combating of Corruption, corrupted 
assets are assets acquired through corruption or assets having an origin in corruption. 
Accordingly, to prove that assets of a certain person were acquired through corruption, 
it’s necessary to prove that such a person has committed a corruption crime. Such 
unreasonable provisions have reduced the retrieval of assets from corrupt officials. 
 
Câu 12: Khi những nghi phạm bạn đang truy tố là cán bộ cấp cao, bạn phải 
đối mặt với những trở ngại gì? 
Interview Question 12: What obstacles have you faced when the suspects you are 
investigating are senior officials? 
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Interview Question 12 Aim 
The question aims to make clear difficulties in investigation processes of 
investigators and prosecutors in cases where defendants are those who hold high 
positions and power and have wide governmental relationships. 
Interview Question 12 Outcome 
IN1: Đối mặt với cán bộ cấp cao hơn. 
IN2: Sự tác động từ các cấp có thẩm quyền 
IN3: Sự tác động và can thiệp  
IN4: Sự tác động từ các cấp có thẩm quyền 
IN5: Họ rất am hiểu phap luật nên tránh những câu hỏi trực tiếp của cơ quan điều tra.  
IN6: Họ có mối quan hệ rất rộng. Do xã hội Việt Nam còn đặt nặng tính cả nể nên quy 
định pháp luật nhiều khi còn đứng dưới những mối quan hệ tình cảm. Cán bộ điều tra 
trong quá trình điều tra sợ làm ảnh hưởng đến những lãnh đạo cấp cao nên họ không 
có điều kiện tốt để chứng minh tội phạm. 
IN7: Đối tượng phạm tội tham nhũng là những người có chức vụ, quyền hạn, có trình 
độ chuyên môn cao, quan hệ xã hội rộng, có điều kiện kinh tế nên thường tìm mọi cách 
để che giấu hành vi phạm tội, mua chuộc cán bộ làm công tác điều tra, truy tố. Mặt 
khác, các vụ án tham nhũng thường xảy ra sau một thời gian dài mới bị phát hiện nên 
các đối tượng đã tiêu hủy hết các chứng cứ, khiến công tác điều tra gặp nhiều khó khăn. 
 
IN1: That is how to behave towards higher senior officers. 
IN2: Influence on the investigation work by competent levels. 
IN3: Interference in and influence on investigation work. 
IN4: Interference from competent levels. 
IN5: They have good knowledge of the law, so they usually avoid giving direct answers 
to questions of investigation divisions. 
IN6: They usually have a wide range of relationships. Besides, because Vietnamese 
society always has a great regard for people having authority and power, investigators 
are afraid of offending key leaders, so they don’t have favourable conditions to prove 
crimes. 
IN7: Corrupt persons are usually persons who have high positions, powers and rights, 
a high level of education, a wide range of relationships in society and favourable 
economic conditions, so they normally attempt to conceal their crimes by offering 
bribes to investigators and prosecutors. On the other hand, corruption crimes are only 
detected after a long period of time, so corrupt persons can destroy the proof, causing 
many difficulties in the course of the investigation. 
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Câu 13: Các chính sách nhà nước đã can thiệp và xử lý các yếu tố đã được 
xác định là có thể gây tham nhũng như thế nào? 
Interview Question 13: How are identified risk factors of corruption offences 
targeted and intervened in via policies and practices? 
Interview Question 13 Aim 
The question concerns government policies that have been promulgated to handle 
and prevent factors causing corruption; these are still weak and may cause corruption. 
Interview Question 13 Outcome 
IN1: Qua rất nhiều cấp quản lý, xử lý. Điều tra và xử lý không triệt để. Không có chế 
độ bảo vệ người tố cáo. 
IN2: Đã ban hành Luật phòng chống tham nhũng và chỉ đạo quyết liệt từ cấp Trung 
ương, tuy nhiên chuyển biến còn nhiều hạn chế 
IN3: Rất nhiều chính sách được ban hành tuy nhiên hiệu quả đạt được vẫn còn hạn chế 
IN4: Việt Nam ban hành luật phòng chống tham nhũng và các hướng dẫn cụ thể, nhưng 
việc thực thi pháp luật thì kém hiệu quả. Do tình hình các lãnh đạo cấp cao có dính 
dáng đến các vụ án tham nhũng, gây rất nhiều khó khăn trong quá trình điều tra. 
IN5: Một số quy định của pháp luật liên quan tới việc phát hiện, xử lý tham nhũng còn 
khó khăn, vướng mắc trong tổ chức thực hiện. Các văn bản quy phạm pháp luật về 
PCTN có nhiều quy định mang tính hình thức, thiếu tính khả thi, thiếu những giải pháp 
có tính đột phá; mô hình, tổ chức các cơ quan chuyên trách chống tham nhũng chưa 
hợp lý, chưa đủ mạnh. 
IN6: Việt nam có một Đảng duy nhất là Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam. Các trường hợp phát 
hiện tham nhũng đều phải chờ hướng chỉ đạo xử lý của đảng, mặc dù quy định pháp 
luật đã có. Điều này gây khó khăn rất lớn cho quá trình thực thi pháp luật. 
IN7: Chính sách pháp luật quy định về các hành vi tham nhũng, nhưng do bộ máy quản 
lý nhà nước cồng kềnh. Cán bộ điều tra gặp rất nhiều khó khăn trong việc chứng minh 
tội phạm. 
 
IN1: The process of interfering in and handling such elements is conducted through 
several levels of management and treatment; the investigation and treatment method is 
not very thorough; moreover, there is no provision to protect denunciators.  
IN2: The government has issued the Law on Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
and there have been strong directions from the central government; however, the 
improvements achieved are still limited. 
IN3: So many policies have been issued, but so far, however, their efficiency is limited. 
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IN4: Vietnam has issued the Law on Prevention and Combating of Corruption and 
detailed guidance; however, the actual enforcement of such law is not effective. 
Involvement of many senior leaders in corruption cases has caused many difficulties 
and challenges in the investigation process.  
IN5: There are many difficulties and problems in enforcing regulations related to 
detecting and handling corruption. Legal documents on the  Prevention and Combating 
of Corruption are not realistic, lack feasibility and fail to provide innovative solutions; 
the organisational apparatus of anti-corruption agencies is not reasonable or strict. 
IN6: There is only one party in Vietnam: the Communist Party of Vietnam. Therefore, 
corruption crimes identified must wait for directive guidance from the party in spite of 
the existence of specific laws. This causes many difficulties in enforcing the law. 
IN7: The government has issued regulations on corruption; however, because of the 
complexity in the organisational apparatus of government, investigators face many 
challenges in proving acts of crime. 
 
Câu 14: Chương trình phòng chống tham nhũng là gì? Nó có tác dụng ra 
sao? 
Interview Question 14: What is the definition of corruption prevention programs? 
How effective are they? 
Interview Question 14 Aim 
The question aims to assess whether corruption prevention programs in public 
investment are effective. 
Interview Question 14 Outcome 
IN1: Xây dựng cho người dân hiểu, nhân thức việc không tiếp tay cho tham nhũng, tố 
cáo các hành vi nhũng nhiễu trên các phương tiện truyền thông từ nhỏ nhất. 
IN2: Ngăn chặn tình trạng tham nhũng, giữ vững niềm tin của người dân vào cán bộ, 
lãnh đạo Nhà nước và viên chức, công chức; là giải pháp cực kỳ quan trọng cho sự phát 
triển và ổn định của đất nước. 
IN3: Chương trình chống tham nhũng cần thực tế hơn. Chương trình có thể giúp cho 
cơ quan chính phủ có quyền lực dễ dàng phát hiện và chống tội phạm tham nhũng. 
IN4: Trước hết mọi hoạt động của cơ quan nhà nước cần phải có tính minh bạch cao, 
mọi việc cần công khai, để có sự kiểm tra và giám sát. Điều này sẽ giúp cho việc hạn 
chế các hành vi tham nhũng. 
IN5: Không trả lời 
IN6: Không trả lời 
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IN7: Việt Nam luôn có nhiều chương trình phòng chống tham nhũng, nhưng chủ yếu 
là hình thức tuyên truyền nên tính hiệu quả chưa cao.  
 
IN1: This program helps to enhance people’s awareness of corruption, including that 
they should not support corruption and must denounce harassment by officers, even 
minor, on mass media. 
IN2: It is a program designed to prevent corruption and maintain public trust in 
government officers, leaders, officials and cadres. It is a very important solution to the 
stability and development of our country. 
IN3: Programs on combating bribery need to be more realistic. The programs can help 
governmental agencies easily detect and combat bribery criminals. 
IN4: First of all, all the activities of state agencies need to have a high level of 
transparency; this means all issues need to be publicised for inspection and supervision. 
This will help reduce corruption. 
IN5: No answer 
IN6: No answer 
IN7: There are many programs about preventing and combating corruption in Vietnam. 
However, they are mainly propaganda programs, so their effectiveness is not high. 
 
Khi tội phạm tham nhũng là những người có quyền lực và trình độ cao trong bộ 
máy nhà nước 
Cả bảy người được phỏng vấn đều khẳng định họ gặp rất nhiều khó khăn trong 
quá trình điều tra thu thập chứng cứ khi người phạm tội là người có chức vụ cao và có 
trình độ cao. Người phỏng vấn số 6 cho rằng” Họ có mối quan hệ rất rộng. Do xã hội Việt 
Nam còn đặt nặng tính cả nể nên quy định pháp luật nhiều khi còn đứng dưới những mối 
quan hệ tình cảm. Cán bộ điều tra trong quá trình điều tra sợ làm ảnh hưởng đến những 
lãnh đạo cấp cao nên họ không có điều kiện tốt để chứng minh tội phạm” 
Việt Nam là một quốc gia Đông nam Châu Á – vùng đất mà chế độ phong kiến 
tồn tại suốt một thời gian dài trong lịch sử. Tuy hiện tại Việt Nam không còn chế độ 
phong kiến nữa, những nếp sống văn hóa đã ăn sâu vô ý thức con người. Những định kiến 
và quan niệm từ thời phong kiến trong đó có văn hoá cả nể, né tránh, bao che người quen 
và giải quyết việc công bằng tình cảm dường như vẫn còn tồn tại trong nếp sống và suy 
nghĩ của người dân Việt Nam, đặc biệt là những người làm quan chức nắm giữ quyền lực. 
 121 
Ngoài ra người phỏng vấn số 7 còn cho rằng “đối tượng phạm tội tham nhũng là 
những người có chức vụ, quyền hạn, có trình độ chuyên môn cao, quan hệ xã hội rộng, 
có điều kiện kinh tế nên thường tìm mọi cách để che giấu hành vi phạm tội”. Nhờ chức 
vụ của người phạm tội, họ có mối quan hệ trong công việc, nên việc điều tra rất khó khăn 
vì người phạm tội sẽ cố gắng tìm kiếm thông tin và che dấu hành vi vi phạm tội thông 
qua các mối quan hệ trong công việc. 
Những rào cản chống tham nhũng trong luật chống tham nhũng 
Người trả lời phỏng vấn số 2,3,4,6 và 7 cho rằng “những quy định trong luật phòng 
chống tham nhũng chưa rõ ràng” điều này dẫn đến việc khó khăn trong việc chống tham 
nhũng trong lĩnh vực đầu tư công. 
Cụ thể họ cho rằng Luật cũng chưa xác định rõ vị trí, vai trò và mối quan hệ giữa 
Luật chống tham nhũng và các văn bản khác trong hệ thống pháp luật dẫn đến cách hiểu 
và vận dụng chưa thống nhất, đặc biệt là với các quy định của Bộ luật hình sự; thiếu quy 
định về các biện pháp xử lý phi hình sự đối với tổ chức, cá nhân có liên quan đến hành vi 
tham nhũng và thiếu quy định về trình tự, thủ tục, thẩm quyền để xử lý các hành vi vi 
phạm Luật PCTN. 
Người phỏng vấn số 6 cho rằng “Luật PCTN quy định cụ thể về các hành vi tham 
nhũng, nhưng khi thực hiện, cán bộ điều tra gặp rất nhiều khó khăn trong việc phát hiện. 
Do các trường hợp phạm tội là cán bộ cấp cao trong bộ máy nhà nước. Họ được những 
người cấp cao hơn ra những văn bản gây trở ngại quá trình điều tra chứng minh vụ án” 
điều này cho thấy thực tiễn luật chống tham nhũng chưa phát huy đủ sức mạnh để có 
những quy một cách đầy đủ, toàn diện về kiểm soát xung đột lợi ích đối với cán bộ, công 
chức, viên chức trong thực hiện nhiệm vụ, công vụ; một số biện pháp hiệu quả còn hạn 
chế như thiếu cơ chế giám sát, tiếp nhận, xử lý thông tin. 
Các quy định về xử lý trách nhiệm của người đứng đầu cơ quan, tổ chức, đơn vị 
khi để xảy ra hành vi tham nhũng trong cơ quan, tổ chức, đơn vị mình còn chưa cụ thể, 
chưa rõ ràng và không khuyến khích được tính chủ động của người đứng đầu trong phòng 
ngừa, phát hiện hành vi tham nhũng; cơ chế xác định người đứng đầu và phân định rõ 
trách nhiệm của người đứng đầu còn thiếu cụ thể… Người phỏng vấn số 5 khẳng định 
“Một số quy định của pháp luật liên quan tới việc phát hiện, xử lý tham nhũng còn khó 
khăn, vướng mắc trong tổ chức thực hiện. Các văn bản quy phạm pháp luật về PCTN có 
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nhiều quy định mang tính hình thức, thiếu tính khả thi, thiếu những giải pháp có tính đột 
phá; mô hình, tổ chức các cơ quan chuyên trách chống tham nhũng chưa hợp lý, chưa đủ 
mạnh” 
Ngoài ra, người phỏng vấn số 5 cho rẳng “chúng ta cũng thiếu một cơ chế phù 
hợp trong việc tổ chức thực hiện các chủ trương chính sách về phòng chống tham nhũng, 
thiếu một hệ thống giải pháp có tính chất căn bản, lâu dài, toàn diện, thiếu một lộ trình cụ 
thể, hợp lý để thực hiện tốt các chủ trương chính sách hiện hành về phòng chống tham 
nhũng”. 
Translation 
Corrupt criminals are those who have high authority and qualifications in the 
apparatus of government. 
All seven respondents stated that they encountered many difficulties in 
investigating and collecting evidence when the criminal was a high-ranking and highly 
qualified cadre. Respondent 6 said: 
“Họ có mối quan hệ rất rộng. Do xã hội Việt Nam còn đặt nặng tính cả nể nên quy 
định phap luật nhiều khi còn đứng dưới những mối quan hệ tình cảm. Cán bộ điều tra 
trong quá trình điều tra sợ làm ảnh hưởng đến những lãnh đạo cấp cao nên họ không có 
điều kiện tốt để chứng minh tội phạm” 
Translation: They have very broad social relationships. Vietnamese society still 
lays too much emphasis on compliance, so many laws are still influenced by subjective 
relationships. During the investigation, investigators fear the influence of senior officials, 
and do not have good conditions to prove the crime. 
Vietnam is a Southeast Asian country, an area where feudal regimes were in 
existence for a long time. Although there are no longer feudal regimes in Vietnam, the 
lifestyle has been ingrained in people. The preconceptions and conception of feudalism, 
including a complaisant culture, avoidance, screening acquaintances and settling public 
affairs with affection, still exist in the way of life and thoughts of the Vietnamese people, 
especially the officials who hold power. 
In addition, Respondent 7 said: 
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“đối tượng phạm tội tham nhũng là những người có chức vụ, quyền hạn, có trình 
độ chuyên môn cao, quan hệ xã hội rộng, có điều kiện kinh tế nên thường tìm mọi cách 
để che giấu hành vi phạm tội” 
Translation: Offenders are those who have high positions, authority, 
qualifications, broad social relationships and economic conditions, so they often find 
ways to conceal the offence. 
Depending on their position, offenders have relationships at work, so the 
investigation is very difficult because the offender will try to seek information and 
conceal their offence through these relationships. 
Obstacles in the course of preventing corruption in anti-corruption law 
Respondents 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 commented that the provisions of the anti-corruption 
law are not yet clear, which has led to difficulties, particularly in the area of government 
spending. 
In particular, they stated that the law has not clearly defined the position, role and 
relationship between the anti-corruption law and other legal documents, leading to lack 
of understanding and application, especially the provisions of the Penal Code; lack of 
regulations on non-criminal handling measures against organisations and individuals 
involved in corrupt acts; and lack of regulations on order, procedures and competence to 
deal with violations of anti-corruption law. 
Respondent 6 stated that the ‘Anti-corruption law specifically regulates corrupt 
acts, but when implementing it, investigators face many difficulties in detection. The 
reason is that criminal cases involve senior officials in the apparatus of government. They 
causes difficulties with the documents granted by the senior officials during the course of 
investigating the case’. This shows that the practice of anti-corruption law has not been 
powerful enough to fully and completely regulate and control the conflicts of interest of 
cadres, civil servants and officials in performing their tasks and public duties. Effective 
measures are limited, such as the lack of mechanisms of monitoring, receiving and 
processing information. 
The provisions on handling responsibilities of the heads of agencies, organisations 
or units when corruption acts occur in their agencies, organisations or units are still 
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unspecific, unclear and discourage initiatives to prevent and detect acts of corruption. 
Mechanisms to identify the head and clearly defining the responsibilities of the head lack 
detail. Respondent 5 affirmed that ‘Some provisions of the law relating to detecting and 
handling corruption are difficult and face obstacles in deployment. The legal documents 
on anti-corruption have many regulations that are formal, lack feasibility and lack 
innovative solutions. The model and organisation of anti-corruption agencies are not 
proper and not powerful enough.’ 
In addition, Respondent 5 stated that ‘we also lack a proper mechanism to organise 
the implementation of anti-corruption policies and guidelines, lack a fundamental, long-
term and comprehensive solution system, and lack a specific and reasonable course to 
implement the applicable policies and guidelines on anti-corruption.’ 
6.4.6 Participant Recommendations to Improve the Effectiveness of Anti-corruption 
(Interview Questions 15–17) 
Câu 15: Làm thế nào để các chương trình này có thể giảm thiểu được những 
nguy cơ tham nhũng? 
Interview Question 15: How do prevention programs reduce the risk factors of 
corruption offences? 
Interview Question 15 Aim 
The question aims to gather recommendations from interviewees on how to make 
corruption prevention programs effective. 
Interview Question 15 Outcome 
IN1: Mọi người dân được tham gia vào công tác chống tham nhũng, tức là mọi cán bộ 
khi thực thi quyền hạn sẽ bị nhiều người theo dõi, đánh giá, từ đó có hành vi, chuẩn 
mực nâng lên, tác động đến ý thức phải chấp hành công tác, giảm thiểu nguy cơ tham 
nhũng. 
IN2: Chương trình cần được công bố rộng rãi để người dân có thông tin, cùng tham gia 
và phản ánh kịp thời thông tin về tham nhũng cho các cơ quan chức năng có cơ sở xem 
xét, xử lý. 
IN3: Chương trình cần đi vào thực tiễn, có cơ chế giám sát, kiểm tra việc thực hiện. 
IN4: Cơ quan chính phủ cùng nhân dân phối hợp lẫn nhau. Cần quy định những khen 
thưởng dành cho những ai tố cáo tham nhũng 
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IN5: trong lãnh đạo, chỉ đạo thực hiện công tác này phải phát huy được vai trò tiên 
phong, gương mẫu của cán bộ, đảng viên, nâng cao chất lượng sinh hoạt, giám sát của 
chi bộ và thực hiện tốt quy chế dân chủ ở cơ sở; người đứng đầu các cơ quan, đơn vị, 
cán bộ, đảng viên có chức vụ phải thực hiện đúng các quy định của Đảng và Nhà nước 
về PCTN, lãng phí, phát huy được dân chủ và vai trò của đoàn thể nhân dân. 
IN6: Vấn đề thực thi pháp luật cần được chú trọng. Vì chỉ có nhà nước pháp quyền thì 
mới bảo đảm mọi quy định pháp luật được thực thi một cách toàn diện và hiệu quả 
IN7: Chính phủ cần nỗ lực nhìn nhận trách nhiệm và đối diện nếu có cán bộ cấp cao 
phạm tội 
 
IN1: Every person is entitled to participate in anti-corruption activities; this means that 
all officers shall be observed and evaluated by others while exercising their powers, 
and therefore, they have to improve their behaviours and awareness of performing 
work, thereby minimising the potentiality of corruption. 
IN2: The program should be publicised widely among the public so that they have the 
necessary information to participate and report information on corruption in a timely 
manner to competent agencies for consideration and handling.  
IN3: It should be applied in reality with an efficient monitoring and inspection 
mechanism. 
IN4: State agencies should cooperate with the public in preventing and combating 
corruption. There should be reward regulations for people who denounce corruption.  
IN5: Exemplary cadres and party committee members should be promoted in leading 
and directing Prevention and Combating of Corruption activities; quality of daily 
activities and supervision work of party committees at grassroots level should be 
enhanced; and democratic policy at each agency and unit needs to be effectively 
developed. Leaders of agencies, organisations and units and party committee members 
holding high positions must comply with the regulations of the Communist Party and 
the state on preventing and combating corruption and waste; roles of the public and 
people’s unions should be promoted.  
IN6: The enforcing law needs to be paid more attention. Only in a law-governed state 
are all laws and regulations enforced comprehensively and efficiently.  
IN7: The government needs to recognise its responsibilities and face the problem if a 
certain senior officer is found to commit a corruption crime. 
 
Câu 16: Nên tập trung vào những vấn đề nào để nâng cao hiệu quả trong việc 
phòng chống tham nhũng? 
Interview Question 16: Which issues should be focused on to improve the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption? 
Interview Question 16 Aim 
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The question aims to find the solutions and recommendations of the interviewees 
to improve efficacy in anti-corruption in public investment. 
Interview Question 16 Outcome 
IN1: Công khai các chương trình, dự án đầu tư, các nguồn kinh phí. Giảm các thủ tục 
hành chính công. 
IN2: Xây dựng hệ thống pháp luật hoàn thiện và đồng bộ. 
IN3: Yếu tố con người. 
IN4: Minh bạch hóa hoạt động của cơ quan nhà nước. Đưa ra những hình phạt nặng và 
cụ thể đối với hành vi phạm tội 
IN5: Cần xác định trách nhiệm của Quốc hội, HĐND các cấp trong công tác giám sát 
PCTN, lãng phí; quy định rõ các tiêu chuẩn chế độ của các chức danh lãnh đạo các cấp, 
các ngành, tiến tới thực hiện chế độ khoán và thực hiện thanh toán bằng tài khoản. 
IN6: Không trả lời 
IN7: Giám sát các dự án liên quan đến các tập đoàn nhà nước. Công khai minh bạch 
các quy trình đấu thầu 
 
IN1: I think that programs, investment projects and budget resources should be 
publicised and public administrative procedures ought to be reduced. 
IN2: Our law system needs to be perfected and synchronised. 
IN3: It is the people element. 
IN4: All activities of state agencies need to be transparent. In addition, strict and 
specific punishments for crimes should be applied.  
IN5: Responsibilities of the National Assembly and People’s Councils in supervising 
corruption and waste preventing and combating should be identified; specific 
regulations on the rights and benefits of leaders in all levels of government and 
departments need to be issued; self-governing policy and payments by bank transfers 
should be applied. 
IN6: No answer 
IN7: Enhance supervision of projects related to state-owned groups. Procurement 
procedures need to be publicised and transparent.  
 
Câu 17: Bạn có kiến nghị gì để cải thiện tính hiệu quả trong chiến dịch phòng 
chống tham nhũng ở Việt Nam hay không? Nếu có, xin hãy nêu cụ thể. 
Interview Question 17: Do you have any recommendations to improve the 
effectiveness of the prevention of corruption in Vietnam? Please specify if you do. 
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Interview Question 17 Aim 
The question aims to detail recommendations to help to improve the efficacy of 
anti-corruption in Vietnam 
Interview question 17 Outcome 
IN1: Không trả lời 
IN2: Tăng cường chính sách đãi ngộ cho công chức, viên chức; minh bạch trong các 
thủ tục hành chính; nâng cao vai trò trách nhiệm của người lãnh đạo, điều hành; hạn 
chế cơ chế xin cho; giảm thiểu sử dụng tiền mặt trong thanh quyết toán; cải cách thủ 
tục hành chính; tăng cường ứng dụng CNTT trong hành chính công; xử lý nghiêm các 
vụ việc, tội phạm về tham nhũng 
IN3: Sự minh bạch trong đầu tư công; chính sách đãi ngộ cho công chức, viên chức; 
hạn chế cơ chế xin cho; giảm thiểu sử dụng tiền mặt trong thanh quyết toán; cải cách 
thủ tục hành chính; tăng cường ứng dụng CNTT trong hành chính công 
IN4: Không trả lời 
IN5: trong lĩnh vực xây dựng quy hoạch, kế hoạch phục vụ nhiệm vụ phát triển kinh tế 
- xã hội cần phải có qui định cụ thể, rõ ràng, ràng buộc các điều kiện trong việc sửa 
đổi, bổ sung quy hoạch, kế hoạch, nhất là về các quy hoạch, kế hoạch liên quan đến đất 
đai, tài nguyên, khoáng sản, tránh việc tùy tiện sửa đổi, bổ sung, nhằm phục vụ lợi ích 
cá nhân hoặc lợi ích nhóm để tham nhũng, tiêu cực. 
IN6: Tiến hành đánh giá đầy đủ, toàn diện về công tác phát hiện, xử lý tham nhũng, 
lãng phí trong thời gian qua; qua đó, xác định phương hướng, mục tiêu, nhiệm vụ của 
công tác này. Cần quy định tăng việc xử lý phạt tiền và hạn chế việc cho tại ngoại, xử 
án treo đối với những người phạm tội tham nhũng, để tăng thêm tính răn đe và nghiêm 
minh của pháp luật. Tăng cường biên chế, điều kiện cơ sở vật chất, trang thiết bị và có 
chính sách ưu đãi đặc thù đối với các cán bộ làm công tác phòng, chống tham nhũng. 
Hoàn thiện các quy định về phòng, chống tham nhũng, có quy định về bảo vệ người 
tích cực đấu tranh phòng, chống tham nhũng, lãng phí. 
IN7: Viện kiểm sát, cơ quan điều tra phải có quyền đề nghị các cơ quan chức năng 
niêm phong, kê biên, phong tỏa tài sản có nguồn gốc từ tham nhũng ngay từ đầu. Nếu 
phải đợi đến khi có bản án của tòa án mới được niêm phong, thu hồi tài sản thì sẽ gặp 
khó khăn vì hầu hết các đối tượng đã tìm cách tẩu tán. 
Bên cạnh đó, một số ý kiến cho rằng cần phải thu hẹp diện kê khai tài sản để quản lý, 
kiểm soát chặt chẽ và hiệu quả hơn; đồng thời phải có cơ chế để tăng cường xác minh 
tính trung thực trong việc kê khai tài sản. 
 
IN1: No answer. 
IN2: Enhancing officials’ and cadres’ welfare regime; improving transparency in 
administrative procedures; increasing the roles and responsibilities of leaders and 
executives; controlling the ‘ask-offer’ policy; reducing the use of cash in settlements; 
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reforming administrative procedures; promoting the application of IT in public 
administration; strictly handling crimes on corruption.  
IN3: Improvement of transparency in public investment and welfare of officers and 
cadres; reduction of the ‘ask-offer’ policy and use of cash in settlements; reforming 
administrative procedures; and promotion of IT in public administration 
IN4: No answer. 
IN5: In setting up planning and plans for socio-economic development, specific and 
clear provisions that stipulate conditions in amending and supplementing planning and 
plans, especially those related to land, natural resources and minerals, to avoid 
unauthorised amending and supplementing for personal benefits and benefits of a 
certain group.  
IN6: It’s necessary to make a comprehensive evaluation of corruption and waste 
detection and the handling of work in the past, thereby identifying directions, objectives 
and duties of this work. Provisions for increasing fines and reducing sanctions such as 
suspended sentences applied to corruption crimes to improve the deterrent effect and 
strictness of law. It’s necessary to increase the number of official cadres, improve 
infrastructure and equipment, and issue incentive policies designated for officers taking 
part in preventing and combating corruption. Provisions on preventing and combating 
corruption should be perfected; there should be provisions on protection of persons 
who make active contributions to preventing and combating corruption and waste.  
IN7: The People’s Procuracy and investigation divisions should have the authority to 
request competent agencies to seal, restrain and block assets acquired from corruption 
from the beginning. If the assets are sealed and blocked only after obtaining decisions 
from courts, competent agencies may face many difficulties because most of the assets 
will have already been dispersed. 
In addition, some people think that it is necessary to reduce the list of persons subject 
to asset declaration for stricter and more effective management and control. 
Additionally, there should be a mechanism to boost verification honesty in declaring 
assets.  
 
Công khai, minh bạch thông tin 
Người phỏng vấn số 1 cho rằng “Công khai các chương trình, dự án đầu tư, các 
nguồn kinh phí trong đầu tư công” Đặc biệt các dự án được giao cho các tập đoàn thuộc 
sở hữu nhà nước. Cần minh bạch thông tin quá trình đầu tư và đấu thầu. 
Cùng quan điểm với người phỏng vấn số một, người phỏng vấn số bảy khẳng định 
“Giám sát các dự án liên quan đến các tập đoàn nhà nước. Công khai minh bạch các quy 
trình đấu thầu” Điều này cho thấy, việc minh bạch thông tin là cực kì quan trọng, góp 
phần trong việc chống tham nhũng trong linh vực đầu tư công tại Việt Nam. 
Nhà nước pháp quyền - nâng cao thực thi pháp luật chống tham nhũng 
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Người phỏng vấn số sáu cho rằng “Vấn đề thực thi pháp luật cần được chú trọng. 
Vì chỉ có nhà nước pháp quyền thì mới bảo đảm mọi quy định pháp luật tham nhũng được 
thực thi một cách toàn diện và hiệu quả”. Người phỏng vấn số 1 cũng có củng cố quan 
điểm với người phỏng vấn số 6. Muốn nâng cao hiệu quả công tác chống tham nhũng, 
chính phủ Việt Nam phải đảm bảo việc thực thi pháp luật phải được tôn trọng và đạt hiệu 
quả cao. Vì chỉ có pháp luật và các chính sách chống tham nhũng là công cụ duy nhất 
trong việc phòng và điều tra các tội phạm tham nhũng một cách hiệu quả nhất. 
Người phỏng vấn số hai cho rằng “hoàn thiện cơ chế quản lý kinh tế, xây dựng 
môi trường kinh doanh cạnh tranh bình đẳng, công bằng, minh bạch.” Để thực hiện tốt 
việc này, chính phủ Việt Nam cần có quy định pháp luật rõ ràng và công bằng trong quản 
lý kinh tế. Điều này sẽ hạn chế các hành vi trục lợi dẫn đến hành vi tham nhũng. 
Người phỏng vấn số 4 cho rằng “Luật PCTN cũng cần được bổ sung các chế tài 
cần thiết và nhất quán với Bộ luật Hình sự, để đảm bảo hiệu quả thực thi và điều chỉnh 
toàn diện các hành vi tham nhũng trong khu vực công”. Việc quy định một cách đồng bộ 
của hai bộ luật này sẽ giúp ích cho việc chống tham nhũng đạt hiệu quả cao hơn. Tránh 
tình trang xảy ra mâu thuẫn trong quy định pháp luật. 
Nâng cao năng lực cán bộ hoạt động trong các cơ quan chống tham nhũng. 
Người phỏng vấn số 5 cho rằng “cần chú trọng công tác đào tạo những cán bộ 
trong các cơ quan chống tham nhũng” Tôi phạm tham nhũng trong đầu tư công tại Việt 
nam thường là những người có chức quyền và trình dộ cao. Do đó để việc điều tra truy tố 
hiệu quả, những cán bộ trong cơ quan chống tham nhũng cần có trình độ cao, và có 
chương trình tào tạo đặc thù. Họ sẽ có cơ hội phát triển hơn về năng lực điều tra, truy tố. 
Tăng nặng hình phạt đối với tội phạm tham nhũng 
Người phỏng vấn số 7 cho rằng “Cần quy định tăng việc xử lý phạt tiền và hạn 
chế việc cho tại ngoại, xử án treo đối với những người phạm tội tham nhũng, để tăng thêm 
tính răn đe và nghiêm minh của pháp luật.” Pháp luật hình sự Việt Nam có hình phạt 
không được nặng đối với tội phạm tham nhũng. Điều này cho thấy, pháp luật chưa đủ sức 
mạnh để phòng ngừa loại tội phạm này. 
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Tăng cường ứng dụng công nghệ thông tin trong quản lý hành chính và kinh tế. 
Có chính sách đãi ngộ với các nhân viên làm việc trong các cơ quan phòng chống tham 
nhũng. 
Tất cả những người phỏng vấn đều cho rằng việc áp dụng công nghệ thông tin vào 
hoạt động của chính phủ hay các tập đoàn kinh tế nhà nước sẽ mang lại lợi ích cho hoạt 
động. Ngoài ra nó cũng mang lại lợi ích trong việc giám sát các dự án đầu tư công. Điều 
này sẽ hạn chế hanh vi tham nhũng xảy ra trong lĩnh vực này. 
Người phỏng vấn số 2, 4 và 7 cho rằng chính phủ cần có chính sách đặc biệt riêng 
về lương hay thưởng đối với các nhân viên làm việc trong cơ quan phòng chống tham 
nhũng. Điều này sẽ tạo cho các nhân viên này tâm lý thỏa mái và điều kiện tốt nhất. Giúp 
cho họ làm việc với hiệu quả cao hơn. 
Translation 
Publicity and transparency of information 
Respondent 1 stated that ‘It’s important to publicise investment programs and 
projects and funding sources in the field of government spending’; especially, projects 
assigned to state-owned corporations. Information on investment and procurement 
processes should be transparent. 
In line with Respondent 1, Respondent 7 affirmed that it is necessary to monitor 
projects involving state-owned corporations. Procurement procedures should be 
publicised and transparent. This shows that transparency of information is extremely 
important, contributing to the fight against corruption in public investment in Vietnam. 
Rule of law: improve the enforcement of anti-corruption law 
Respondent 6 said: 
“Vấn đề thực thi phap luật cần được chú trọng. Vì chỉ có nhà nước phap quyền thì 
mới bảo đảm mọi quy định phap luật tham nhũng được thực thi một cách toàn diện và 
hiệu quả” 
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Translation: The issue of law enforcement needs to be a focus, because only the 
rule of law can ensure that all the provisions of the anti-corruption law are implemented 
in a comprehensive and effective manner. 
Respondent 1 had the same point of view as Respondent 6. To improve the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption work, the Government of Vietnam must ensure that the 
enforcement of the law is observed and highly efficient; the law and anti-corruption 
policies are the only tools to prevent and investigate corrupt criminals optimally. A law-
governed state is always the best tool in crime prevention, especially corruption. When 
law provisions are implemented and used specifically, corruption cases will be handled 
well. 
Respondent 2 stated that: 
“hoàn thiện cơ chế quản lý kinh tế, xây dựng môi trường kinh doanh cạnh tranh 
bình đẳng, công bằng, minh bạch.” 
Translation: It’s important to improve the economic management mechanism and 
establish a fair, equal and transparent business environment. 
To do this well, the Government of Vietnam should have clear and fair legal rules 
for economic management. This will limit the profitable acts that can lead to corruption. 
Creating a good business environment will not only help economic growth, but limit 
corruption in the field of public investment. 
Respondent 4 stated that: 
“Luật PCTN cũng cần được bổ sung các chế tài cần thiết và nhất quán với Bộ luật 
Hình sự, để đảm bảo hiệu quả thực thi và điều chỉnh toàn diện các hành vi tham nhũng 
trong khu vực công”  
Translation: Anti-corruption law should be supplemented with sanctions, which 
are necessary and consistent with the Penal Code, to ensure effective enforcement and 
comprehensive correction of corrupt acts in the public sector. 
The coherent regulation of these two laws will be helpful to achieve more effective 
anti-corruption. Contradictions in the law should be avoided. 
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Improving the capacity of the cadres working in anti-corruption agencies 
Respondent 5 stated that: 
“cần chú trọng công tác đào tạo những cán bộ trong các cơ quan chống tham 
nhũng” 
Translation: It is important to focus on the training of the cadres working in anti-
corruption agencies. 
Corruption in government spending in Vietnam is often committed by senior and 
highly qualified officials. Therefore, to investigate and prosecute effectively, cadres 
working in anti-corruption agencies need to gain high qualifications and attend special 
training programs, where they have the opportunity to develop more capacity in 
investigation and prosecution. 
Increasing penalties for corrupt criminals 
Respondent 7 stated that: 
“Cần quy định tăng việc xử lý phạt tiền và hạn chế việc cho tại ngoại, xử án treo 
đối với những người phạm tội tham nhũng, để tăng thêm tính răn đe và nghiêm minh của 
pháp luật.” 
Translation: It is necessary to increase the rate of fines and restrict standing bail 
and the suspended sentence for corrupt offenders to increase the deterrence and strictness 
of the law. 
The penalties for corruption committed under the Vietnam Penal Code are not 
strict, and have not imposed the power of law in dealing with corrupt crimes. There should 
be stricter penalties for corrupt criminals. 
Vietnam’s penal law does not have a severe penalty bracket for corrupt crimes; 
this shows that the law is not powerful enough to prevent this crime. 
Strengthening the application of information technology in administrative and 
economic management, and offering preferential treatment to the cadres working in anti-
corruption agencies 
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All respondents said that the application of information technology to the 
operation of the government or state-owned corporations would benefit operations. It 
would also benefit the monitoring of public investment projects and limit corruption 
occurring in this field. 
Respondents 2, 4 and 7 argued that the government should have a specific 
compensation policy for cadres working in anti-corruption agencies, to provide cadres 
with the best support and conditions to help them work more efficiently. 
6.5 Conclusions 
In Vietnam, there is an independent anti-corruption agency; however, this agency 
is controlled by Vietnam’s Party. That is the reason why this agency cannot perform the 
tasks well. To understand the reasons why corruption occurs in Vietnam, this thesis 
utilised a qualitative research interview to analyse corruption investigation and 
prosecution. Interviews were conducted with government ministry/department officials, 
who were involved with or had been in charge of the three corruption cases over the past 
10 years. Participants in the research were asked about their investigation of three 
completed major corruption cases: Duong Chi Dung 2013, Bui Tien Dung 2007 and 
Huynh Ngoc Sy 2010. 
Chapter 6 discussed participants’ opinions on the root causes of corruption and 
their obstacles, including interviewee profiles (Interview Questions 1–4), interviewee 
careers (Interview Question 5), corruption investigation and prosecution timeline 
(Interview Questions 6–9), corruption’s main causes (Interview Question 10), obstacles 
faced during investigations of senior officials (Interview Questions 11–14) and 
participants’ recommendations to improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption (Interview 
Question 15–17). 
Participants were asked for their opinions about the root causes of corruption and 
their obstacles when suspects are senior officials. Four of the seven interviewees believed 
that foreign aid has a counter-effect on domestic corruption levels. Investigators and 
prosecutors do not have authority to investigate or open cases. The difference between 
the anti-corruption law and the Criminal Law in the definition of corruption poses a 
difficulty when fighting crime. Managers and leaders lack incentives to fight against 
corruption, while the project management process contains a considerable number of 
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risks. Another point is that the state-owned enterprises seek their own benefits, and cause 
serious loss to the state budget and international funding. 
The ineffectiveness of anti-corruption in public investment and administration 
comments included that many decrees and policies have been issued but efforts are not 
considered effective. Shortcomings in the public procurement system include a lack of 
guidelines, inadequate notification about bidding opportunities, lack of skills, poor 
availability of information and unclear public procurement legislation and standard 
documents. Vietnam has issued laws on prevention and combating of corruption, but 80% 
of interviewees stated that the actual enforcement of such a law cannot be not effective 
while bidding information is not transparent. State-owned enterprises’ legal framework 
and corporate governance are still not tight enough to manage operations and the use of 
the state budget creates unequal treatment and dissatisfaction among business 
communities. 
To improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption and corruption prevention, 
participant recommended more transparent and strict procurement procedures for both 
ODA loans and international funding. A trusted and skilled third party should be put in 
charge of the evaluation of consultant bidding, promoting IT in public administration and 
electronic procurement system, publicising procurement information and enhancing ex-
post audits related to procurement. Many recommendations were proposed to strengthen 
the system and organisations to prevent corruption and to strengthen government capacity 
to achieve transparency in public procurement. Encouragement of the private sector for 
better compliance and privatisation of state-owned enterprises via proper and solid 
corporate governance would assist. 
The next chapter explores the survey technique used and evaluates anti-corruption 
policies and law in public investment in Vietnam. Chapter 7 provides an overview of the 
three anti-corruption commissions and the advantages and disadvantages of the anti-
corruption law. 
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Chapter 7: Survey Design, Analysis and Outcomes 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the survey data analysis regarding the evaluation of the 
enforcement of anti-corruption policies and the law in public investment in Vietnam. It 
focuses on a demonstration of the research findings after the data collection process 
concluded. This chapter reports a descriptive analysis of findings regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of the law in anti-corruption based on the data collected 
during the survey research. The survey data analysis is categorised into seven categories 
providing answers to the research questions as follows: 
1. corruption frequency in public investment in the period 2009–2014 
2. effectiveness of investigation activities 
3. anti-corruption law effectiveness 
4. law effectiveness in deterring corruption in Vietnam 
5. participants’ obstacles when trying to prevent corruption 
6. discovery of corruption in public investment and shortcomings in corruption 
prevention 
7. challenges in corruption investigation and prosecution. 
7.2 Survey Process 
The survey questionnaire was designed, prepared and uploaded online. An online 
survey with the support of Qualtrics was employed. The invitation letters and the link to 
access the questionnaires were sent to the representative office of the three agencies (the 
Government Inspectorate, the police force and People’s Procuracy) by email so that they 
could be sent to all participants. The survey was sent around 300 participants, and a total 
of 150 responses were acceptable for the analysis. 
7.3 Background 
The 150 participants were or are currently working in the Government 
Inspectorate, the police force and People’s Procuracy. Being government officials, these 
respondents spend much of their time investigating and addressing corruption matters. 
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7.4 Survey Data Analysis 
This section analyses survey data, including the first three questions in the survey 
collecting participants’ perspectives regarding the reality of corruption in public 
investment during the period 2009–2014, their points of view about investigations and 
anti-corruption law effectiveness. The next four questions discuss participants’ opinions 
regarding whether current criminal law in Vietnam is sufficient to prevent corruption. 
The last two questions discuss participants’ opinions concerning their challenges in 
corruption investigations and prosecutions. 
7.4.1 Corruption Frequency in Public Investment 
To better understand the field in which corruption in public investment most 
frequently occurred in 2009–2014, Survey Question 1 takes a detailed look at the 
corruption situation in the area of public investment. 
Câu 1. Theo bạn, từ năm 2009 đến năm 2014, tham nhũng về đầu tư công xảy 
ra thường xuyên nhất trong lĩnh vực nào? 
a. Xây dựng 
b. Đầu tư cơ sở vật chất 
c. Đất đai, tài sản 
e. Khác, vui lòng cho biết cụ thể ................................................. 
Translation: 
Survey Question 1: In your opinion, in which field did corruption in public 
investment most frequently occur from 2009 to 2014? 
a. Construction 
b. Investment of facilities 
c. Land, property 
e. Other, please specify…………………………………………. 
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Aim 
To determine the field in which corruption in public investment occurred the most 
in the period 2009–2014. 
Outcome 
When querying in which field corruption in public investment occurred the most 
over 2009–2014, 43% of respondents (65 of 150) answered facilities investment, 30% 
construction and 27% land and property (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Survey Question 1: Outcomes summary. 
Table 9: Most Common Field of Corruption in Public Investment, 2009–2014 
# Answer % Count 
1 Construction 30% 45 
2 Investment of facilities 43% 65 
3 Land, property 27% 40 
4 Other, please specify…………………………………………. 0% 0 
 Total 100% 150 
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Investment in facilities, construction and land and property are major areas of 
corruption. As in the investment process in these two areas, corrupt persons are more 
likely to exhibit corrupt behaviour. In management, they involve investment in facilities 
and spending on programs and projects. Typically examples include appointing a 
construction contractor in contravention of the prescribed regime to influence execution 
of construction works and pay high prices; collusion among bidding organisations to win 
bids at a high cost compared with the cost of construction; compiling dossiers of complete 
construction volume price tickets for payment of investment capital before actual 
construction volumes are appropriated to occupy the state budget capital; expropriation 
of a volume of work that is not practiced nor done or work not included in the cost 
estimate or design to settle the capital account; purchasing materials, raw materials and 
equipment in incorrect quantities, types and unit prices according to the cost estimate and 
design, or purchasing less, declaring more and buying poor quality for construction but 
settling accounts for good-quality equipment and supplies at high prices; and collusion to 
make payment records to compensate for ground clearance higher than the reality in the 
form of increasing the land area, infrastructure compensation and decentralisation of the 
house higher than the actual price, thereby implying compensation higher than allowed. 
7.4.1.1 Comment on Response 
There is a contradiction between high investment and poor performance in 
national infrastructure, supporting the finding and pointing to the important question of 
public investment efficiency. If many public facilities projects are wasteful and imbued 
with corruption and many funded projects are delayed and fail because of poor 
management, the return to investment will be low or zero (Dapice & Nguyen, 2009). 
Excessive bureaucracy and red tape, overregulation, corruption, dishonesty in dealing 
with public contracts, lack of transparency and trustworthiness, inability to provide 
appropriate services for the business sector, and political dependence of the judicial 
system impose significant economic costs on businesses and slow the process of 
economic development (World Economic Forum, 2014). 
7.4.1.2 Summary 
The most problematic issue is the strong and positive correlation between 
corruption and poverty (Luong, 2016a). Luong (2016a) argued that the absence of public 
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scrutiny causes corruption to continue with serious consequences affecting the welfare of 
the whole nation and punishing those with low incomes. The recent report of Governance 
and Public Administration Performance Index 2015 shows that not less than 20% of 
citizens reported paying bribes to achieve certificate of their land use right; another 12% 
reported paying bribes to access better hospital services, and even worse, 30% of 
respondents, including students in primary school, confirmed that they had been illicitly 
solicited by educators (Luongb, 2016).  
7.4.2 Investigation Activity Effectiveness 
To help assess the effectiveness of investigation activities into corruption in public 
investment cases, Survey Question 2 aided the researcher to obtain an objective 
assessment on the effectiveness of investigation activities. 
Câu 2: Hãy đánh giá hiệu quả của các hoạt động điều tra tham nhũng trong 
các trường hợp đầu tư công gần đây? (với 1 là kém hiệu quả nhất và 5 là hiệu quả 
nhất) 
1     2     3     4     5 
Translation: 
Survey Question 2. Please score the effectiveness of the investigation activities 
into corruption in recent public investment cases (1 is the least effective and 5 is the 
most) 
1     2     3     4     5 
Aim 
To collect respondents’ thoughts on investigation activities’ effectiveness 
Outcome 
Some 43.33% of respondents stated that investigation activities into corruption in 
public investment were ineffective, while 37.33% said that their effectiveness was just 
average. Only 19.33% thought that they were effective (see Figure 7). 
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(1–5 scale with 1 the least effective and 5 the most) 
Figure 7: Survey Question 2: Outcomes summary. 
Table 10: Respondents’ Thoughts on Investigation Activity Effectiveness 
# Answer % Count 
1 1 1.33% 2 
2 2 42.00% 63 
3 3 37.33% 56 
4 4 17.33% 26 
5 5 2.00% 3 
 Total 100% 150 
 
7.4.2.1 Comment on Response 
As the time from committing criminal offences to the time of detecting criminal 
offences is lengthy, offenders have the knowledge, position, power, relationships and 
other conditions to influence the investigation of cases. The ability of investigators and 
prosecutors to deal with corruption crimes is limited. Due to the large scale of corruption 
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cases, some of which are up to USD 1 million, requiring the identification of damage, 
many projects are unfinished or not put into operation; thus, project damage assessment 
is very difficult. The scale of the project is not within the legal period for judgement. 
The finding is further supported by a report from Vietnamfinance (2016), which 
argued that major corruption cases involve many people with close connections, who 
keep information secret at any cost, and so it is tough to uncover them. It is difficult for 
outside people to unearth corrupt acts, according to Senior Lieutenant General Le Quy 
Vuong, Deputy Minister of Public Security. They try to conceal their acts by various 
tricks such as providing falsified documents, hiding documents and giving misleading 
information (Vietnamfinance, 2016). In many cases, people are denounced but competent 
authorities do not have sufficient evidence to handle the cases in line with the law. Police 
at all levels have filed charges in almost 3,000 corruption cases and the number of people 
involved has exceeded 7,000. Those cases have caused losses of over VND 23.5 trillion 
(over USD 1 billion). Corruption is prevalent in the fields of banking, land management, 
natural resources, mining, infrastructure construction and management of state capital 
and assets (Vietnamfinance, 2016). Losses caused by those corruption cases exceed VND 
60 trillion, along with 400 hectares of land. However, only VND 5 trillion and around 
200 hectares have been recovered (Vietnamfinance, 2016). 
According to Truong Hoa Binh from KDLC (2018), because of economic reform, 
integration and expansion of the global economy, corruption has become more rampant 
and sophisticated, seriously affecting economic development, security and social 
stability, the value of democracy, and above all, the rule of law in Vietnam. Corruption 
prevention and anti-corruption legislation became effective on 1 June 2006 (Vu & 
Nguyen, 2014). In January 2007, the function of supervising corruption investigations in 
the Department of Public Prosecution was detached from general criminal investigations 
(Nguyen, 2007). The Department of Public Prosecution plays a supervisory role for 
corruption investigations and works in close collaboration with the Ministry of Public 
Security and the corruption investigation department in prosecuting criminals and 
collaborating with international anti-corruption officials (Nguyen, 2007). 
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7.4.2.2 Summary 
Corruption is a sophisticated and complicated criminal act, committed by those 
who abuse power, have powerful acquaintances and are able to exert influence on the 
criminal justice system to avoid prosecution for wrong doings (Vu & Nguyen, 2014). 
7.4.3 Anti-corruption Law Effectiveness 
Survey Question 3 helps the researcher to obtain an objective assessment of the 
effectiveness of the anti-corruption law when applied to actual investigations of 
corruption and anti-corruption. 
Câu 3: Hãy đánh giá hiệu quả của việc thực hiện Luật Chống Tham nhũng 
trong bộ phận chống tham nhũng ở Việt Nam giai đoạn 1999-2014? (với 1 là kém 
hiệu quả nhất và 5 là hiệu quả nhất) 
1     2     3     4     5 
Translation: 
Survey Question 3: Please score the effectiveness of the anti-corruption law 
implementation in anti-corruption in Vietnam in the period of 1999–2014 (1 is the 
least effective and 5 is the most). 
1     2     3     4     5 
Aim 
To evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption law in the period 1999–2014 
Outcome 
Some 54% of respondents said that the effectiveness of the anti-corruption law 
was only average, 19.33% claimed that it was effective in practice, while 24.67% said 
that it was not effective (see Figure 8). 
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(1–5 scale with 1 the least effective and 5 the most) 
Figure 8: Survey Question 3: Outcomes summary. 
Table 11 Effectiveness of Anti-corruption Law, 1999–2014 
# Answer % Count 
1 1 0.67% 1 
2 2 24.67% 37 
3 3 54.00% 81 
4 4 19.33% 29 
5 5 1.33% 2 
 Total 100% 150 
 
Based on the answer to the question, it can be seen that many documents directly 
related to anti-corruption have been issued, amended and supplemented, helping to create 
a stronger legal basis to contribute to prevent, detect and deal with corrupt acts. However, 
the document system is still overlapping and inadequate, creating a loophole for some 
corrupt officials and public servants to take advantage. 
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Regulations on publicity and transparency are not comprehensive and lack 
enforcement assurance measures. Particularly, the principle, form, content, time and 
responsibility for publicity and transparency have not been clarified, in addition to the 
overlapping content of publicity and transparency by sector or domain. In addition, there 
are documents and remedies to control the dubious incomes of officials, civil servants 
and persons with positions and powers that are inadequate. 
7.4.3.1 Comment on Response 
The current anti-corruption law stipulates that corruption is the act of a person 
holding a high position or authority who misuses his position and power for the sake of 
the self and the subject of corruption as ‘a person with a position or authority’ for specific 
objects. In reality, however, there are those who, despite their lack of authority, have 
exploited the influence of other persons holding positions of authority to gain profit (for 
example, parents, spouses, siblings and grandchildren of said persons with position and 
power). 
Current legislation also lacks a mechanism to supervise, receive and process 
information, and reflect violations of receiving and giving gifts. The giving and receipt 
of gifts to relatives of persons holding positions and powers related to public duties have 
not been remedied, leading to uncontrolled activities and off-duty income of persons 
holding positions and powers. 
The first concern is the current status of Vietnam’s legislation (Vu & Nguyen, 
2014). The implementation of investigative activities has shown that Vietnam’s legal 
framework in anti-corruption is insufficient, outdated and incomprehensive (UNDP, 
2012). Vietnam’s legal framework does not sufficiently define all forms of corruption as 
criminal acts (UNDP, 2012). For those acts of corruption that are classified as criminal, 
criminal sanctions are not always enforced (Vu & Nguyen, 2014). Investigative bodies 
often lack the necessary powers and capacities to conduct effective investigations 
(UNDP, 2012). An example of this is dealing with instruments and/or proceeds of crime, 
which is as important as the prosecution of the corruption offender (Vu & Nguyen, 2014). 
The purpose of the provisions in tracing, restraining, freezing and seizing assets in the 
Criminal Procedure Code is to facilitate the prosecution of the crime, and is not aimed at 
confiscation of the unlawful assets themselves (Vu & Nguyen, 2014). Vietnam is now 
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implementing policies to make assets transparent. However, this does not seem to be 
effective. This may allow the corruption offender to conceal the proceeds of crime 
(UNDP, 2012). Meanwhile, the criminal procedure legislation of well-developed 
countries considers asset recovery and confiscation as equally essential as the prosecution 
of the offender, and civil forfeiture is a process separate from the prosecution of the 
offender (Vietnam Breaking News, 2016). Vietnam’s Criminal Procedure Code is not an 
effective legal instrument to deal with the proceeds of corrupt acts. 
It can be seen that the application of the Law on Anti-Corruption in Vietnam has 
encountered many problems and barriers, making anti-corruption ineffective; that more 
than 70% of respondents said that the anti-corruption law is not effective and only below 
average is reasonable. 
7.4.3.2 Summary 
Procedure code lacks provisions to enable investigative activities aimed at 
corruption acts, such as asset evaluation, financial forensics, voice recording, surveillance 
and collection of electronic evidence (World Bank, 2013). Concerning the Penal Code, 
some corruption offences remain unclear and obscure; this may cause difficulties 
determining and proving corrupt acts. 
7.4.4 Effectiveness of the Law in Deterring Corruption 
Survey Question 4 helps the researcher to better understand whether the 
punishments in the Vietnam Criminal Law are sufficient to handle corruption criminals, 
and whether they comprise an effective tool to prevent corruption. 
Câu 4: Theo bạn, các hình phạt đối với tội phạm tham nhũng quy định trong 
Luật hình sự của Việt Nam có đủ ngăn chặn, giáo dục tội phạm tham nhũng và ngăn 
ngừa loại hình tội phạm này xảy ra không? (với 1 là kém hiệu quả nhất và 5 là hiệu 
quả nhất) 
1     2     3     4     5 
Translation: 
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Survey Question 4: In your opinion, are the punishments for corruption 
criminals prescribed in the Vietnam Criminal Law sufficient to deter and educate 
the corruption criminal and prevent this kind of crime happening? (1 is the least 
effective and 5 is the most) 
1     2     3     4     5 
Aim 
To collect opinions on the ability of the Vietnam Criminal Law punishment to 
deter corruption 
Outcome 
 
(1–5 scale with 1 the least effective and 5 the most) 
Figure 9: Survey Question 4: Outcomes summary. 
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Table 12: Vietnamese Criminal Law Effectiveness Responses 
# Answer % Count 
1 1 1.34% 2 
2 2 46.31% 69 
3 3 28.19% 42 
4 4 22.82% 34 
5 5 1.34% 2 
 Total 100% 149 
 
According to Figure 9, 47.65% of participants responded that the punishments 
enforced in the Vietnam Criminal Law were not sufficient to deter corrupt individuals; 
only 24.16% believed they were effective and 28.19% believed they were just average. 
7.4.4.1 Comment on Response 
Based on the results of this question, the satisfaction with the effectiveness of 
punishments for corruption is low (up to 75.84% thought that the level of effectiveness 
was average or inefficient). 
According to a report by the Noichinh (2014), the suspended sentence rate for 
corruption cases was about 36.5%; this was 37.1% in 2011 and 30.2% in 2012. In the 
latest report of the government on anti-corruption (submitted to the 21st session of the 
Standing Committee of the National Assembly), compared with the same period in 2012, 
the investigation, prosecution and trial of corruption cases increased both in number of 
cases and number of offenders (prosecution increased by eight cases, with 91 defendants, 
and prosecution increased by 91 cases with 202 defendants). However, the handling of 
the responsibility of heads of agencies and units for corruption decreased 34%; only 36 
heads were dealt with, of which four were subjected to criminal proceedings. In the first 
half of 2013, although the rate of corruption suspended sentences was only 28%, the 
lowest level yet, according to legal experts, this rate remains too high for a crime that 
leaves society with serious consequences. 
The investigation, prosecution and trial of corruption offenders are not serious and 
definitive; a situation of covering up exists in some places, despite the law. Many 
corruption cases are not judged seriously, and penalties are lenient. According to the 
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Noichinh (2014), the suspended sentence rate for corruption-related cases is 30.8% 
(36.5% in 2010, 37.1% in 2011 and 34.2% in 2012), which is higher than other types (on 
average, only 21%). Corruption is a serious crime, but the National Assembly Standing 
Committee reports that many of the courts make light judgements in such cases. The 
yearly review of the Supreme People’s Court shows that in some localities, of nine corrupt 
defendants adjudicated, eight were suspended; in some localities, with 10 defendants 
accused of corruption, all 10 were sentenced below the lowest level of penalty. 
Bribery is often considered a crime with no visible victim (Dao-Le, 2011). Dao 
Le (2011) states that the real nature of bribery is usually masked or justified by customs, 
traditions, cultures or misguided perceptions, and the wrongfulness of bribery is often 
hard to recognise. Consequently, the condemnation of bribery and the fight against 
bribery offences are not always supported (Dao-Le, 2011). That perception also leads to 
the fact that some criminal systems adopt inadequate punishments and measures when 
dealing with corruption crimes and this creates an opportunity for some people to commit 
corruption (Dao-Le, 2011). 
7.4.4.2 Summary 
Vietnamese criminal law covers most types of bribery, including giving a bribe, 
receiving a bribe and acting as an intermediary for bribery (World Bank, 2013). The code 
prescribes elements of each offence to a certain extent. However, the prescription seems 
rather general. The penalties provided express the criminal law policy of strict treatment 
of such offences, reflecting the determination of Vietnam in the struggle against bribery 
(World Bank, 2013). Apart from the seriousness of the penalties, lenient treatment of 
offenders is permitted via provisions on exclusion of and exemption from criminal 
responsibility. Thus, Vietnamese criminal law covers notable types of bribery but not all 
prevalent kinds. 
7.4.5 Participants’ Obstacles When Trying to Prevent Corruption 
Survey Question 5 helps the researcher to determine the main difficulties in the 
process of preventing corruption in the field of public investment. 
Câu 5: Những trở ngại nào cản trở bạn khi cố gắng ngăn chặn các vụ việc 
tham nhũng? 
 149 
a. Tiêu chuẩn chuyên môn của nhân viên chống tham nhũng 
b. Áp lực từ người giám sát 
c. Chính sách và Luật pháp không cung cấp cho bạn đủ quyền để phát hiện ra tội 
phạm tham nhũng 
d. Khác, vui lòng cho biết cụ thể …………………………………………. 
Translation: 
Survey Question 5: Which obstacles influence you when trying to prevent 
corruption? 
a. The qualifications of officers in anti-corruption agencies 
b. Pressure from supervisors 
c. The policy and the law provide you with insufficient power to discover 
corruption criminals 
d. Other, please specific…………………………………………. 
Aim 
To assess challenges faced when trying to prevent corruption 
Outcome 
According to Figure 10, 47.65% said that their challenges include pressure from 
supervisors, while the rest claimed that the qualifications of officers in anti-corruption 
agencies and insufficient power to discover corrupt individuals were the main barriers to 
anti-corruption (25.50% and 26.85%, respectively). 
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Figure 10: Survey Question 5: Outcome summary. 
Table 13: Challenges Faced When Trying to Prevent Corruption 
# Answer % Count 
1 The qualifications of officers in anti-corruption agencies 25.50% 38 
2 Pressure from supervisor 47.65% 71 
3 
The policy and the law provide insufficient power to discover 
the corrupt individual 
26.85% 40 
4 Other, please specific…………………………………………. 0.00% 0 
 Total 100% 149 
 
7.4.5.1 Comment on Response 
The state apparatus is cumbersome and heavily bureaucratic, the process of 
administrative reform is slow and there are many administrative procedures that are 
cumbersome; these provide conditions for officers to engage in harassment and 
corruption. Laxity in economic management and the continued popularity of ‘asking and 
giving’ provide conditions for corruption to arise. 
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The legal framework and conditions to ensure anti-corruption are not guaranteed. 
Although the anti-corruption law has seen positive changes in recent years, many laws 
relating to anti-corruption have been issued. However, they are not complete nor clear, 
and there is insufficient determination to fight against corruption, leading to 
ineffectiveness in reality. Vietnam has no law on information transparency and access to 
information, so it is difficult for agencies, organisations and people to access information 
on finance, production or business and investment activities of enterprises, managers of 
production and business, and monitoring the state budget. Fighting corruption and waste 
is, therefore, notoriously difficult. 
Transparency in income of officials with high positions and power has not been 
attained. Proof of income has not been realised, and, moreover, no mechanism is available 
to regularly inspect and assess the assets of officials who hold the position and have the 
right to fight corruption. 
The process of judicial reform in the fight against corruption has been slow and 
ineffective. Vietnam has an anti-corruption law; although the Penal Code has a chapter 
on corruption, the law is not clear, specific or strict; therefore, deterrence is not 
significant. Functionality of many agencies is overlapping and unclear, resulting in lack 
of publicity and transparency and difficulties in monitoring. The responsibility and 
responsibility regime of the head are unclear, so mistakes are attributed to the collective 
leadership and it is difficult to handle individuals. Civil servants lack professionalism as 
well as modernity. The culture of resignation and culture of error confession when 
mistakes are made is ineffective. 
Investigation of foreign cases is difficult because Vietnam has not yet signed a 
judicial assistance agreement with many countries, so investigation is mainly based on 
reciprocal relations between judicial authorities from country to country. Delegating 
investigation and reception of the results of investigative entrustment must be carried out 
through the Supreme People’s Procuracy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Embassy 
and dependence on foreign countries; thus, investigation work is prolonged. Judicial trust 
documents must be translated into a foreign language and legally binding on translation 
companies, so it is time consuming and non-confidential, and knowledge of international 
law and experience of investigation of cases with foreign elements is very limited. 
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As explained by Do (2011), in the fight against corruption, the UN convention 
recommends states to turn following specified acts into criminal offences, as described in 
Articles 15 and 25: national public officials giving or receiving bribes, obstruction of 
justice, foreign public officials or public international organisations giving or receiving 
bribe, concealment, abuse of functions, laundering of proceeds of crime, trading in 
influence, embezzlement or misappropriation of property by public officials and civil 
servants, illicit enrichment, private sector giving or receiving, and embezzlement of 
property in private sector. 
7.4.5.2 Summary 
After a comparison between the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
requirements and Vietnam’s existing criminal law, within the provisions on crimes of 
corruption and related acts, there are some weaknesses and disadvantages. 
7.4.6 Discovery of Corruption in Public Investment and Shortcomings in 
Corruption Prevention 
Survey Question 6 helps to identify the causes of ineffective corruption prevention 
in public investment and Survey Question 7 points out the main weaknesses in the anti-
corruption process. 
Câu 6: Các nguyên nhân nào hạn chế việc phòng ngừa và phát hiện các 
trường hợp tham nhũng đối với đầu tư công mà bạn đã quan sát được từ năm 2009 
đến năm 2014? 
a. Cơ chế phát hiện tham nhũng không thật hiệu quả 
b. Các quy định về Luật Phòng chống tham nhũng chưa chứng minh hiệu quả cao 
c. Người phạm tội là người có chức vụ và quyền hạn cao 
d. Trình độ của cán bộ trong các cơ quan chống tham nhũng chưa đáp ứng được 
yêu cầu 
e. Khác, vui lòng cho biết cụ thể ................................................. 
Translation: 
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Survey Question 6: What were the causes limiting the prevention and 
discovery of cases of corruption in public investment that you inspected from 2009 
to 2014? 
a. The corruption detection mechanism is not very effective 
b. Regulations on anti-corruption law have not proved highly efficient 
c. Offenders are people in positions of power 
d. The qualifications of officers in anti-corruption agencies do not meet 
requirements 
e. Other, please specific…………………………………………. 
Aim 
Survey Question 6 helps the researcher clarify the obstacles that make public 
investigation of corruption crime prevention ineffective. 
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Outcome 
 
Figure 11: Survey Question 6: Outcomes summary. 
Table 14: Causes That Limit the Discovery of Corruption in Public Investment 
# Answer % Count 
1 The corruption detection mechanism is not very effective 14.00% 21 
2 Regulations on anti-corruption law have not proved efficient 32.67% 49 
3 Offenders are people in positions of power 32.67% 49 
4 
The qualifications of officers in anti-corruption agencies do not 
meet requirements 
20.67% 31 
5 Other, please specific…………………………………………. 0.00% 0 
 Total 100% 150 
 
Some 65.34% said that the two main reasons for limiting the prevention and 
detection of corruption in public investment were that regulations in the anti-corruption 
law have not proved efficient and that offenders were people in positions of power. In 
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contrast, 14% selected that the corruption detection mechanism was not very effective, 
while 20.67% selected that the qualifications of officers in anti-corruption agencies did 
not meet requirements (see Figure 11). 
7.4.6.1 Comment on Response 
Anti-corruption law in Vietnam has not yet fully and comprehensively regulated 
measures to control conflicts of interest for cadres, public servants and officials in the 
performance of duties and public duties, decreasing the efficiency of corruption 
prevention and detection. The provisions on handling of responsibilities of heads of 
agencies, organisations or units when corruption acts occur in their agencies, 
organisations or units are not yet specific, failing to encourage the heads in prevention 
and detection of corruption. 
7.4.6.2 Summary 
Regulations on anti-corruption have not performed efficiently and criminals are 
those in positions of power; these factors have obstructed corruption detection in 
Vietnam. 
Câu 7: Theo bạn, trong số những khiếm khuyết dưới đây, khiếm khuyết nào 
có liên quan đến việc phòng chống tham nhũng trong những năm gần đây? 
a. Tính minh bạch trong hoạt động của cơ quan nhà nước 
b. Quản lý tài sản và đầu tư công không hiệu quả 
c. Luật chưa có quy định và hướng dẫn cụ thể về cơ chế kiểm soát đầu tư công 
của Nhà nước 
d. Khác, vui lòng cho biết cụ thể …………………………………………. 
Translation: 
Survey Question 7: In your opinion, among the below shortcomings, which is 
related to the failure of corruption prevention in recent years? 
a. The transparency in state agencies’ activities 
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b. Asset management and public investment are not effective 
c. The law has not prescribed or given specific guidance on the state’s public 
investment checking mechanism 
d. Other, please specific…………………………………………. 
Aim 
Survey Question 7 will help to understand the reasons for the ineffective 
corruption prevention process and the causes of corruption. 
Outcome 
 
Figure 12: Survey Question 7: Outcome summary. 
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Table 15: Shortcomings Related to the Failure of Corruption Prevention 
# Answer % Count 
1 The transparency in state agencies’ activities 29.53% 44 
2 Asset management and public investment are not effective 37.58% 56 
3 
The law has not prescribed or given specific guidance on the 
state’s public investment checking mechanism 
32.89% 49 
4 Other, please specific…………………………………………. 0.00% 0 
 Total 100% 149 
 
Some 56 of 150 responded that poor management of assets and public project 
investment (37.58%) were responsible, 49 said that there was insufficient guidance from 
the state on the public investment mechanism (32.89%) and 44 stated that the law has not 
prescribed or given specific guidance on the state’s public investment checking 
mechanism (29.53%). 
7.4.6.3 Comment on Response 
The regulations on assets and income transparency have not helped control asset 
and income fluctuations. The handling of declarants who are dishonest or unable to 
reasonably explain changes in their assets and incomes are ineffective. The provisions on 
accusations and denunciation settlements are still incomplete and cannot promote the 
participation of people in detecting corrupt acts. Roles and relationships between the anti-
corruption law and other legal documents have led to incomprehensible and inconsistent 
applications and lack of measures to deal with organisations and individuals that violate 
the provisions of the anti-corruption law. 
7.4.6.4 Summary 
Corrupt objects are persons with a position and authority, so they are often aware 
of the law and have access to information, economic resources and broad relationships. 
Some may make great contributions to society and have a certain level of prestige; thus, 
this situation is difficult to detect and handle. 
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7.4.7 Challenges in Corruption Investigations and Prosecutions 
Survey Question 8 helps the researcher to identify the main causes that obstruct 
the investigation of a corruption case and Survey Question 9 explains why the 
investigation process is so time consuming. 
Câu 8: Nguyên nhân nào gây cản trở bạn khi điều tra vụ việc tham nhũng? 
a. Không đủ nhân sự 
b. Không đủ thẩm quyền 
c. Chính sách và Luật pháp không bảo vệ bạn 
d. Khác, vui lòng cho biết cụ thể …………………………………………. 
Translation: 
Survey Question 8: What is the cause of obstruction when you are 
investigating a corruption case? 
a. Not enough personnel 
b. Not enough power 
c. The policy and the law do not protect you 
d. Other, please specific…………………………………………. 
Aim 
This question helps clarify the causes of obstruction in investigation of corruption 
cases in public investment. 
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Outcome 
 
Figure 13: Survey Question 8: Outcomes summary. 
Table 16: Obstructions to Corruption Case Investigations 
# Answer % Count 
1 Not enough personnel 30.00% 45 
2 Not enough authority 44.00% 66 
3 The policy and the law do not protect you 26.00% 39 
4 Other, please specific…………………………………………. 0.00% 0 
 Total 100% 150 
 
Some 111 respondents answered that not enough personnel (30%) and not enough 
authority (44%) were the two main causes of obstruction during corruption case 
investigations, while 39 said that the policy and the law not protecting you (26%) was the 
main cause (see Figure 13). 
7.4.7.1 Comment on Response 
Corruption is often difficult to detect and investigate, particularly embezzlement 
and bribery. Offenders can be state officials who hold positions of power and are capable 
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of engaging in criminal acts and concealing proceeds of crime (Nguyen & Vu, 2007). 
Further, in Vietnam, there is a gap in the legislation to control cash flows, economic 
transactions and incomes. 
Most investigators are transferred from another force; some have never 
investigated crimes before, and this affects the quality of criminal case investigations, 
leading to the return of records for further investigation, prolonged investigation duration 
and failure of settlement. In particular, knowledge of international law and experience in 
investigating cases with foreign factors are very limited, resulting in many difficulties in 
the investigation and settlement, especially in countries that have not yet signed the 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Vietnam or have signed the treaty but do not 
cooperate with Vietnam. In addition, the mandate of the investigation must be approved 
by the Supreme People’s Procuracy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Embassy, 
which leads to a lengthening of the investigation time, and affects the investigation 
progress of current cases with foreign factors. Judicial mandate documents must be 
translated into foreign languages and legally enforceable, involving contracts with 
translation companies, resulting in a waste of time, lack of confidentiality and requiring 
a source of funding. 
The qualifications and capacities of commanders and investigators (mainly 
investigators) in investigation are limited. This is a big challenge for corruption 
investigators as corruption offenders are often very well educated. 
Many people are afraid of denouncing corruption as they fear the consequences. 
This situation is caused by a lack of protection mechanisms, so that denouncers feel alone 
and isolated. So far, although there have been no agencies or units reporting or providing 
official statistics on the situation of threats or harms to denouncers, the study and 
summary of some cases confirm that the actions of offenders or their relatives such as 
bribery, threatening and damaging have occurred, resulting in unsettled cases and other 
negative results. 
7.4.7.2 Summary 
There are no dedicated regulations on the protection of corruption denouncers in 
Vietnam. The current law regulations on protection of corruption denouncers are 
evaluated in principle only, are not specific and dispersed through many legal documents 
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and lack consistency. Some regulations on protection of corruption denouncers are 
inadequate, difficult to implement and ineffective in reality, so they are difficult to bring 
to life. There is a lack of documents stipulating effective mechanisms and measures to 
protect denouncers from revenge. 
Câu 9: Tại sao khoảng thời gian kể từ khi phát hiện đến thời điểm điều tra 
vụ việc tham nhũng luôn luôn dài hơn các loại tội phạm khác? 
a. Tính phức tạp của nó 
b. Tính minh bạch trong quá trình điều tra 
c. Uy quyền của tội phạm tham nhũng 
d. Khác, vui lòng cho biết cụ thể …………………………………………. 
Survey Question 9: Why is the period from the time of detection to the time 
of investigating a corruption case always longer than for other kinds of crime? 
a. Its complexity 
b. Lack of transparency in the investigation process 
c. The power of corruption criminals 
d. Other, please specific…………………………………………. 
Aim 
The question will identify the causes of prolonged and difficult detection and 
investigation of corruption offenders in public investigation. 
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Outcome 
 
Figure 14: Survey Question 9: Outcomes summary. 
Table 17: Length of Corruption Case Investigations 
# Answer % Count 
1 Its complexity 18.24% 27 
2 The lack of transparency in the investigation process 39.86% 59 
3 The power of corrupt individuals 41.89% 62 
4 Other, please specific…………………………………………. 0.00% 0 
 Total 100% 148 
 
In this question on why corruption cases take longer than other kinds of crime (see 
Figure 14), 62 of 149 responded because of the high position of power of the corrupt 
individual (41.89%), followed by 59 blaming the lack of transparency during the 
investigation process (39.86%). Some 27 respondents said that prolonged investigations 
of the corruption cases were due to their complexity (18.24%). 
 163 
7.4.7.3 Comment on Response 
A current difficulty in inspection and investigation is the requirements for 
inspection in finance, banking, capital construction and science and technology: the 
appointment of inspectors and prolonged assessment duration, the refusal and avoidance 
of inspection agencies, and even incorrect inspection conclusions and repeated 
inspections. One case took 13 months to inspect, longer than the investigation duration; 
this is an important reason for prolonged cases violating the investigation time limit. 
7.4.7.4 Summary 
The majority of corruption offenders are those holding high positions and power; 
offences are carefully conducted via many sophisticated tricks and corrupted assets are 
carefully hidden. In many cases, corrupted assets are transformed, transferred, dispersed, 
and even used for extravagant expenditures, so they are no longer capable of being 
detected or returned. In the course of legal proceedings, many procedural bodies have not 
been decisive in combating corruption offenders and failed to apply urgent provisional 
measures, such as seizing assets and prohibiting asset transfer. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 7 focused on exploring the quantitative research survey technique to 
collect micro data and provide research findings using descriptive statistical data analysis. 
7.5.1 Corruption Frequency in Public Investment in the Period 2009–2014 
Some 43% of respondents (65 of 150) responded that facilities investment was the 
field with the most corruption in public investment. Based on research from World 
Economic Forum (2014), there is a contradiction between high investment and poor 
performance in national infrastructure, supporting the finding and pointing to the 
important question of public investment efficiency. In addition, there is a strong and 
positive correlation between corruption and poverty (Luong, 2016). 
7.5.2 Investigation Activity Effectiveness 
More than 80% (121 of 150) provided either neutral or ineffective answers 
regarding investigation activity effectiveness. In fact, only 8% of corrupted assets and 
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half of corrupted land hectares were able to be recovered (Vietnam Breaking News, 
2016). Investigation and prosecution activities in Vietnam face numerous difficulties and 
challenges. 
7.5.3 Anti-corruption Law Effectiveness 
Some 78% responded that law effectiveness was either average, minimal or 
dismal. Vietnam’s legal framework in implementing anti-corruption is insufficient, out 
of date and incomprehensive (UNDP, 2012). Procedure code lacks provisions to enable 
investigative activities aimed at corruption acts (World Bank, 2013). 
7.5.4 Law Effectiveness in Deterring Corruption 
Nearly 50% of participants answered that the punishments enforced in the 
Vietnam criminal law are not sufficient to deter corrupt individuals (Dao-Le, 2011). 
7.5.5 Participants’ Obstacles When Trying to Prevent Corruption 
Some 73 of 150 respondents said that their challenges included pressure from 
supervisors, a lack of qualifications and insufficiency of the current policy and law. 
According to Do (2011), there are some insufficiencies in the law, such as that illicit 
enrichment of public officials and property bribery and embezzlement in the private 
sector have not been seriously criminalised in Vietnam. There are also problems 
pertaining to organisation skills, qualifications and collaboration of law enforcement 
agencies. 
7.5.6 Discovery of Corruption in Public Investment and Shortcomings in 
Corruption Prevention 
Some 49 participants responded that this is due to inefficiency of anti-corruption 
regulation, followed by 48 responding that people with high positions abuse their power. 
Some 56 responses of 150 blamed poor management of assets and public project 
investment, while a further 50 said that there is insufficient guidance from the state on 
public investment mechanisms. 
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7.5.7 Challenges in Corruption Investigation and Prosecution 
More than half of the participants believed that challenges included a lack of 
authority, followed by 46 participants identifying a lack of personnel, while the rest 
indicated that the policy and law does not protect them. Some 63 of 149 responses 
concerned the high position of power of corrupt individuals, followed by 59 responses 
highlighting the lack of transparency during the investigation process. 
The next chapter synthesises the main points and arguments that have been raised 
in Chapters 6 and 7. It discusses the outcomes of the interviews and survey. Multiple 
regression analysis was used to explore responses to the research questions. 
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Chapter 8: Limitations of Anti-corruption Law in Vietnam 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 concentrates on synthesising the main points and arguments described 
in Chapters 6 and 7. It discusses and analyses data collected from interviews and surveys, 
based on which the three research questions are answered and the objectives of the 
research achieved. First, data collected from interviews and surveys are analysed and 
discussed; thus, this chapter establishes a link between the data and the research questions. 
Then, this chapter discusses and gives examples to answer each of the research questions 
in detail. 
8.2 Data Collection and Analysis: Addressing the Research Questions 
8.2.1 Research Question 1: What Are the Causes of Corruption In Public 
Investment In Vietnam? 
8.2.1.1 Field with the Most Occurrences of Corruption in Public Investment in Vietnam 
Construction, investment in facilities and land and property had the most 
occurrences of corruption in public investment (see Figure 15). 
 167 
 
Figure 15: Survey Question 1: Fields with the most occurrences of corruption in public 
investment, 2009–2014. 
To further describe and support this issue, data from other sources are included. 
According to Figure 16 (Yap & Nguyen, 2017), Vietnam’s public and private sector 
infrastructure investment accounted for 5.7% of GDP in recent years, the second highest 
in Asia, just a little behind China (6.8%) according to the Asian Development Bank. This 
was followed by Indonesia and the Philippines, who spend less than 3%, and Malaysia 
and Thailand, who spend the least, under 2% (Yap & Nguyen, 2017). 
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Figure 16: Asia biggest infrastructure spenders (reproduced from Yap & Nguyen, 
2017). 
According to World Economic Forum (2014), Vietnam scored only 3.3 in terms 
of the quality of national public infrastructure investment, and ranked at 112, which is 
much lower than other Asian countries such as China (ranked 64 of 144 countries), 
Thailand (ranked 76 of 144 countries) and India (ranked 90 of 144 countries). 
The 2014 Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2014) stated 
that among various infrastructure investments, generally Vietnam scored the lowest 
regarding the quality of ports, roads, and electricity (see Table 18). 
Table 18: Vietnam’s Overall Infrastructure Quality Scores and Rank (reproduced from 
World Economic Forum, 2014) 
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Transport and electricity infrastructure, two sectors playing very important roles 
in any country, are very weak in Vietnam, with electricity losses and traffic jams 
occurring constantly and increasingly (Dapice & Nguyen, 2009). 
Thus, there appears to be a contradiction between the high investment in and poor 
performance of national infrastructure, pointing to questions regarding public investment 
efficiency. 
If many public facility projects are wasteful and imbued with corruption and many 
funded projects are delayed and fail because of poor management, the return on 
investment will be low or zero (Dapice & Nguyen, 2009). 
The interview and survey data suggest that corruption in public investment in 
Vietnam can be attributed to the following factors.  
8.2.1.2 Moral Breakdown 
Bribery derives from greed. It is humanity’s greedy nature that leads to predatory 
behaviour in cases in which people are tasked with management. Interviewee 7 stated that 
‘Personal interests and monetary aspirations have made the person assigned economic 
responsibility corrupt, causing serious consequences for state capital and an adverse 
influence on society’. According to Interviewee 3, corruption is attributable to ‘the moral 
breakdown of a large number of cadres, civil servants, officials and party members, 
including officials and party members working in law enforcement agencies’. 
Such weaknesses and limitations are attributable to the fact that ‘not a few Party 
Committees, Party organizations, administrations at different levels and heads of 
agencies, organizations and units have improperly performed their tasks of leading and 
directing anti-corruption and wastefulness activities’ (Vietnamlawmagazine, 2012, p.1). 
Some leaders and managers at different levels, including the central level, and in 
various sectors have not been exemplary as regards morality and lifestyle, exhibiting a 
lack of determination to prevent and fight corruption and wastefulness (Vietnam Law & 
Legal Forum, 2012). 
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8.2.1.3 Protectionism in State-owned Enterprises 
Interviewee 4 stated that ‘corporations that are 100% state-owned are always 
given public investment works; this is where corruption offences always appear’. 
In Vietnam, for state-owned enterprises, the monitoring mechanism is not tight, 
and the auditing regime is sometimes not implemented regularly and thoroughly. Tax 
evasion, false declarations and false documentation continues in many enterprises. This 
creates conditions for corruption offences to arise. 
Concurring with this opinion, Interviewee 2 confirmed that ‘The protectionism of 
state-owned enterprises leads to monopoly, loose management mechanisms and lack of 
transparency, facilitating corruption offences to arise in these enterprises’. 
In addition, inappropriate supervision of public procurement procedures can result 
in undetected concrete corruption practices (World Bank, 2013). 
As both sides of corrupt transactions share an interest in concealment, many cases 
are likely to remain undetected (Vietnam Breaking News, 2016). The difficulty to detect 
bribery offences appears to be caused by the secret and silent nature of bribery 
transactions (Luong, 2016b). 
8.2.1.4 Handling the People Involved 
The provisions on handling of responsibilities of heads of agencies, organisations 
or units when corruption acts occur in their agencies, organisations or units are not yet 
specific and clear. As Interviewee 5 stated, ‘We also lack a proper mechanism for the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies, lack a radical, long-term, comprehensive 
system of solutions, and lack a specific and appropriate roadmap to carry out the current 
policies on anti-corruption’. 
8.2.1.5 Long Investigation Periods for Corruption Cases in Public Investment 
Seven interviewees said that due to the complexity the case, the investigation 
often lasts. This gives the person involved in the case a chance to hide evidence, making 
the investigation process complicated and making it difficult to detect criminals. The 
lengthy investigation process allows criminals to hide or remove criminal evidence. 
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8.2.1.6 Regulations on the Protection of Witnesses, Experts and Victims are Vague and 
General 
Most interviewees agreed that ineffective denunciation is a cause of corruption in 
public investment. With limited protection of whistleblowers in Vietnamese law, 
corruption whistleblowers do not stand as witnesses in corruption cases. As Interviewee 
1 stated, ‘Vietnamese law does not specifically stipulate a program for the protection of 
corruption whistleblowers, which affects the detection of corruption practices’. 
Being recognised as a fundamental right of citizens in the Constitution of 
Vietnam, denunciation is a crucial channel for government to access information on, 
detect and handle violations of the law. Vietnam has long recognised the rights of 
whistleblowers, and corruption whistleblowers in particular, via many different legal 
instruments (Vietnam Law & Legal Forum, 2016). However, many legal provisions are 
just principles, non-specific and scattered across various legal instruments of different 
legal effect. This is the main reason why whistleblowers, in many cases, still hesitate, feel 
scared and do not cooperate actively with state agencies in the inspection, verification 
and handling of denunciations (Towards Transparency, 2016) 
8.2.1.7 Lack of Transparency and Ineffective Human Resource Management 
According to the survey questionnaire, 56 from 150 people were concerned about 
poor asset management and public investment, while 49 were concerned about the fact 
that the law has not prescribed and given specific guidance on the state’s public 
investment checking mechanism (see Figure 17). 
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Figure 17: Survey Question 7: Shortcomings related to the failure of corruption 
prevention. 
Interviewee 1 said that the cause was that ‘The way to manage staff has many 
procedures, the responsibility of the head is not high and the individuality in handling 
situations is also unclear, unfair or undetermined’. In the same vein, Interviewee 2 added, 
‘The communication regime lacks transparency and control’ before the occurrence of 
corruption. 
Interviewers 6 and 3 argued that ‘there is no transparency in management, which 
leads to the offender having a condition for personal gain’. Vietnam is now implementing 
policies to make assets transparent, but this effort has not been effective, allowing 
corruption offenders to conceal the proceeds of crime (UNDP, 2012). 
Most interviewees said that transparency in information and the functioning of the 
machinery of government is one of the mechanisms for promoting people’s trust in 
government and also one of the most restrictive measures for anti-corruption as, when 
everything is transparent, people can monitor and manage in the sense of democracy. 
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Where there is no transparency, there is corruption. Public officials’ income and property 
are not under supervision or transparent; supervision and transparency of income and 
property are challenging to implement. Published decree No 64/1998/ND-CP of 1998 
offers detailed guidance on how to implement the Ordinance Against Corruption. But its 
legislative purpose, object declaration and scope are limited, although the declaration is 
required among public officials (World Bank, 2013). Thus, they are rarely disciplined or 
examined for penal liability; as a result, the corruption prevention program is inefficient 
(Do, 2011). 
Vietnam’s management of the investment sector lacks transparency; little 
information is available on public investment projects, and this makes monitoring 
difficult. Excessive bureaucracy and red tape, overregulation, corruption, dishonesty in 
dealing with public contracts, lack of transparency and trustworthiness, inability to 
provide appropriate services for the business sector, and political dependence on the 
judicial system impose significant economic costs on businesses and slow the process of 
economic development (World Economic Forum, 2014). 
The most problematic issue is the strong positive correlation between corruption 
and poverty. The absence of public scrutiny allows corruption to continue, with serious 
consequences for the whole nation, but particularly those on low incomes (Luong, 
2016b). 
The Governance and Public Administration Performance Index reported that more 
than 20% of citizens admitted that they have had to pay bribes to obtain their land use 
right certificate (Luong, 2016b). 
8.2.1.8 Effects of Limitation of the Anti-Corruption Law on the Practice of Investigating 
Corruption Offenses and on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
Before listing the effects of the limitations of the anti-corruption law of Vietnam, 
this thesis recognises that this law also suffers from a lack of transparency. To address 
this, the research explores the consequences of the lack of transparency in theory and 
provides examples to illustrate the realities. 
According to Kolstad and Wiig (2009): 
1. A lack of transparency makes corruption less risky and more attractive. 
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2. A lack of transparency makes it harder to use incentives to make public 
officials act cleanly. 
3. A lack of transparency makes it hard to select the most honest and efficient 
people for public sector positions or contract partners. 
4. Informational advantages imply access to rents, making reform difficult. 
5. A lack of transparency makes cooperation more difficult to sustain, and 
opportunistic rent-seeking more likely. 
6. A lack of transparency may undermine social norms and reduce trust. 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009) also noted that corruption decreases when: 
1. Bureaucrat wages increase. 
2. The fine increases. 
3. Bribe are lower. 
4. The probability of being caught increases. 
5. The moral costs of obtaining income from bribery increases. 
6. Bureaucrats risk aversion increases. 
From such a simplified framework, it follows that the combination of a large bribe, 
low wages and lack of enforcement are stimulating corruption (Becker & Stigler, 1974). 
At first, lack of transparency can make corruption more attractive and less risky. 
In most cases, transparency affects enforcement of the law. In an environment lacking 
transparency, it is difficult to gather evidence for the investigation and prosecution of 
corruption cases. Corrupt individuals themselves can also more easily avoid prosecution. 
Not only does a lack of transparency tend to increase the scale of corruption, a lack of 
information and transparency means corrupt officials have greater bargaining power 
when information is sparse, which will lead to higher bribes. In addition, the cost of being 
charged with corruption is lower, because once again, in an environment lacking 
information, it will be difficult to assess what officials have done with misappropriated 
property. This possibly decreases the bribes bureaucrats require to commit corrupt acts 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). This scenario is very much reflects the case of Vietnam, as 
current corruption is a systemic problem widespread in many sectors of the Vietnamese 
state. The lack of transparency has created an environment of escalating corruption and it 
is increasingly more challenging to reform this situation. 
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Second, the lack of transparency may cause difficulties in offering incentives. So 
far, corruption has been from the perspective of a corrupt official or agent only (Kolstad 
& Wiig, 2009), but agents can be perceived as acting on behalf of the government. Under 
the supervision of superiors, the agent may take corrupt actions. The supervisor will try 
to keep the agent from acting corruptly and wants the agent to be honest in his or her job. 
The supervisor will propose an incentive for the agent to be honest (Kolstad & Wiig, 
2009). The agent will report back to his or her supervisor on performance and price. But 
a problem occurs when, in an environment lacking transparency, the supervisor can only 
know the effectiveness of the incentive through the agent’s report. So, the opportunity for 
agents to commit corrupt acts is high, and the risk of being detected low. In addition, the 
cost is an imperfect indicator or signal of the agent’s actions. Reporting low costs 
indicates that the agent behaves honestly. If the agent is given a higher payment (bonus) 
when he or she reports low costs, he or she receives an incentive to behave honestly 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). 
The more ambiguous the environment, the more inaccurate reports are. This has 
two consequences. First, lack of transparency creates a very difficult environment for 
controlling corruption. Second, because it is impossible to know the exact quality of the 
work due to the reports, it will be difficult to reward individuals who are doing well. Such 
a non-transparent environment creates very little motivation for good agents to develop 
their abilities and to feel their worthiness; they may question why they have to work 
honestly while there are so many others behaving badly and suffering few consequences. 
A lack of transparency increases the bias and variance of the signal. More generally, a 
lack of information may make it harder to identify appropriate anti-corruption policies 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). 
Third, lack of transparency makes it difficult to select honest bureaucrats or 
contract partners. 
In an environment lacking transparency, it is difficult for supervisors to obtain 
reliable signals on agent integrity. It is also difficult, costly and expensive to test what 
kind of agent an agent is. It is more difficult to tell whether agents are honest than to 
recruit agents (working organisations) which are honest. Similarly, it is more difficult to 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of a contractual partner than to contract the most cost-
effective partner (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009) 
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A lack of transparency makes cooperation more difficult to sustain and 
opportunistic rent-seeking more likely 
Lack of transparency discourages public participation in democratic processes. 
Secrecy raises the price of information and thereby discourages voters or groups without 
special interests from participation. 
In the same vein, when the government controls information, voters tend to expose 
cases of wrongdoing less, since it is very likely that this choice would be unfavourable; 
in the end, the possibility of these cases being exposed is very low. A bad government 
tends to be less opposed because politicians or bad policies are less likely to be identified 
and therefore replaced. Information capture also intensifies the moral hazard problem: 
elected politicians are more likely to engage in extradition as they know they are not likely 
to be caught. Gathering information is risky because voters have a high chance of 
engaging in corrupt behaviour, as this can bring great benefits with little chance of being 
caught. Conversely, transparency reduces the possibilities of rent-seeking activities and 
increases the accountability of the government (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). 
It follows that corrupt governments would forgo huge rents if they implemented 
reform increasing access to information. According to Stiglitz (2002), civil servants tend 
to want to increase asymmetric information, so that the price given for the information 
they hold will be higher. This is related to the rentier state perspective, which suggests 
that resource revenues undermine democracy in several ways (Ross, 2001). 
A lack of transparency may undermine social norms and reduce trust 
In terms of the effects of a lack of transparency on social norms and beliefs, the 
two majorly affected areas include the institutions themselves and the public at large; how 
institutions interact with one another and how individuals interact with corrupt 
individuals within the state. 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009) argued that in the case of the institutions, individuals are 
within the state together. In this case, lack of information will increase the level of 
corruption; for example, in the case of two regulators of an individual or firm, the two 
companies may set too high a bribe rate than optimal for the agencies. The cause of this 
is that, when setting the bribe, neither does the establishment of high bribes increase the 
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likelihood of another organisation taking bribes. This can be overcome by both agencies 
acting complicity in setting the bribe. Again, this can only happen in an environment 
where both sides have each other’s information and agree to set levels (Kolstad & Wiig, 
2009). 
The second case concerns individuals wanting to change the current state of 
corruption. Kolstad and Wiig (2009) emphasised that in an environment where corruption 
is widespread, meaning that it has a solid foundation, the efforts of individuals are 
unlikely to create great change. This is true of the current situation in Vietnam: a recent 
survey found that bribery rates in Vietnam are among the highest in Asia, at 65% 
(Transparency International, 2017). The problem is related to social norms, for purely 
self-interested individuals, social norms against corruption may be hard to establish in 
mechanisms for punishing the corrupt (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). It is difficult for 
individuals to object to corruption because of the lack of information and cooperation 
from other individuals. In addition, when any individual acts dishonestly, faith is eroded. 
The result is that individuals with good intentions must behave opportunistically rather 
than candidly. This reduces the effectiveness of anti-corruption as well as the spillover 
effects of corrective actions. 
In combating corruption, one of the biggest problems that a government can face 
is demonstrating its efforts to reduce this bad practice. But with the many anti-corruption 
laws existing in the legal system, the effectiveness of preventing, criminalisation and law 
enforcement and asset recovery is low. As a result, there can be many significant effects. 
Corruption in Vietnam is rampant in almost all branches of the bureaucracy. In 
the 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, Vietnam performed below average, with a score 
of 2.9 on a 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) scale. The country ranked 112 of 182 
assessed countries worldwide and 21 of 35 countries in the Asia Pacific region. The World 
Bank (2010) confirmed Vietnam’s poor performance on control of corruption as well as 
other areas of governance (rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence), showing little or no 
improvement over the years. For instance, between 2004 and 2010, there was no 
significant change in any of the six areas of governance assessed. The Control of 
Corruption Indicator increased from 22.9 in 2004 to 33 in 2010 (on a 0 to 100 scale, with 
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higher values corresponding to better outcomes), but this improvement is not statistically 
significant (Martini, 2012). 
The limits of the law also create opportunities for corrupt officials. With an 
increasingly complicated situation, corruption is still a thorny issue. Corruption threatens 
areas including social development and economic growth, and the ineffectiveness of anti-
corruption laws are undermining the trust of both people and the business community. 
First, the effects of this systematic corruption on social development are alarming. 
Acuña-Alfaro (2013, p. 35) also sees corruption as systemic, writing that ‘for every walk 
of life, every Vietnamese citizen must face an endless path of exactions both large and 
small’. Some Vietnamese leaders have publicly conceded that state anti-corruption efforts 
leave much to be desired. For example, in May 2014, the Party Secretary, Nguyen Phu 
Trong, lamented on a government website that attempts to curb corruption had fallen short 
of expectations, pointing to the finance, banking, land and mineral management, and 
public investment sectors. The schemes are ‘more sophisticated and difficult to detect 
because of their tendency to hold high positions and significant power’ (Giaoduc, 2014). 
The National Assembly’s Committee for Judicial Affairs in September 2015 affirmed that 
‘corruption continues to be one of the most pressing issues in society and a threat to socio-
political stability in Vietnam’ (Giaoduc, 2014). 
Dang (2016) explored the impact of corruption on the socio-economic 
development process at the provincial level, the impact of corruption on private sector 
development, the prevalence and burden of corruption, the significant and negative 
impacts on private sector development, as demonstrated by the level of private sector 
investment and number of jobs, and concluded that control of corruption would bring 
about sizeable benefits for provincial economic development. If the percentage of firms 
that agree that paying bribes is common in their line of business (corruption prevalence) 
is reduced by 1%, then private sector investment is expected to increase by 3.7%. If the 
percentage of firms agreeing that informal charges cost 10% or more of their revenue 
(corruption burden) is reduced by 1%, then private investment is expected to increase by 
6.4%. For job creation, the corresponding effects of corruption prevalence and corruption 
are 1% and 1.8% (Dang, 2016). Further, corruption prevalence, burden and predictability 
all have significant impacts on the level of average per capita income: a 1% decrease in 
the measure of corruption prevalence will lead to a 1.5 % increase in income per capita; 
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a 1% decrease in the measure of corruption burden will lead to a 2.3 % increase in income 
per capita; and a 1% increase in the measure of corruption predictability will lead to an 
increase of at least 1.5% in income per capita (Dang, 2016). 
Second, the negative impact of corruption on Vietnam’s economic growth is a 
significant issue. Corruption is a phenomenon that causes damage to individuals, 
businesses, organisations, the public sector and the economy in general. The harmful 
effects of corruption on national economic development are widely acknowledged in the 
literature and have been the subject of passionate discussions. Using empirical 
approaches, several authors have shown that corruption scares away investors, which 
reduces the productivity of public expenditures, distorts the allocation of resources and 
thus lowers economic growth (Anh, Minh, & Tran-Nam, 2016). Corruption has also been 
the focus of various international studies. According to the World Bank, the cost of 
corruption at the global level is about USD 1 trillion per year in a world economy of USD 
30 trillion (Kaufmann & Mastruzzi, 2005). While corruption associated with poor 
institutions has a negative effect on GDP growth, ‘residual corruption’, which is unrelated 
to other governance characteristics, is positively associated with GDP growth in countries 
with poor institutions (Mironov, 2005). Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) show that 
corruption’s impact on growth is conditional on the quality of political institutions: in 
regimes that are highly accountable, corruption has a negative impact on growth, but in 
regimes where institutions have limited accountability, corruption has no impact on 
growth (Baland, Moene & Robinson, 2010). 
A study conducted by Wei and Smarzynska (1999) confirmed that corruption 
metes out significant costs regarding lower economic growth when the direct method is 
considered. However, the indirect method shows that the impact of corruption on the 
growth of human capital (education) and domestic investment channels is positive, 
whereas the impact of corruption on growth in terms of accountability is negative and 
statistically significant. Using these results, this thesis examines the costs of corruption 
in Vietnam, to show that had CPI levels improved by just one unit between 2000 and 
2012, the economy would have grown by an average of 6.73% during this period to 
6.94%. If corruption levels had fallen one standard deviation (i.e., CPI increased from 2.6 
to 5.0), then Vietnam could have achieved a growth rate of 7.22%. This illustrates the 
primary finding that corruption undermines economic performance. 
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At the macroeconomic level, limitations in the prevention of corruption also have 
a significant impact. It is customary to cite data from the World Economic Forum, for 
example, which suggests that corruption equals more than 5% of global GDP (USD 2.6 
trillion), and from the World Bank, which states that USD 1 trillion is paid in bribes each 
year. The International Monetary Fund also reports that investment in corrupt countries 
is about 5% less than in corruption-free countries. World Economic Forum (2008) 
estimates suggest that corruption increases the cost of doing business by 10% on average. 
Academic research has focused policymakers on evaluating the prevalence and effects of 
corruption on economic growth and development (Tromme, 2016). Research provides 
evidence for the negative relationship between corruption and economic growth, GDP 
per capita, investment and other significant macroeconomic variables. Two researchers, 
Holmberg and Rothstein (2012), have also found that corruption is consistently correlated 
with lower growth rates, GDP per capita and human development levels. 
The Asia Pacific Institute of Management and Transformation and Change 
Management has conducted a study on the level of corruption at the provincial level. The 
research team employed a dichotomy of strategic and transactional costs and benefits of 
engaging in corruption. The authors discussed both the cause and consequences of 
corruption from a macroeconomic point of view. The Asia Pacific Institute of 
Management and Transformation and Change Management found that most firms engage 
in corruption to follow the rules of the game, because they are subject to significant 
pressures to bribe. And yet, typical benefits that firms expect in return, such as fewer 
administrative hurdles, do not always materialise or do so under certain conditions (e.g., 
depending on the size of the company and years in operation). Benefits of corruption, 
such as transactional benefits (i.e., better administrative services) or access to business 
opportunities, hold true only for certain firms. On the other hand, corruption has a 
negative impact on the firm’s strategic capability by eroding the integrity of the culture, 
demotivating innovation and risking the company’s reputation. These harmful effects are 
normally hidden and not well-recognised by firms.  
Results in Nguyen, Ho, Le and Nguyen (2016) show that over 2009–2011, each 
firm in the sample paid on average VND 460–600 million in informal costs per year (USD 
20,000–30,000), yet still made VND 512–646 million in profit before tax each year (USD 
24,000–30,000). The informal payments were equivalent to 78–107% of the firm’s PBT; 
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that is, to make VND 100,000 in profit, a firm has to pay VND 70,000–100,000 in 
informal costs (Nguyen et al., 2016). 
According to the 10-year Review of the Anti-Corruption Law, finalised by the 
Government Inspectorate, more than 92% of corruption money has been dispersed, 
uncontrollable and irrecoverable (Kdlc, 2018). There are many difficulties in attempting 
to recovery economic assets in corruption cases; in particular, the amount collected is 
small compared with the total amount of enforcement and handling of cases is slow. For 
example, according to the decision of the court, the defendant Duong Chi Dung had to 
compensate Vinalines VND 110 billion, but the judgement execution agency handling 
the case recovered only just over VND 14 billion. For another corruption offence, Huynh 
Thi Huyen Nhu was supposed to repay nearly VND 14,000 billion, but preliminary 
estimates showed property distraction and blockade ensured an execution of just over 
VND 500 billion. These are just two of the many significant economic cases where 
corrupted assets are unlikely to be recovered (Kdlc, 2018). 
There have been serious cases of corruption in recent years, and the process of 
investigation has revealed many weaknesses. Typically, in Trinh Xuan Thanh’s case, 
from 2007–2013, he served as Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee, General 
Director, Party Secretary, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation 
Construction of oil and gas in Vietnam (PVC; he was accused of losing more than VND 
3,000 billion, about USD 132 million). Trinh Xuan Thanh was arrested in January 2018. 
Another case is Vu Huy Hoang, a retired trade and industry minister who was disciplined 
for ‘poor management and serious wrongdoing’. The VCP’s investigating body, the 
Central Inspection Commission, concluded that the Ministry of Industry and Trade under 
Vu Huy Hoang had committed violations in the planning and appointment of Trinh Xuan 
Thanh. Both cases reveal weaknesses in the investigation and prevention of corruption; 
in Trinh Xuan Thanh’s case, there has been a large loss of state assets unlikely to be 
recovered (Nguyen, 2017). 
Cases involving corruption are usually big but difficult to enforce. In the process 
of investigating and prosecuting, measures to ensure the enforcement of judgements are 
limited. Even for fines, practical recovery may not be feasible. For example, Pham Thanh 
Binh, Chairman of Vinashin Group, was supposed to execute more than VND 600 billion, 
but the final property was only one house in Trung Hoa – Nhan Chinh, worth about VND 
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5 billion (half wife, half husband). In addition, few are interested in auctions of properties 
related to judgement executions, because of the very high risks, according to Hoang Sy 
Thanh (Vietnamnet, 2012). 
One notable aspect regarding the ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption law is the 
increasing influence of interest groups. Although corruption does not directly create 
interest groups, according to Vov (2014), these groups 1) create relationships, brackets 
with those in office, the deciding authority to be placed in office; 2) investors and 
enterprises make connections with competent agencies or persons; 3) businesses in the 
area of interest that cause widespread loss (collective damage (taking land, taking 
cooperation money, taking insurance of staff in the agency); damage to the state; 
‘national’ damage, if interest groups take advantage of projects involving foreign 
elements). Negative officials in the interest group enjoy and understand the complexity 
of the law; if the law is pure and easy to understand, they cannot be corrupt. The 
researchers argue that these interest groups are in extraordinary danger, for the following 
factors. 
First, interest groups come right from the policy formulation phase. If corruption 
occurs where there is a physical or public element, the benefits of the group are expressed 
in active, authoritative discussions right from the policy formulation phase. 
Second, the interest group consists of officials who in the previous period were 
competent and clean. If corruption has a broad, complicated, multifaceted relationship 
(such as corruption cases involving criminal offences, offences against criminals, 
offenders), the interest group is purely relationships in the ruling, even reputable groups. 
It is the capacity, the important position to have the opportunity to create group benefits, 
because only they have the right and ‘to have’ in the activities of building, adjusting and 
amending policies. 
Third, there must be new professionalism to detect interest groups. If this is only 
criticism of corruption in general, many ordinary people can also judge this. But to find 
the interest groups requires proficient professionals. Therefore, information about interest 
groups is only available at conferences of the VCP, parliamentary forums, or from 
government, commentators’ or experts’ comments; interest groups are not a matter of 
concern (Nguyen, 2016). 
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General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong emphasised that this is a serious problem 
not only in Vietnam but in other countries and times; many countries have lost their 
government and regime because of corruption. Corruption is a plague on the public, and 
the state has the benefit of the group is the conclusion, to hook up with each other to harm 
the state and reality, not now just happened that long time ago (Xuan, 2017). 
8.2.2 Research Question 2: What Are Challenges, Difficulties and Barriers to Anti-
corruption In Public Investment In Vietnam? 
According to data collected from the survey, respondents mostly believe that 
corruption detection mechanisms are not very effective (14%), regulations on anti-
corruption law have not proved to be efficient (32.67%), offenders are people in positions 
of power (32.67%) and the qualifications of officers in anti-corruption agencies do not 
meet requirements (20.67%) (see Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18: Survey Question 6: Causes that limit the discovery of corruption in public 
investment. 
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8.2.2.1 Corruption Detection Mechanisms are not Very Effective 
According to Interviewee 4, ‘The law on asset recovery in corruption cases is still 
ineffective. The confiscated asset is less than the damage the accused has committed in a 
corruption case in public investment’. 
In dealing with instruments, proceeds of crime, tracing, restraining, freezing and 
seizing assets, the purpose of the provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code is to facilitate 
the prosecution of the crime rather than confiscation of the unlawful assets (Vu & 
Nguyen, 2014). 
The criminal procedure legislation considers asset recovery and confiscation 
essential tasks for the prosecution of the offender, in which civil forfeiture is a separate 
process along with the prosecution of the offender (Vietnam Breaking News, 2016). In 
Vietnam, this procedure is not appropriately adopted, and the Criminal Procedure Code 
is not an effective legal instrument to deal with the proceeds of corrupt acts. 
According to Thai (2014), only 22.3% of stolen public funds have been recovered 
(nearly VND 1.5 trillion or USD 70.6 million). 
Proceeds of corruption crime can be turned into lawful assets through money 
laundering, including investing in businesses, stock markets and even gambling (Nguyen 
& Vu, 2007). This leads to vast amounts of assets not being recovered. The offender 
accepts punishment and is not willing to cooperate with judicial authorities to return the 
assets (Nguyen & Vu, 2007). 
Mutual legal assistance channels do not work (no results from assistance aboard). 
There are difficulties in determining true values of assets, particularly shares and real 
estate, late actions taken to restrain and freeze proceeds of crime, which results in 
disposition (Luong, 2016b). 
Truong Minh Manh, deputy head of the Supreme People’s Procuracy, said about 
VND 17 trillion (USD 800.02 million) was not recovered in corruption cases discovered 
in 2010–2014 (Thai, 2014); only VND 5 trillion (USD 235.3 million) was recovered in 
that period. 
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Investigation and asset recovery are difficult because Vietnam’s current anti-
corruption law does not provide for the recovery of wealth from illicit enrichment 
encounters. In fact, the recovery rate of corrupted assets is very low due to restrictions in 
the anti-corruption law. Interviewee 1 stated that ‘although the Vietnamese law contains 
provision on the confiscation of illegal assets, however, this regulation is just general and 
not specific, resulting in the ineffective implementation’. 
According to the General Inspectorate of the Government, Phan Van Sau (2016), 
after ten years of implementation, there were a total of 2,530 cases of corruption, with 
5,447 defendants prosecuted. The number of prosecutions is close to 3,000, and the 
number of trials is about 2,630. According to Mr. Sau, the total damages of these 
corruption cases amounted to VND 59,750 billion and over 400 hectares. Of these, the 
authorities only recovered VND 4,676.6 billion, less than 8%, and over 219 hectares of 
land. A recent government report confirmed that corrupted assets in some cases had been 
dispersed, uncontrolled and revoked (Thanhtra, 2016). 
In other anti-corruption law systems, illicit enrichment regulations facilitate the 
recovery of illicit assets, resulting in effective recovery. For example, under Section 10 
of Hong Kong’s Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, it is an offence for a government 
officer to maintain a standard of living, or to possess or control assets, which are not 
commensurate with his or her official income unless he or she can give a satisfactory 
explanation to the court (UNDP, 2012). This provision places the onus of proof on the 
accused. The highest penalty for this offence is a 10-year imprisonment sentence plus a 
fine (up to HKD 500,000). Section 10 was invoked no less than 37 times in the first five 
years of ICAC’s operations. One of the most famous cases involves a criminal 
investigation detective who was caught with an unproven USD 600 million (more money 
than he could have earned at work in 10,000 years) (Schneider, 2007). 
A similar provision exists in Singapore anti-corruption law. Singapore Prevention 
of Corruption Act, Article 24, allows CPIB to investigate any public employee who shows 
signs of having money or property incompatible with the income of a civil servant. In 
fact, that property may be taken into consideration by the court as corroborating the 
testimony of any witness in the trial or inquiry that the accused person accepted or 
obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain gratification and as showing that the 
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gratification was accepted or obtained or agreed to be accepted or attempted to be 
obtained corruptly as an inducement or reward (UNDP, 2012). 
8.2.2.2 Qualifications of Officers in Anti-corruption Agencies do not Meet Requirements 
Those who commit crimes of corruption are persons with a high level of power 
and professional qualifications. This requires investigators to be knowledgeable and have 
a deep understanding about the area they are investigating. 
There is a lack of training and skills in anti-corruption investigation, prosecution 
and adjudication; investigators, prosecutors and adjudicators who deal with corruption 
cases should have deep knowledge and specialist skills. They rarely learn the 
fundamentals and receive practical training about the investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication in their work (Tatarski, 2016). Limited budgets lead to insufficient training, 
lack of capacity and experience in officers in financial and banking sectors, economic 
investment and construction (Nguyen & Vu, 2007), and lack of cooperation between 
citizens and the government in anti-corruption measures. Interviewee 3 said that ‘Limited 
understanding of public investment has made it difficult for investigators to investigate 
corruption cases in the field of public investment’. 
The anti-money-laundering department in Vietnam lacks power and functions 
restrictedly (Vu & Nguyen, 2014). There has been an absence of specialised agencies for 
financial forensics or intelligence units (Vu & Nguyen, 2014). This has caused difficulties 
in investigating corruption cases and subsequent confiscation of assets. 
According to the Interviewee 6, ‘Despite the effort in investigating corruption 
cases in public investment, due to the limited knowledge of economics of the 
investigators, the investigation of corruption cases is not highly effective’. 
Vietnam has made huge efforts to improve its human resources in the criminal 
justice system, but in reality, requirements are not met (Vietnam Breaking News, 2016). 
Some investigators do not have enough experience, knowledge and capacity related to 
corruption crime, such as knowledge of foreign languages, high-tech infrastructure, 
international laws, financial and legal matters and intensive investigative skills (Thai, 
2014). 
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8.2.2.3 Offenders are Often High-Level and Powerful Officers 
Some 32.67% of respondents said that offenders in corruption cases in public 
investment are people with high power. This makes it very difficult to investigate cases. 
In addition, Interviewee 7 stated that ‘those who commit crimes of corruption are 
persons with a high level of power, professional qualifications, broad social relationships 
and good economic conditions, so they often find ways to conceal the offence’. Due to 
the position of the offender, they have good relationships at work; investigating is very 
difficult because the offender seeks information and hides offences through relationships. 
Corruption is a sophisticated and complicated crime; corruption is committed by 
those who abuse power, have a vast network of relationships and can strongly influence 
and distort the criminal justice system to conceal their wrongdoings (Vu & Nguyen, 
2014). 
8.2.2.4 The Accused in Corruption Cases 
All interviewees stated that, as Vietnam is a Southeast Asian country, it has a 
culture of having too much respect for seniors and acquaintances and a very subjective 
concept of justice still exists in the way of life and thoughts of the Vietnamese people, 
especially those who hold power. 
This is further supported by a report from Vietnam Breaking News (2016), which 
argued that major corruption cases normally involve many people with close connections, 
who keep information secret at any cost, and thus, it is tough to uncover them. 
8.2.2.5 Anti-corruption Law has not Proved Highly Efficient 
Some 54% of survey respondents said that the current anti-corruption law had 
only average effectiveness; 19.33% said that the anti-corruption law was less effective in 
anti-corruption (see Figure 19). 
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(1–5 scale with 1 the least effective and 5 the most) 
Figure 19: Survey Question 3: Effectiveness of anti-corruption law. 
Most interviewees specifically stated that the law does not clearly define the 
position, role and relationship between the anti-corruption law and other legal documents, 
leading to inconsistency in understanding and application, especially with the provisions 
of the Penal Code (Vietnam Law & Legal Forum, 2017). There exists a lack of regulations 
on non-criminal handling measures against organisations and individuals involved in 
corrupt acts and a lack of regulations on the order, procedures and competence to deal 
with violations of the anti-corruption law. 
Interviewee 6 stated that, ‘The anti-corruption law specifically regulates corrupt 
behaviour, but when implemented, investigators face many difficulties in detecting 
corruption as the offenders are senior officials in the state apparatus. They have been 
given documents from higher levels that interfere with the investigation of the cases.’ 
The implementation of investigative activities has shown that Vietnam’s legal 
framework in anti-corruption is insufficient, out of date and unreliable (UNDP, 2012). 
Vietnam’s legal framework does not define adequately all forms of corruption as criminal 
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acts (UNDP, 2012). Commenting on Vietnam’s anti-corruption law, UNDP (2012) 
concluded that it does not place a high priority on strengthening investigative powers and 
imposing sanctions against corruption; instead, Vietnam’s anti-corruption law focuses 
more on raising awareness of corruption and giving responsibilities to broader anti-
corruption and public officials rather than setting up enforcement mechanisms to deal 
with corruption. 
Unclear provisions on the concept of anti-corruption law and Penal Code 
Vietnam has an anti-corruption law in 2012 that regulates the definition of anti-
corruption acts but penalties for corrupt crimes are regulated by the Vietnamese Penal 
Code (2017). However, the anti-corruption action in the Penal Code has many differences 
compared with the anti-corruption law (Vietnamlawmagazine, 2017). This confuses and 
embarrasses anti-corruption officers during the investigation of cases. Interviewee 7 
stated that ‘The regulation of corruption acts against corruption offences is unclear, and 
the provisions are overlapped in two separate laws. This makes it difficult to investigate 
a corruption case.’ 
The categorisation of corruption as a ‘position offence’ in the Criminal Code is 
not necessary; for example, vague definitions in the anti-corruption law and Penal Code 
of ‘corruption acts’ makes the regulation confusing and hard for investigative agencies to 
apply in practice: 
Vietnam’s anti-corruption law provides for acts of corruption as follows: 
Article 3. Corrupt acts 
1. Embezzlement of property. 
2. Receiving a bribe. 
3. Abuse of position and authority to appropriate property. 
4. Abusing positions and powers while performing tasks or public duties for 
personal interests. 
5. Abuse while performing duties or public duties for personal gain. 
6. Abusing one’s position and powers to influence others to make personal 
profits. 
7. Counterfeiting in work for the sake of profit. 
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8. Bribery and bribery brokerage carried out by persons holding positions and 
powers to settle affairs of agencies, organisations, units or localities for 
personal interests. 
9. Taking advantage of positions and powers to illegally use state property for 
personal interests. 
10. Harassment for profit. 
11. Not performing duties or public duties for personal gain. 
12. Abusing positions and powers to cover for persons who commit law-breaking 
acts for self-seeking interests; obstructing or illegally interfering in the 
inspection, inspection, audit, investigation, prosecution, adjudication and 
judgement execution for personal interests. 
Based on the above, the main content of the 2012 anti-corruption law are that the 
subjects listed are civil servants with position and authority and take actions with a profit 
motive. Also, the provisions on corrupt behaviour are vague and duplicate; for example, 
clauses 4 and 6 refer to taking advantage of positions and powers while performing tasks 
and public duties for personal interests, and abuse of rights while performing tasks or 
public duties for personal interests. 
According to the 2012 anti-corruption law, corruption cases are investigated and 
prosecuted as well as subject to penalties based on criminal law. The provisions on crimes 
of corruption are contained in Chapter XXI (Crimes Relating to Position). These are 
crimes that harm the proper functioning of state agencies and organisations and adversely 
affect the performance of official duties by persons holding positions and powers. Section 
A of this chapter (Crimes of Corruption) criminalises seven types of corruption: 
Article 278. Neglecting property 
Article 279. Bribery 
Article 280. Abusing positions and powers to appropriate property 
Article 281. Abusing positions and powers while performing official duties 
Article 282. Abusing power while on duty 
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Article 283. Abusing positions and powers to induce others to make personal 
profits 
Article 284. Forfeiture of work 
Vietnam’s criminal law does not provide for acts such as bribes, brokering bribery 
and abuse of influence on persons holding positions of power for self-seeking (related to 
people holding positions and powers in public agencies) as corrupt acts. According to 
UNDP (2012), most comparable countries have defined the above acts as corrupt 
behaviour. Certain acts of corruption are provided for in the anti-corruption law but do 
not imply sanctions for these acts in criminal law. There has to date been no effort to 
codify, with specific reference to corruption, the various corrupt acts referred to in the 
final category listed in the anti-corruption law on obstruction of justice (UNDP, 2012). 
One deficiency in these provisions is that the definition of corruption as a ‘position 
crime’, coupled with the emphasis on ‘losses to the state’, excludes from coverage acts 
that occur in or by a large number of former state entities that have, in some way, been 
privatised or socialised, but in which the state and its officials still have major interests 
(UNDP, 2012); for example, corruption practices in companies with less than 50% capital 
contribution by the state. The rules of this section are limited. Although the share of 
capital contributed by the state is 50% or less of the total capital contribution of the 
enterprise, this does not mean that the damage caused by the act of embezzlement of 
property in that enterprise is lower than that of an enterprise to which the state has made 
a capital contribution of over 50%. For example, for a joint stock company with total 
capital of VND 20 billion and state capital of VND 12 billion (60%), if a person has 
appropriated VND 5 billion (loss of state capital is VND 3 billion), they are prosecuted 
for misdemeanour property; for a joint stock company with total capital of VND 200 
billion and state contribution of VND 80 billion (40%), a person with power and authority 
embezzling VND 20 billion will not be prosecuted for property misappropriation. 
In a well-known corruption case, Bui Tien Dung, director of the PMU18 project, 
embezzled millions of dollars to spend on gambling activities, but ultimately, was not 
prosecuted for corruption. Dung was charged with illegal gambling and offering bribes; 
these crimes are not regulated and sanctioned in criminal law as corruption practices. The 
 192 
investigator and prosecutor followed the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedural Law to 
prosecute Dung. 
8.2.2.6 Penalties and Other Measures to Address Corruption 
Interviewees 2 and 3 shared the view that the anti-corruption law provides for acts 
of corruption, but the conduct of proceedings for the investigation of a corruption case is 
governed by another law. This makes the investigation of a corruption case by 
investigators unclear and leads to an incomprehensive and inefficient investigation. 
The anti-corruption law (2012) does not directly regulate the handling and 
investigation of corruption cases. Vietnam’s anti-corruption law does not focus on 
overcoming weaknesses and difficulties in investigating corruption cases. The 
responsibility to investigate and handle these cases is vested in other codes. 
The Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedures Code, not the anti-corruption 
law, provide the legal basis for anti-corruption criminal investigation and prosecution, 
while the laws on public officials and public employees provide the basis for non-criminal 
disciplinary actions. There is no mention of sanctions or penalties in the anti-corruption 
law; these are found in the laws just mentioned (UNDP, 2012). The problem is that the 
sanctions of these laws are not specifically designed to investigate cases involving 
corruption; in fact, some of the rules are vague, creating many limitations and 
complications for the investigation process. 
8.2.2.7 There is No Provision on Illicit Enrichment 
Asset management is ineffective; as a result, the state does not detect cases of 
illicit enrichment. Interviewee 6 commented that ‘Transparency in asset declaration of 
government officials, as well as of people, is not effective. The law on asset declaration 
in Vietnamese law is still ineffective, leading to limitations in detection of illicit 
enrichment. This is also one of the causes of difficulties in detecting corruption offences.’ 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption states that, subject to its 
constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each state party shall 
consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, illicit enrichment, that is, a significant 
increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in 
 193 
relation to his or her lawful income (United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
2003). 
At present, both the anti-corruption law in Vietnam and the Criminal Code do not 
contain provisions governing illicit enrichment of officials. Given this, Vietnam argues 
that it is not feasible to introduce laws relating to illicit enrichment as well as to proving 
the source of income for civil servants. They also give reasons for the legal means to carry 
out surveillance behaviour. Since most transactions are not actually conducted through 
the banking system and the ‘traditional family model’ under which property is not 
assigned to individuals but to ‘all generations of the family’ living together, the 
‘presumption of innocence’ argument was also raised (United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, 2017). 
According to the UNDP, the process of finalising financial transparency 
regulations will take place in parallel with increasing precision and legalisation of the 
financial transaction, property right and land ownership systems, to be increasingly 
accurate and verifiable. Vietnam’s declaration of being ‘exceptional’ in these matters is 
not obvious; Hong Kong and Singapore have similar cultural practices (UNDP, 2012). 
8.2.2.8 No Regulations on Declaration and Management of Officials Relatives’ Assets 
Article 52 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003) 
(prevention and detection of transfers of proceeds of crime) emphasised the role of control 
of relatives or family members as may be necessary, in accordance with domestic law, to 
require financial institutions within its jurisdiction to verify the identity of customers, to 
take reasonable steps to determine the identity of beneficial owners of funds deposited 
into high-value accounts and to conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts sought or 
maintained by or on behalf of individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent 
public functions and their family members and close associates. 
Anti-corruption law in Vietnam has neither a specific article on controlling the 
assets of relatives of officers nor gives authority to the investigative agency to examine 
the assets of relatives of officers. This makes the investigative process more difficult and 
ineffective. In the investigation process, according to Nguyen Duc Cam, Deputy Chief 
Inspector of Danang, corrupt officials often hide property under the name of another 
person by sending corrupted property to their children, parents or siblings, and measures 
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should be taken to monitor asset volatility of those involved. In fact, in Singapore, which 
arguably has the strongest anti-corruption law enforcement, the Prevention of Corruption 
Act (PCA) gives the CPIB clear powers of search and seizure for corruption offences. 
The public prosecutor also has strong powers under the PCA to investigate financial and 
other affairs of any Singaporean civil servant and his or her immediate family members 
(UNDP, 2012). Along with other special powers, CPIB Singapore is recognised as one of 
Asia’s most effective anti-corruption agencies. Strong support from the Singapore 
government is an integral part of CPIB’s success. 
8.2.2.9 Low Level of Punishment Affects Anti-corruption in Vietnam 
Nearly 50% of respondents said that the forms of enforcement in Vietnam’s 
Criminal Law were not sufficient to deter corrupt individuals, while only about 20% of 
participants believed that it was effective (see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20: Survey Question 4: Opinions about the ability of Vietnam’s Criminal Law to 
deter corruption. 
Inappropriate punishment for corrupt criminals in the field of public investment 
is one of the causes of this type of crime. Increasing the punishment for corruption is 
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necessary. For those acts of corruption that are classified as criminal, criminal sanctions 
are not enforced effectively (Vu & Nguyen, 2014). Interviewee 7 stated that, ‘It is 
necessary to increase the punishment and restriction on bail and suspended sentence for 
corruption offenders, in order to increase the deterrence and strictness of the law’. 
Punishment measures are not severe enough for corruption criminals, and the law is not 
strong enough to prevent this kind of crime. 
One of the highlights of UNDP (2012) is the finding that not all acts of corruption 
are considered crimes in the Vietnamese legal system relating to anti-corruption. For 
example, in 2011 and 2012, the government issued two decrees (No. 34/2011 / ND-CP 
and No. 27/2012 / ND-CP) regulating disciplinary action against civil servants. 
Disciplinary action against corruption occurs in two cases: first, the case has been 
convicted by a court, and second, the offence has not been so serious as to require criminal 
proceedings (UNDP, 2012). Another noteworthy point is that the penal code itself also 
exempts liability for certain forms of corruption, namely corruption cases under VND 
500,000 and less serious consequences are not considered criminal or otherwise 
disciplined in violation of such conduct. Thus, the application of penalties for the handling 
of corruption cases is not only governed by criminal law but affected by administrative 
law. 
Because of the lighter penalties, cases of corruption at Vietnamese institutions are 
usually made by referring to a form of discipline, which is also prescribed by law and is 
considered ‘legal’. Based on this, agencies can report that they have taken anti-corruption 
seriously, including failing to do so by criminalising the five cases not covered by 
Vietnam’s anti-corruption law but being acts of corruption according to international 
standards. 
The decrees on disciplinary sanctions referred to above set out different offences, 
including violations of the anti-corruption law as well as the Criminal Code, that result in 
different punishments – a reprimand, a warning, a reduction in the classification of salary, 
dismissal from position and termination of employment. Thus, for example, false 
declaration of assets under the 2012 anti-corruption law can be dealt with under these 
decrees. As in the Criminal Law, the gradation of offences and punishments is based 
primarily on the criterion of ‘seriousness of consequences’ and losses to the state. 
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8.2.3 Research Question 3: What Are the Solutions Needed to Improve Anti-
corruption Effectiveness In Public Investment In Vietnam? 
8.2.3.1 Publicity and Transparency of Information 
Interviewee 1 stated ‘Publicity of investment programs and projects, funding 
sources in public investment’, especially for projects assigned to state-owned enterprises. 
Information on the investment and bidding process should be transparent. 
Agreeing with opinion of Interviewee 1, Interviewee 7 responded ‘To monitor 
projects involving state-owned enterprises, to keep transparency of bidding procedures’. 
This shows that transparency of information is extremely important, contributing to the 
fight against corruption in the field of public investment in Vietnam. 
8.2.3.2 Rule-of-Law Governed State – Enhancing the Enforcement of Anti-Corruption 
Law 
Interviewee 6 stated that ‘Law enforcement issues need to be addressed, as only a 
rule-of-law governed state will ensure that all regulations on corruption are implemented 
in a comprehensive and effective way’. Interviewee 1 shared this view. To improve the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption work, the Vietnamese government must ensure that the 
implementation of the law is respected and effective because anti-corruption laws and 
policies are the only means of preventing and investigating corruption offences in the 
most effective way. 
Interviewee 2 responded ‘Improving the economic management mechanism and 
the building of a fair, equal and transparent business environment’. To perform this task, 
the Vietnamese government must have clear and fair regulations in economic 
management. This will limit the amount of profiteering that leads to corrupt behaviour. 
Interviewee 4 stated that ‘The anti-corruption law also needs to be supplemented 
with necessary and consistent sanctions of the Penal Code, to ensure effective 
enforcement and comprehensive correction of corruption practices in public sector’. The 
uniform provision of these two laws will help to fight corruption more effectively, 
avoiding conflicting situations in the law. 
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8.2.3.3 Improving the Capacity of Officials Working in Anti-corruption Agencies 
Interviewee 5 stated that ‘it is important to focus on the training of officials in 
anti-corruption agencies’. Corruption offences in public investment in Vietnam involve 
persons having a high level of power and professional qualifications. Therefore, to 
investigate and prosecute effectively, officials in anti-corruption agencies need to have 
high qualifications and specific training programs. They should have the opportunity to 
develop more capacity for investigation and prosecution. 
8.2.3.4 Increasing Penalties for Corruption Offences 
Interviewee 7 stated that ‘It is necessary to increase the sanctioning of fines and 
restrictions on bail and the suspension of corrupt offenders in order to increase the 
deterrence and strictness of the law’. Vietnam’s penal law is not strict enough for 
corruption offences, and this, the law is not strong enough to prevent this kind of crime. 
8.2.3.5 Strengthening the Application of Information Technology in Administrative and 
Economic Management; Policies of Treatment for Employees Working in Anti-corruption 
Agencies 
All interviewees said that the application of information technology to the 
operation of government or state economic groups would benefit the operation. It also 
benefits the monitoring of public investment projects. This would limit the corrupt 
behaviour that occurs in this area. 
Interviewees 2, 4 and 7 argued that the government should have a special policy 
on salaries or bonuses for officials working in anti-corruption agencies, to give these 
employees the best possible psychological support and conditions to help them work more 
effectively. 
8.3 Conclusion 
Currently, the measures to prevent corruption reflected in anti-corruption laws 
partly reflect the will of the VCP in recognising the dangers of corruption. This chapter 
emphasised that independence and competence create better conditions for anti-
corruption agencies to prevent and handle corruption cases. Vietnam’s anti-corruption 
agencies are not given full power or support from the government to carry out 
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investigations and enforcement of the anti-corruption law. Therefore, it might lead to the 
existence of institutional corruption as discussed in the theoretical framework and it failed 
to gain the trust from the public. Once the trust from the public has not been found, it 
might result to suspicion, which happens not only within but also beyond the institutions. 
It might aggravate the situations of corruption. A comprehensive anti-corruption law 
should address this by naming these exceptional powers. A comprehensive anti-
corruption law should give anti-corruption officials the power to deal effectively with 
their work. This is a handy way to help anti-corruption build the public trust. At the same 
time, it is not necessary to assess corrupt behaviour through damage or severity of 
consequences; in practice, this has been ineffective in preventing and dealing with 
corruption cases. Corrupt behaviours must be evaluated via the building of moral conduct 
and daily performance of officers-in-charge. If officers have any signals suspicious or do 
not perform their tasks in the right track, their performance must be tracked promptly to 
ascertain that they are not going to violate corruption further. 
The overlap in the mandate, functions and powers of anti-corruption agencies 
reduces the effectiveness of investigations and handling of corruption cases. This needs 
to be overcome to ensure better coordination among agencies in the absence of a formal 
body responsible for all anti-corruption processes (UNDP, 2012). 
Regarding limitations in criminalisation and law enforcement, the omission of 
some cases should be seen as a corrupt practice that creates a loophole in the law, making 
it easier for corruption-related acts. Such omissions have made the public view the 
institution as unreliable as specified by Lessig (2012) and Brock (2014) in the theoretical 
framework. The stipulation that only individuals in the state (with positions and powers) 
are subject to anti-corruption law also creates limits. With these cases, the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption has recommendations for cases that should be defined as 
corruption (not just those in the state but corruption in the private sector or public sector 
joint ventures with the private sector). Also, the decision to prosecute and punishments 
based on severity are vague and difficult areas requiring better definition in Vietnam’s 
anti-corruption law. In other words, Vietnam’s anti-corruption law must be designed and 
updated in more details on a regular basis to make sure that there is no crack in the law 
chapters in which violators-to-be can optimise to corrupt. Once those officers familiarise 
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themselves with the corruption practice, they might cause institutional corruption which 
is tremendously challenging to battle as affirmed by Balboa and Medalla (2006).  
In addition, legal regulations related to the protection of witnesses, prosecutors 
and their families should be finalised soon and implemented seriously. In most cases, the 
source of denunciation is denouncing individuals and corrupt officials have high office 
and power and money; thus, the risk of retaliation from corrupt officials is real. If the anti-
corruption law does not guarantee safety and have the effect of partially encouraging 
denunciation of violations, the content of the law will lose its significance. The existence 
of regulations which protect people who are witnesses, prosecutors and their families will 
make themselves at ease when they report suspicious deeds or practices related to 
corruption performed in their workplaces or in the societies. Otherwise, the corruption 
will be on the rise instead of being reduced. It is vital that legal regulations have to make 
people who have the intention to violate the law feel scared when there is any possibility 
of their corruption. Besides, anti-corruption officers must maintain their accountability 
and have to say “absolute no” to corruption because these officers are more likely to be 
affected by corruption practice. In order to make them accountable for their job 
performance, it is important that they should be paid satisfactorily as well as have good 
benefits.  
One of the most serious shortcomings of Vietnam’s anti-corruption law is the lack 
of regulations regarding illicit assets. Permitting the investigation of abnormal public 
assets of civil servants, which may not necessarily involve previous corrupt acts, is one 
of the most effective tools for detecting corrupt behaviour. It also prevents illicit 
enrichment. The effectiveness of regulations related to illicit enrichment has been proven 
in the case of other countries, such as Singapore and Hong Kong (UNDP, 2012). What 
constitutes an effective anti-corruption law is the collaboration in performing anti-
corruption practice of all the officers-in-charge. It is certain that the laws have to reflect 
exactly deeds as well as practices deemed to have violated corruption together with 
certain punishments.  
Regarding asset recovery, efficiency in the recovery of property lost due to 
corruption is relatively poor. Management and disclosure of assets of government 
officials is sparse and carried out in a rather formal way, but the contents of the law related 
to asset recovery does not give the investigating body sufficient power to retrieve assets. 
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Reform of the regulations on the management of civil servants’ property and 
strengthening the authority of the authorities will be one of the noteworthy actions of the 
VCP and the state. There is no doubt that as mentioned in the theoretical framework, 
institutional corruption will not only affect the economic development of the institutions 
themselves on a small scale but also the economic development of an entire entity or a 
nation on a large scale. As asserted by Mbanefo and Eboka (2017), corruption if 
widespread impacts on the allocation of entrepreneurial skills. It will lead to the downturn 
of the economic development of a country if regulations fail to address feasible corruption 
practices in full detail.  
This thesis has raised a major issue concerning Vietnam ODA: lack of 
transparency. This creates many problems in public administration management and 
corruption prevention based on the findings and the theoretical framework. From the 
points mentioned regarding the increased opportunities for corruption to the selection of 
pure individuals in the organisation, the erosion of trust and the will to cooperate with 
parties, it can be seen that some high-potential threats threaten the functioning of a one-
party state. In addition, the issue of public confidence in Vietnam for government 
activities being at a relatively low level poses a potential danger in stabilising national 
politics and building people’s trust (a goal of government) encountered many difficulties 
and in a bad case is impossible. 
One of the issues faced by policymakers in Vietnam is the increase in party 
interests within the party. The erosion of legislation and interest groups with power that 
encompasses a wide range of processes from policy formulation to the administration and 
monitoring of the public will cause difficulties that will hinder elimination of group 
interests. Interest groups are a serious social problem. No country has eliminated group 
interests and interest groups. But if this does not return to the interests of the group and 
the interest group, then there is no healthy economic development, the appearance of the 
threatened regime. To counter group interests and interest groups, it is necessary to 
address some of the following approaches. 
The next chapter concludes the thesis. It discusses the theoretical, practical and 
methodological implications of the study, and the limitations examined during the 
research process of this study. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to highlight and summarise the key points from previous 
chapters in this study. It also concludes the research and recommends future research 
direction. Previous chapters were analysed to produce valuable findings to achieve the 
research objectives on corruption in public investment in Vietnam, evaluate the 
effectiveness and accountabilities of anti-corruption in public investment in Vietnam, 
including the Government Inspectorate of Vietnam, the People’s Procuracy of Vietnam 
and the People’s Public Security Forces, based on their functions, powers and 
responsibilities, and analyse corruption offences in public investment in terms of 
organisational structure and criminal behaviour to identify the principal practical 
recommendations to enhance effectiveness in combating corruption in public investment 
in Vietnam. This chapter offers a summary of key contributions and makes several 
recommendations. The last two sections acknowledge the limitations of this study, and 
make suggestions for future research in this area. 
9.2 Summary of Findings 
This section discusses how the findings of the study respond to the three research 
questions: 
Research Question 1: What are the causes of corruption in public investment in 
Vietnam? 
Research Question 2: What are the challenges, difficulties and barriers of policies 
tackling corruption in public investment in Vietnam? 
Research Question 3: What are the solutions needed to improve anti-corruption 
effectiveness in public investment in Vietnam? 
The research questions explore the causes of corruption in public investment in 
Vietnam and comment on the corruption status of Vietnam. From there, the thesis 
identifies the barriers that affect the investigation and fight against corruption in the field 
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of public investment in Vietnam. The findings of this study are presented in the following 
sections. 
9.2.1 Distinctive Characteristics of Corruption Offences in Public Investment in 
Vietnam 
Chapters 6 and 7 discussed the data collected from surveys and interviews. 
Through discussion and analysis (Chapter 8), it is found that corruption in public 
investment in Vietnam has the following characteristics as set out below. 
9.2.1.1 Poor Professional Knowledge of Anti-corruption Officers 
According to data from the survey, 25.50% of interviewees believed that the 
limited qualifications of anti-corruption officers affected the investigation of cases. Thus, 
improving the level of knowledge of officers serving in corruption investigations in public 
investment might be significant. As offenders are often high-level and powerful officers, 
this has greatly hindered the investigation of corruption cases in the field of public 
investment. 
9.2.1.2 Protectionism in State-owned Enterprises 
Vietnam has many enterprises entirely owned by the state, leading to government 
protection for these enterprises. Those who are assigned the task of managing these 
enterprises have taken advantage of this protection and used their power for profiteering. 
Corruption offences in public investment often occur in these enterprises. 
9.2.1.3 Offenders Are Often High-level and Powerful Officers 
Vietnam is a Southeast Asian country with a culture of too much respect for 
seniors and acquaintances; a subjective concept of justice still exists in the way of life and 
thoughts of the Vietnamese people, especially those who hold power. Those who commit 
crimes of corruption are persons with a high level of power, professional qualifications, 
broad social relationships and substantial economic resources, so they often find ways to 
conceal the offence. Due to the position of the offenders, they have extensive work 
networks; the investigation is often difficult because the offenders seek information and 
hide offences through these relationships. Via these relationships, offenders find it easy 
 204 
to commit corruption which cause a tremendous impact on the cause of mistrust from the 
public.  
9.2.2 Vietnam’s Policies and Mechanisms to Combat Corruption In Public 
Investment Under Legislative Documents 
The anti-corruption law does not clearly define the position, role and relationship 
between the anti-corruption law and other legal documents, leading to inconsistency in 
understanding and application. The effectiveness of application of the anti-corruption law 
is not high, and this affects the anti-corruption process in Vietnam. 
9.2.2.1 Low Level of Punishment Affects Anti-corruption in Vietnam 
Based on the interview data, inappropriate sentences for corrupt criminals in the 
field of public investment is one of the causes of this type of crime. Punishment measures 
are not severe enough for corrupt offences; this shows that the law is not strong enough 
to prevent this kind of crime. 
9.2.2.2 The Rule of Law 
The application of the law should always ensure respect for the law. In Vietnam, 
the situation of too much respect for seniors and acquaintances exists in the process of 
dealing with violations of the law, specifically against corruption offences in public 
investment in Vietnam. This affects the effectiveness of law enforcement in anti-
corruption. 
9.2.3 Vietnamese Law Enforcement Agencies Perceive the Situation of Corruption 
Offences in Public Investment 
Anti-corruption in Vietnam is not effective. Human resource management, 
handling the people involved and moral breakdown are leading causes of ineffective anti-
corruption. 
9.2.3.1 Handling the People Involved 
In the anti-corruption law, the provisions on handling of responsibilities of heads 
of agencies, organisations or units when corrupt acts occur in their agencies, organisations 
or units are not yet specific and clear. 
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In the case of corruption, apart from the accused in the case, the heads of direct 
management of the accused have not been dealt with severely. The handling of those 
managers’ responsibilities is still superficial, making it easier for corrupt offences to 
continue. 
9.2.3.2 Ineffective Workforce Management 
Management of staff involves many procedures, the responsibility of the head is 
not high, individuality in handling situations is unclear, unfair and undetermined. The 
communication regime lacks transparency and control before the occurrence of 
corruption. 
9.2.3.3 Moral Breakdown 
Bribery is derived from greed; it is humanity’s greedy nature that leads to 
predatory behaviour in cases in which people are assigned management tasks. Personal 
interests and monetary aspirations make people assigned economic responsibility corrupt, 
causing serious consequences on state capital and an adverse influence on society. 
9.2.4 Challenges, Difficulties and Barriers to Policies Tackling Corruption in Public 
Investment in Vietnam 
The main causes of corruption in public investment in Vietnam include lack of 
transparency in management and application of laws, protectionism, the lengthy 
investigation periods of corruption cases and the ineffective anti-corruption law. 
9.2.4.1 Lack of Transparency 
Lack of transparency in management leads to ideal conditions for corruption. 
Transparency in information and the functioning of the machinery of government is one 
of the mechanisms for promoting people’s trust in government and the best measures for 
anti-corruption. Vietnam’s management of the investment sector lacks transparency; with 
little information on public investment projects available, monitoring is difficult. 
9.2.4.2 Protectionism for State-owned Enterprises 
Corporations that are entirely owned by the state are always assigned public 
investment works; this is where corruption offences appear. 
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In Vietnam, for state-owned enterprises, the monitoring mechanism is not tight. 
Auditing is not always implemented regularly and thoroughly. Tax evasion, false 
declarations and false documentation continue in many enterprises, creating conditions 
for corruption offences to arise. 
9.2.4.3 Lengthy Investigation Periods for Corruption Cases in Public Investment 
Due to the complexity of cases, investigations are often lengthy, giving the person 
involved in the case the chance to hide evidence, complicating the investigation process 
and causing difficulties in detecting criminals. 
9.2.4.4 Anti-corruption Barriers in Anti-corruption Law 
The rules in the anti-corruption law are not clear, which leads to difficulties in 
fighting corruption in the field of public investment. Vietnam also lacks a proper 
mechanism for the implementation of anti-corruption policies, a radical, long-term, 
comprehensive system of solutions, and a specific and appropriate roadmap to carry out 
current policies on anti-corruption. 
9.3 Research Limitations 
Interviews 
Although the present study contributes significantly to the existing literature on 
corruption in public investment in Vietnam, limitations are acknowledged. It should be 
emphasised that this study used a semi-structured interview approach, which has distinct 
strengths but involved a limited sample of only seven interviews. However, it allowed a 
focus on those who investigate and prosecute corrupt criminals in public investment. All 
respondents were working at the police investigation agency and procuracy. 
Survey 
For the survey, invitations were sent to three police agencies, the procuracy and 
the Government Inspectorate. It was hoped to collect 300 samples; however, only 150 
questionnaires were collected. 
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9.3.1 Sample Size 
As noted in Chapter 3, the semi-structured interview methodology focuses on 
information collected, meaning that the sample size can be as small as an individual, but 
still produce a meaningful result. Only seven interviewees were recruited for the 
interviews, but this approach gathered in-depth information on the investigation process 
and prosecution of those accused of corruption in the field of public investment, and 
suggested an explanation for the causes and barriers in anti-corruption. 
9.3.2 Location of the Participants 
The selected location for the research project is Ho Chi Minh City, which was 
selected because of limited time and other conditions related to conducting the research. 
There is a pattern of imbalance in terms of location of residence of interviewees; not 
intentionally, all interviewees came from South Vietnam. Due to geographical, socio-
cultural, economic, demographic and historical differences, it is necessary to take into 
account these constraints when assessing causal factors and barriers to corruption in 
public investment in Vietnam. However, the negative impacts are greater because most 
large public investment projects, in violation of the law of corruption, take place in the 
south, namely Ho Chi Minh City. Nevertheless, we assume that the findings of the thesis 
can be used to investigate corruption cases in public investment in Vietnam. 
9.3.3 Selection of Participants 
9.3.3.1 Interviews 
Respondent were currently working in the police force and People’s Procuracy. 
These seven people were directly involved in the investigation, interrogation and 
prosecution of the three major corruption cases: Duong Chi Dung 2013, Bui Tien Dung 
2007 and Huynh Ngoc Si 2010. 
9.3.3.2 Survey 
Some 150 responses were accepted for the survey. Respondents included those 
currently working in the police, the Procuracy and the Government Inspectorate. All 
participants in this research were aged 28–45 years old. 
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9.4 Research Contributions 
The most important contribution of this study is methodological, whereby the 
process approach to investigating the prosecution of corruption in public investment was 
used to research the field. In the field of science and criminology in Vietnam, state-
sponsored interviews will hopefully allow for deeper, more focused and informed 
intervention strategies. The study offers a better understanding of the causes of corruption 
in the field of public investment, but the barriers to effective application of the anti-
corruption law revealed in this study may be clearer in raising public awareness. High-
quality intervention programs are required to reduce the crime rate of corruption in public 
investment in Vietnam, and improve prevention. The contribution of this study to the 
theoretical aspects of risk factors for corruption in public investment is also important, as 
it applied research, culture, beliefs and political institutions in a study on the state of 
corruption in the field of public investment in Vietnam. 
9.4.1 Contribution to Theory 
In investigating the causes of corruption in the field of public investment, the 
barriers to the application of the anti-corruption law render it ineffective; this study has 
made important contributions to the understanding of crime. In the absence of studies on 
the relative risk factors for corruption in public investment in Vietnam, it is important to 
understand and apply this model to investigate the causes and the barriers to investigating 
cases of corruption. Previous studies in Vietnam have looked at risk factors for corruption 
in the field of public investment, but mainly focus on the causal effects of these factors. 
In general, there is still a lack of understanding of causal factors, policy barriers and anti-
corruption legislation that affect the investigation of corruption cases in the field of public 
investment. 
The findings from this study may add to a better understanding of causal factors, 
policy barriers and the anti-corruption law that affect the process of investigating 
corruption in the field of public investment. This study may also put better understanding 
of institutions and social structures as specified by Scott (2013) in terms of the operation 
of institutions and the localisation of interpersonal relationships.  In addition, a more in-
depth approach to culture, beliefs and political institutions provides a different 
perspective on the causes, policy barriers and anti-corruption legislation that affect the 
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process of investigating corruption cases in the field of public investment. This is very 
important because it shows that special factors at the macro level do not seem to have 
much to do with corruption; the factors that affect this crime in Vietnam include the 
behaviour of the Vietnamese people, the lack of policy and legal regulations, the 
ineffective application of the law and the lack of transparency in information. A 
combination of findings from previous studies and findings from this study will increase 
the understanding of the barriers leading to ineffectiveness of anti-corruption in the field 
of public investment in Vietnam. Besides, this study also clarifies rent-seeking behaviours 
(Bardhan, 1997; Bhagwati, 1982) as they create a platform for corruption practice. 
Actually, rent-seeking behaviours are usually found in economics, mainly known as 
lobbying activities and now they can be found in laws when corruption-related deeds 
happen. According to North (1990), institutions can be comprehended as the norms of the 
specific activities or games in the society. They exhibit limitations in terms of laws, 
morale and culture. North (1990) chiefly stayed his concentration on formal together with 
informal institutions. These institutions can give a space for rent-seeking behaviours to 
emerge if there are no activities which help to fight against corruption. As a consequence, 
the findings from my thesis elucidate the theoretical framework. It adds more details to 
the framework as it finds out limitations in Vietnam’s anti-corruption laws, cultural 
aspects in terms of close relationships leading to an easier way to commit corruption, 
shortage of transparency and so on. These data link to the theoretical framework.  
9.4.2 Practical Contributions 
The practical contribution of this study lies in understanding the causes of 
corruption in the field of public investment, and the barriers resulting in ineffective 
application of the anti-corruption law. Investigating these causes not only helps to better 
understand the risk factors but increases the awareness of authorities about the assessment 
of new strategies and methods to enhance the prevention of corruption. More importantly, 
a better understanding of the causes of corruption in the field of public investment and 
the barriers resulting in ineffective application of the anti-corruption law will directly 
affect the influence of interventions in the handling of corruption in public investment. 
From the findings of this study, the implications for more effective approaches to dealing 
with corruption in public investment in Vietnam are considered. Even though this thesis 
was conducted only within Vietnam, neighbouring countries which share the same 
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background with Vietnam can also find data collected from this thesis productive in terms 
of corruption. Findings from corruption in Vietnam in this study might be applicable to 
some countries in Southeast Asia since corruption is not only an ancient but also a modern 
issue. Its diverse emergence is occurring at warp speed, requiring policy and law makers 
to be alert and aware of this change to initiate updated laws which are more appropriate 
and relevant to the current situations. This does not mean that other countries outside 
Southeast Asia will not find this thesis fruitful. From my point of view, this thesis is 
appropriate to countries where corruption practice takes place in the sophisticated way 
like Vietnam.   
9.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
The evaluation of the limitations of this study has highlighted the possible 
improvements in future studies of corruption offences in public investment in Vietnam. 
Due to the lack of studies on the causes of corruption in the field of public investment and 
barriers resulting in the ineffective application of anti-corruption law in Vietnam, in the 
future, it is necessary to continue to implement activities in this field to better understand 
and respond to cases of corruption crime in public investment in Vietnam. Based on the 
theoretical framework recommended in this thesis, future researchers can study to add 
more detail to this framework or to expand it when there are more complicated corruption 
practices happening in the long run. Specifically, they are also advised to make use of 
findings from Bardhan (1997), Bhagwati (1982) and North (1990) as they have created 
very strong perceptions towards corruption practice. Consequently, if future researchers 
can base their studies on the perceptions, their studies may be more value-added.  
What is proposed here is a gathering of researchers on anti-corruption policy and 
law systems in Vietnam, combined with interview and survey results, from which 
opinions on limitations of anti-corruption law in Vietnam will be forthcoming. To ensure 
that these findings have greater integrity, consistency and reliability, future research 
should focus on a larger sample across the whole of Vietnam, which would help to 
generalise the results of these studies. If the budget allows, future researchers can also 
compare the findings from one country with data collected from another country as 
regards to corruption. This will inevitably add more value to future study since each 
country will have different kinds of corruption practice though they might be adjacent to 
each other. Additionally, future research should have more in-depth interviews to go in 
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search of clearer dimensions of corruption which is happening. Due to the influence of 
culture, Vietnamese as well as Asian participants usually feel shy when interviewed. 
Therefore, to make in-depth interview sessions at ease, researchers should spend time 
familiarising themselves with them so that their responses could be more reliable and 
valid to the studies.  
Future research should also focus on those who were involved in corruption in 
public investment in Vietnam and were released, to better understand the causes and legal 
loopholes that the offenders took advantage of in the course of the corruption offences. 
This approach would give researchers more chances to gather details of participants from 
other sources. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview questionnaires  
Where do you work? 
How long have you been working in this organization? 
What is your current title in this organization? 
How long have you been in this position? 
What are your responsibilities in this position? 
How long it takes from the time you receive initial investigation records to the end of 
the inquiry? 
Specifically, for the cases you have been involved in the investigation, it takes how 
much time for you to find evidences to prosecute? 
Are you satisfied with the investigation results? 
How effective are the prevention of corruption in public investment area? 
In your opinions, what are the main causes of the corruption in this case? 
Which provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act obstructs you in the process of 
investigating? 
Which obstacles have you faced when the suspects whom you are investigating are 
senior officials? 
How are identified risk factors corruption offenses targeted and intervened in policies 
and practices? 
What is the definition of corruption prevention programs? How effective are they? 
How do prevention programs reduce the risk factors of corruption offenses? 
Which issues should be focused to improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption? 
Do you have any recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the prevention of 
corruption in Vietnam? Please specify if you do. 
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Appendix 2: Confirmation for supporting interview 
SUPREME PEOPLE’S PROCURACY 
PEOPLE’S PROCURACY 
Ho Chi Minh City 
 
No. 31/ TKTP&CNTT 
 
Re: Consent to support research student 
in collecting data 
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF 
VIETNAM 
Independence-Freedom-Happiness 
 
 
 
Ho Chi Minh City, March 15th, 2015 
 
To: Human Research Ethics Committee 
RMIT University, Melbourne 
 
This is certify that Mr. Nguyen Thanh To  is currently the postgraduate (research student) 
at RMIT University, Melbourne. In June 2015, Mr. Nguyen Thanh To will have a 
presentation to protect his Confirmation Candidature. 
Topic title in English: “Corruption Cases and Law Enforcement in Public Investment: A 
Vietnam Perspective” 
Topic title in Vietnamese: “Vấn đề thực thi pháp luật và các vụ án tham nhũng trong lĩnh 
vực đầu tư công: một góc nhìn Việt Nam” 
According to the actual demand and to ensure the truth of research result regulated by 
RMIT University, Department of Crime Statistics and Information Technology- Supreme 
People’s Procuracy will endeavor to facilitate and support Mr. Nguyen Thanh To in 
contacting competent agencies for his collecting of data and interview for he can perform 
his research as stipulated by the University and according to Vietnamese law. 
For this reason, we respectfully expect Human Research Ethics Committee- RMIT 
University, Melbourne to permit Mr. Nguyen Thanh To to proceed the next stages of his 
research process. 
Best regards. 
ON BEHALF OF DIRECTOR OF SUPREME 
PEOPLE’S PROCURACY 
FOR DEPARTMENTAL HEAD  
DEPUTY HEAD 
(Signed and sealed) 
DUONG THANH HAI 
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Appendix 3: Invitation to participate in a research project 
(interview) 
 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT (INTERVIEW) 
 
Project title: “Corruption Cases and Law Enforcement in Public Investment: A 
Vietnam Perspective” 
Investigators: 
Dr. John Douglas Thomson, chief investigator       
Assoc Prof. Penelope June Weller, co-investigator  
Dr. Quach Thuy Quynh, co-investigator    
Thanh To Nguyen, PhD candidate        
Dear: ………….………………………….. 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. 
Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before 
deciding whether to participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask 
one of the investigators. 
1. Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted? 
This research is a part of a PhD program at RMIT University, Australia under the 
supervision of Dr Doug Thomson, Assoc Prof. Penelope June Weller and Dr. Quach Thuy 
Quynh. The project title is “Corruption Cases and Law Enforcement in Public 
Investment: A Vietnam Perspective”. The research be conducted by Mr To Thanh 
Nguyen. Mr Nguyen was a prosecutor in Ho Chi Minh city and now Mr Nguyen is doing 
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a PhD at RMIT University full time. The aim of this research is to examine laws and 
policies that deal with anti-corruption in Vietnam, in the context of public investment. 
The thesis identify practical policies, models and strategies for the purpose of improving 
the capacities and effectiveness of anti-corruption in public investment in Vietnam. This 
research has been approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee. 
2. Why have you been approached? 
You have been invited to participate because you are public servant working in anti-
corruption. You were directly involved in the investigation and prosecution in one of three 
major corruption cases (Duong Chi Dung 2013, Bui Tien Dung 2007, Huynh Ngoc Si 
2010). The Procuracy has provided you with this letter. Your responses be both crucial 
for improving the effectiveness of corruption prevention in Vietnam in the future. We 
would like to invite you to provide information for this research. Your participation is 
entirely voluntary. 
3. What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed? 
The thesis identify practical policies, models and strategies for the purpose of improving 
the capacities and effectiveness of anti-corruption in public investment in Vietnam. 
4. If I agree to participate, what I be required to do? 
If you agree to participate, please contact Mr To Thanh Nguyen by email. Mr Nguyen 
interview you at the place of your choosing. The suggested locations for the interview 
include: public library, local cafe or RMIT campus in Vietnam. You be invited to answer 
some questions about your relevant perceptions regarding to the operation of 
investigation one or more of corruption case you have been involved in and what are the 
problems you have faced when you were investigating your corruption case. 
The interviews be audio recorded with your permission. The purpose of recording is to 
ensure the exact translation and transcription from voice to text as Vietnamese is the 
unique language employed in the interviews. The records be protected and used only for 
the research. After completing the interview, Mr Nguyen store the recordings and bring 
them back to the Graduate School of Business and Law at RMIT University, then 
transcribe these records there. If you are not be ing to be recorded, taking notes be used 
as a substitution. 
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Choosing a location away from the workplace ensure confidentially and reduce any 
possibly of interview between coworkers. 
The interview take approximate 1 hour. 
The expected time for scheduling interview is from 15 February 2016 to March 24th 2016. 
5. What are the possible risks or disadvantages? 
The questions are about Vietnam laws and policies. Your confidential be strictly 
maintained. All name be removed and the information you provide be de-identified. We 
are not asking you provide information about corruption. Should you be concerned about 
your responses to any of the questions, you can refuse to answer or stop the interviews 
immediately without any explanation. Mr Nguyen is available to help you with your 
concerns directly and confidentially if you need. 
6. What are the benefits associated with participation? 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. There are no direct benefits. 
7. What happen to the information I provide? 
The information collected be kept secretly and securely and be used for the research only 
The information you provide be safeguarded in a safe place in RMIT University in 
Australia and permanently destroyed after the study completes. Your information not be 
identified in any stage of this study. The data from all participants be combined for 
analysis. The results of this study be presented in the form of thesis, journal articles and 
conference papers. 
If you disclose criminal activity that has not been prosecuted then Mr Nguyen be obliged 
to forward this information to the relevant body. 
Any information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others 
from harm, (2) if specifically required or allowed by law, or (3) you provide the 
researchers with written permission. 
8. What are my rights as a participant? 
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As the participant of this research, you have the following rights: 
• The right to withdraw from participation at any time 
• The right to request that any recording cease 
• The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can 
be reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the 
participant. 
• The right to be de-identified in any photographs intended for public publication, 
before the point of publication 
• The right to have any questions answered at any time. 
9. Whom should I contact if I have any questions? 
You can contact the researchers through the following address: 
Dr. John Douglas Thomson, chief investigator       
Assoc Prof. Penelope June Weller, co-investigator   
Thanh To Nguyen, PhD candidate         
Yours sincerely, 
To Thanh Nguyen 
PhD Candidate 
RMIT University 
If you have any concerns about your participation in this project, which you do not 
wish to discuss with the researchers, then you can contact the Ethics Officer, 
Research Integrity, Governance and Systems, RMIT University, GPO Box 2476V 
VIC 3001. Tel: (03) 9925 2251 or email human.ethics@rmit.edu.au 
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Appendix 4: Invitation to participate in a research project 
(survey) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1: INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
(ANONYMOUS SURVEY) 
 
Project title: “Corruption Cases and Law Enforcement in Public Investment: A 
Vietnam Perspective” 
Investigators: 
Dr. John Douglas Thomson, chief investigator     
Assoc Prof. Penelope June Weller, co-investigator   
Dr. Quach Thuy Quynh, co-investigator     
Thanh To Nguyen, PhD candidate        
Dear: ………….………………………….. 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. 
Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before 
deciding whether to participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask 
one of the investigators. 
1. Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted? 
This research is a part of a PhD program at RMIT University, Australia under the 
supervision of Dr Doug Thomson, Assoc Prof. Penelope June Weller and Dr. Quach Thuy 
Quynh. The project title is “Corruption Cases and Law Enforcement in Public 
 242 
Investment: A Vietnam Perspective”. The research be conducted by Mr To Thanh 
Nguyen. Mr Nguyen was a prosecutor in Ho Chi Minh city and now he is studying a PhD 
at RMIT University full-time. The aim of this research is to examine laws and policies 
that deal with anti-corruption in Vietnam, in the context of public investment. The 
research identify practical policies, models and strategies for the purpose of improving 
the capacities and effectiveness of anti-corruption in public investment in Vietnam. This 
research has been approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics Commitee. 
Participation is voluntary. 
2. Why have you been approached? 
You have been invited to participate because you are public officer working in anti-
corruption in Vietnam including People’s Public Security Forces, Supreme People’s 
Procuracy of Vietnam, and the Government Inspectorate of Vietnam. The study has set 
up a questionnaire related to the evaluation of the enforcement of the anti-corruption 
policies and laws in Vietnam in the field of public investment. The questionnaire be sent 
to all public officers working in the three anti-corruption commissions in Vietnam. 
Results of the survey be analyzed and used to improve effectiveness of policies and laws 
system in anti-corruption. 
3. What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed? 
Mr Nguyen identify practical policies, models and strategies for the purpose of improving 
the capacities and effectiveness of anti-corruption in public investment in Vietnam. You 
need to respond to questions about what the problems of anti-corruption in law and policy. 
4. If I agree to participate, what I be required to do? 
If you agree, please answer the anonymous questionnaire independently on Qualtrics 
website. 
You are not been asked to provide any personal information. The questionnaire is 
anonymous. 
Please answer before 20 March 2016. 
The survey take approximate 30 minutes. 
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5. What are the possible risks or disadvantages? 
Because the survey is anonymous. There are no risks to you. The data collected be kept 
secretly and securely and be used for the research only. 
The survey questionnaire is made by Quantric website. If the people invited agree to take 
the survey, you can answer directly on the website. Personal information of the 
participants is not required in the questionnaire. Therefore, the group of invited people 
just know that there is an invitation sent to their working place. They can not know exactly 
neither which people are involved nor what the answer is. Information of the participants 
be absolutely confidential. 
Users should be aware that the World Wide Web is an insecure public network with the 
potential risks that a user’s transactions are being or may be viewed, intercepted or 
modified by third parties or that data which a user downloads may contain computer 
viruses or other defects. 
6. What are the benefits associated with participation? 
Your participation in this project is completely voluntary. There are no direct benefits. 
7. What happen to the information I provide? 
The information you provide be safeguarded in a safe place in RMIT University in 
Australia and permanently destroyed after the study completes. The data from all 
participants be combined for analysis. The results of this study be presented in the form 
of thesis, journal articles and conference papers. 
8. What are my rights as a participant? 
As the participant of this research, you have the following rights: 
• The right to have any questions answered at any time. 
9. Whom should I contact if I have any questions? 
You can contact the researchers through the following address: 
Dr. John Douglas Thomson, chief investigator      
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Assoc Prof. Penelope June Weller, co-investigator  
Dr. Quach Thuy Quynh, co-investigator     
Thanh To Nguyen, PhD candidate        
Yours sincerely, 
To Thanh Nguyen 
PhD Candidate 
RMIT University 
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Appendix 5: Survey questionnaires  
1. In your opinion, in which field the corruption on public investment is most 
frequently occurs from 2009 to 2014? 
a. Construction 
b. Investment of facilities 
c. Land, property 
e. Other, please specify: …………………………………………. 
2. Please score the effectiveness of the investigation activities into the corruption on 
public investment cases recently? (with 1 is the least effective and 5 is the most) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. Please score the effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Law implementation on anti-
corruption section in Vietnam in the period of 1999-2014? (with 1 is the least 
effective and 5 is the most) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. In your opinion, are the punishments for corruption criminals that prescribed in the 
Vietnam Criminal Law sufficient to deter, educate the corruption criminal and 
prevent this kind of crime happening? (with 1 is the least effective and 5 is the most) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Which obstacles influent you when trying to prevent the corruption cases? 
a. Qualifications of officer in anti-corruption agencies 
b. Pressure from supervisor 
c. The Policy and the Law provide you with not sufficient power to discover the 
corruption criminal 
d. Other, please specify: …………………………………………. 
6. What are the causes limiting the prevention and discovery cases of corruption on 
public investment that you have inspected from 2009 to 2014? 
a. The corruption detective mechanism is not very effective 
b. Regulations on Anti-corruption Law have not proved with high efficiency 
c. The offenders are people in position with high power 
d. The qualification of officer in anti-corruption agencies have not met up with the 
requirements 
e. Other, please specify: …………………………………………. 
7. In your opinion, among below shortcomings, which is related to the failure of 
corruption prevention in recent years? 
a. The transparency in state agencies’ activities 
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b. Assets management and public investment are not effective 
c. The Law has not prescribed and gave specific guidance on the State’s public 
investment checking mechanism 
d. Other, please specify: …………………………………………. 
8. Which cause that obstruct you when investigating a corruption case? 
a. Not enough of personnel 
b. Not enough power 
c. The Policy and the Law not protect you 
d. Other, please specify: …………………………………………. 
9. Why the period from the time of detecting to the time of investigating of a 
corruption case is always longer than other kinds of crime? 
a. Its complicatedity 
b. The transparency in investigation process 
c. The power of corruption criminals 
d. Other, please specify: …………………………………………. 
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Appendix 6: Notice of Approval from Human Research Ethics 
Committee 
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